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Displaying 51 - 60 of 6637
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| McPherson v. Schlemmer | 749 P.2d 51 (Mont. 1988) | 230 Mont. 81 (Mont. 1988) |
In McPherson v. Schlemer , plaintiff’s cows were killed by defendant when they wandered onto the highway. The court determined that damages were calculated at the present and future profits for fair market value. |
Case | |
| Tighe v. North Shore Animal League | 142 A.D.3d 607, 36 N.Y.S.3d 500 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) | 36 N.Y.S.3d 500, 2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 05807 | In May 2012, Tighe adopted a dog from the North Shore Animal League after having been warned that the dog was possessive regarding food. After taking the dog home, Tighe noticed that the dog exhibited aggressive behavior, such as jumping at the backyard fence and growling at her when she attempted to feed the dog. In July of 2012, the dog bit Tighe’s hand when she tried to pick up a cookie off of the floor. As a result, Tighe spent three days in the hospital due to severe blood loss and swelling. Additionally, in September of 2012, the dog bit Tighe in the face causing severe injuries. After the incident in September, Tighe filed suit against the North Shore Animal League to recover damages for negligence, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court dismissed the claim of emotional distress but granted summary judgment in favor of Tighe with regard to the other claims of negligence. The North Shore Animal League appealed the lower court’s decision. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of New York overturned the lower court’s decision and granted summary judgment in favor of the North Shore Animal League on all claims. The court found that the North Shore Animal League was not a proximate cause to Tighe’s injuries for failing to adequately warn her about the dog’s aggreesive behavior because Tighe learned of the dog’s aggressive behavior three months prior to the incident that caused Tighe’s injuries. According to the court, once Tighe learned of the dog’s aggressive tendencies, she was in the best position to take “precautionary measures to prevent harm to herself.” So, even if the North Shore Animal League had failed to warn Tighe of the dog’s aggressive tendencies prior to the adoption, Tighe “independently” learned of the dog’s aggressive behavior prior to the incident which eliminated the North Shore Animal League as being a proximate cause of her injuries. | Case | |
| MN - Habitat - Minnesota Environmental Rights Act (Chapter 116B. Environmental Rights) | M. S. A. § 116B.01 - 13 | MN ST § 116B.01 - 13 | Minnesota protects the environment under the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act (MERA). Under MERA, citizens may bring suits for civil remedies where activities are interfering with their enjoyment of natural resources, including eagle nesting sites. The law provides a comprehensive scheme under which anyone with sufficient interest in protecting land, water, air, or any natural resources may bring suit to enjoin an action. | Statute | |
| US - Eagles - Golden Eagle Management Plan | 1982 WL 133688 (F.R.) | FR Doc. 82-3479 (1982) |
This notice advises the public of the Fish and Wildlife Service's development of a golden eagle management plan and invites public comment. The plan is needed to : (1) identify golden eagle needs; and (2) guide Service management and research efforts for golden eagles. The intended effect of the plan is to protect and conserve golden eagle populations while facilitating balanced development of the Nation's natural resources and the resolution of eagle/man conflicts. |
Administrative | |
| HI - Dog - General Dog Provisions | H R S § 143-1 - 20; H R S § 183D-65 | HI ST § 143-1 to 20; HI ST § 183D-65 | This Hawaii statute provides the pertinent regulations for dogs in the state. Included in its provisions are licensing, impoundment, seizure of loose or unlicensed dogs, and stray animals. Of particular note is a provision that makes it unlawful for any officer to knowingly sell or give any impounded dog to any person, firm, corporation, association, medical college, or university for the purpose of animal experimentation. | Statute | |
| University Towers Associates v. Gibson | 846 N.Y.S.2d 872 (N.Y.City Civ.Ct. 2007) | 18 Misc.3d 349, 2007 WL 4126442 (N.Y.City Civ.Ct.), 2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 27481 |
In this New York case, the petitioner, University Towers Associates commenced this holdover proceeding against the rent-stabilized tenant of record and various undertenants based on an alleged nuisance where the tenants allegedly harbored pit bulls. According to petitioner, the pit bull is an alleged “known dangerous animal” whose presence at the premises creates an threat. The Civil Court of the City of New York held that the landlord's notice of termination did not adequately apprise the tenant of basis for termination; further, the notice of termination and the petition in the holdover proceeding did not allege objectionable conduct over time by the tenant as was required to establish nuisance sufficient to warrant a termination of tenancy.
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Case | |
| Smith v. Kopynec | 119 So.3d 835 (La.App. 1 Cir.,2013) | 2012-1472 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/7/13) |
The plaintiff appeals the lower court's dismissal of her claims against defendant-landowners and their insurers. The plaintiff was injured (for the second time) by the defendant-landowners' son's pitbull while walking past their home. While it was undisputed that the landowners did not own the dog, the issue was whether they had a duty to prevent the attack via "custodial liability." Here, the defendant-landowners asserted that they thought the son had gotten rid of the dog after it was confiscated and quarantined by animal control after it first attacked the plaintiff. Thus, this court found that defendant-landowners did not know of the dog's presence on their property and affirmed the trial court's order of summary judgment. |
Case | |
| HI - Wildlife - Chapter 124. Indigenous Wildlife, Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, and Introduced Wild Birds | Haw. Admin. Rules (HAR) § 13-124-1 to § 13-124-13 | HI ADC § 13-124-1 to § 13-124-13 | The purpose of this chapter is to conserve, manage, protect, and enhance indigenous wildlife; and manage introduced wild birds. | Administrative | |
| Night monkey poking out of a soiled hideout | Slideshow Images | ||||
| Hayes v. State | 518 S.W.3d 585 (Tex. App. 2017) | 2017 WL 1193845 (Tex. App. Mar. 31, 2017) | Defendant appeals an order with the Henderson County Sheriff's Office to destroy his dogs under Chapter 822 of the Texas Health and Safety Code. More specifically, defendant claims reversible error after he was denied a jury trial. Defendant's three dogs were seized after they attacked an individual riding a bicycle in front of defendant's residence. After a hearing, the dogs were found to be dangerous pursuant to Section 822.041 related to dogs causing serious bodily injury to a person. The judge then ordered the dogs to be humanely destroyed. Hayes appealed the order and requested a jury trial, which was objected to by the Henderson County Attorney's Office and sustained by the court. The dogs were found to be dangerous at a bench trial and ordered humanely euthanized, while defendant was ordered to pay $2,780 to the county. On appeal, defendant argues the county court erred in removing his case from the jury trial docket. The court now considers two questions: "(1) whether the owner of a dog ordered to be humanely destroyed by a justice, county, or municipal court judge, pursuant to Chapter 822, subchapter A, of the Texas Health and Safety Code, has the right to appeal such order; and (2) if an appeal is allowed, whether a jury can be requested to hear the de novo appeal." The court here declined to adopt the state's interpretation that the statute's silence as to a right of appeal indicates that the legislature eliminated that right. In fact, the court observed Subchapter A of Chapter 822 dealing with less serious "dangerous dogs," allows a party to appeal a dangerous dog finding. The court found it would be inconsistent that the more severe Subchapter D denies an appeal of right where the less severe subchapter grants it, especially where a forfeiture of property occurs (i.e., dogs). As to the right to jury trial, the court found Chapter 822 silent on that issue. However, the court found the order for seizure and destruction of defendant's "special personal property" guaranteed him a trial by jury under Article I of the Texas Constitution. The trial court's Final Order was reversed and the case was remanded to county court. | Case |