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Displaying 61 - 70 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mackley v. State | 481 P.3d 639 (Wyo. 2021) | 2021 WY 33 (Wyo., 2021) | The Wyoming Supreme Court considers whether the jury was properly instructed on the charge of aggravated animal cruelty. The case stems from an incident where a dog escaped his owner and attacked the defendant's dogs at his front door. A local teenager grabbed the offending dog ("Rocky") and dragged him into the street as the dog fight carried on. The defendant responded by grabbing his gun and shooting Rocky as he was held by the teenager. A jury convicted defendant of both aggravated animal cruelty and reckless endangering. At the trial, defendant moved for judgment of acquittal on both charges, arguing that the Wyoming Legislature has established that humanely destroying an animal is not animal cruelty and that the State did not provide evidence that he intentionally pointed a firearm at anyone, which defendant contends is necessary for the reckless endangering charge. On appeal here, the court first observed that defendant's challenge to a confusing or misleading jury instruction was waived because he negotiated with the prosecution to draft it. Further, the Supreme Court did not find an abuse of discretion where the district court refused defendant's additional instructions on the humane destruction of an animal in the jury instructions on the elements for the aggravated cruelty to animals charge. While defendant argued that the instructions should include subsection m from the statute, he only now on appeal contends that the subsection should have been given as a theory of defense. Thus, reviewing this argument for plain error, the Court found that defendant's theory that his killing was "humane" and thus excluded from the crime of aggravated cruelty was not supported by the language of the statute. In fact, such an interpretation not only goes against the plain language, but "then any animal could be killed, under any circumstances, as long as it is killed quickly." Defendant presented no evidence that the dog he shot was suffering or distressed and needed euthanasia. The trial court did not commit error when it declined to instruct the jury on subsection m. As to the reckless endangering conviction, the court also affirmed this charge as defendant showed a conscious disregard for the substantial risk he placed the teenager in regardless of whether he pointed the gun at the victim. Affirmed. | Case |
| KS - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty and Animal Fighting Laws | K. S. A. 21-6411 - 6418; 21-5504; 60-5401 | KS ST 21-6411 - 6418; 21-5504; 60-5401 | The Kansas anti-cruelty statutes define cruelty to animals as knowingly killing, injuring, maiming, torturing, burning or mutilating any animal. Also included as cruelty are abandoning any animal, failing to provide food, horse-tripping, and poisoning any domestic animal, unlawful disposition of animals, dog and cock-fighting. Cruelty to animals may be a misdemeanor or a felony. Exceptions are made for such things as veterinary practices, research experiments, rodeo and farming practices, euthanasia, and pest control. It is also illegal to allow a dangerous animal to run at large or to engage in sodomy with an animal. | Statute |
| OK - Initiative - State Question 687/Initiative Petition 365 (Ban Cockfighting) | State Question 687/Initiative Petition 365 (Ban Cockfighting) | This petition makes it a felony to instigate or encourage cockfighting, possess or train birds for cockfighting, or maintain a facility for cockfighting in the state of Oklahoma. The ballot proposal also makes it a misdemeanor to knowingly be a spectator at a cockfight. It passed in 2002 with 56% of the vote. | Statute | |
| News Archives | This page provides archives of the news items that appeared on the website's front page. The month and year of the news story is listed. | Basic page | ||
| De Lanoy v. Taylor | 452 P.3d 1036 (Or.App., 2019) | 300 Or. App. 517 (2019) | This Oregon case involves a dispute over who now owns a female whippet dog named "Isis." Isis was adopted from the local humane society and lived with the plaintiff and his family until 2014. In the summer of 2014, plaintiff asked his friend Rich to keep Isis while plaintiff moved to Florida. Both plaintiff and Rich understood that Rich was just caring for Isis and that plaintiff remained Isis' owner. Defendant is Rich's ex-girlfriend had a different understanding; that plaintiff had abandoned Isis and, as such, Isis became defendant's property. In 2016, plaintiff filed an action for replevin against defendant, seeking immediate return of Isis. Defendant countered with a counterclaim for a declaratory judgment that the dog was gifted to Rich - who subsequently abandoned the dog - and so defendant became the rightful owner. A bench trial ruled in favor of plaintiff, finding insufficient evidence to establish that plaintiff had gifted the dog or that Rich had abandoned the dog. On appeal, defendant raises a single procedural error, that the court erred by granting plaintiff replevin the procedures in ORCP 83 A were not followed. Notably, the court found that there was no ruling against defendant with regard to noncompliance of a court rule. More importantly, there was no challenge to the court's disposition of the declaratory judgement counterclaim. Thus, defendant presented no error in the disposition of her counterclaim. Accordingly, because the trial court declared plaintiff to be the lawful owner of Isis, and no one has challenged that declaration, the court did not reach defendant's arguments about the proper procedure for a replevin claim. | Case |
| GA - Ecoterrorism - Article 2. Georgia Farm Animal, Crop, and Research Facilities Protection Act | Ga. Code Ann., § 4-11-30 to 35 | GA ST § 4-11-30 to 35 | This article is known as the Georgia Farm Animal, Crop, and Research Facilities Protection Act. A person commits an offense if, without the consent of the owner, the person acquires or otherwise exercises control over an animal facility, an animal from an animal facility, or other property from an animal facility with the intent to deprive the owner of such facility, animal, or property and to disrupt or damage the enterprise conducted at the animal facility. Other prohibited actions also include gaining entry where a person knows entry is forbidden. In the definition of "consent," the act states that the term does not include assent that is induced by force, threat, false pretenses or fraud. It also excludes assent given by a person that the actor knows is not authorized by the owner, or given by a person who the actor knows is unable to make reasonable decisions (e.g., because of youth, intoxication, or mental disease or defect). Violations that involve exercising control over a facility are felonies; those that involve illegal entry or damage less than $500 are misdemeanors. | Statute |
| State Veterinary Practice Laws | This map links to state veterinary practice codes for each state. | State map | ||
| Rupert v. Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service | 957 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1992) |
Appellant was the pastor of an all-race Native American church that required the use of eagle feathers during certain worship who challenged the BGEPA after being denied a permit to obtain eagle feathers because he was not a member of a recognized Indian tribe. Under an equal protection analysis, the court found the limitation on the use of eagle parts to Native Americans is rationally related to the government's interest in preserving the eagle population as well as the special religious and cultural interests of Native Americans. For further discussion on religious challenges to the BGEPA by non-Native Americans, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act. |
Case | |
| MA - Pet Sales Age Restriction - Chapter 129. Livestock Disease Control | M.G.L.A. 129 § 39G; § 43 | MA ST 129 § 39G; § 43 | This statute provides that any dog or cat brought or shipped into the commonwealth shall be accompanied by an official health certificate issued by an accredited veterinarian, a copy of which shall be sent to the commissioner of agricultural resources. Further, a commercial establishment, pet shop, firm or corporation shall not import into the commonwealth, for sale or resale in the commonwealth, a cat or dog less than 8 weeks of age. | Statute |
| WA - Endangered Species - Chapter 77.15. Fish and Wildlife Enforcement Code | West's RCWA 77.15.120, 130, 135, 410, 420, 425, 430 | WA ST 77.15.120, 130, 135, 410, 420, 425, 430 | Under Washington endangered species provisions, a person is guilty of unlawful taking of endangered fish or wildlife in the second degree if person hunts for, fishes for, possesses, maliciously harasses, or kills fish or wildlife, or possesses or intentionally destroys the nests or eggs of fish or wildlife; the fish or wildlife is designated by the commission as endangered; and the taking of the fish or wildlife or the destruction of the nests or eggs has not been authorized. Additionally, a person is guilty of unlawful taking of endangered fish or wildlife in the first degree if the person has been previously convicted under the above provision within a five-year time period. Once convicted of unlawful taking of endangered fish or wildlife in the first degree (a class C felony), any licenses or tags used in connection with the crime are revoked and the person's privileges to hunt, fish, trap, or obtain licenses under this title are suspended for two years. | Statute |