Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| People v. Preston | 300 N.W. 853 (Mich. 1941) | 299 Mich. 484 (Mich. 1941) |
Defendant was convicted of wilfully and maliciously killing three cows. The issue considered on review was: "Are the circumstances and testimony here, aliunde the confession of the respondent, sufficient to create such a probability that the death of the cattle in question was intentionally caused by human intervention and to justify the admission in evidence of the alleged confession of the respondent?" The court held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. |
Case | |
| OK - Importation - Subchapter 25. Wildlife Classified as Domesticated and Exempt | OK ADC 800:25-25-1 - 3 | OAC 800:25-25-1 - 3 | The purpose of this Subchapter is to establish a list of wildlife that are to be considered domesticated and, therefore, exempt from licensing and permit requirements of the Department. | Administrative | |
| US - AWA - Subpart J. Importation of Live Dogs | 9 C.F.R. § 2.150 - 2.153 | This subsection covers the importation of dogs into the United States. No person shall import a live dog from any part of the world into the continental United States or Hawaii for purposes of resale, research, or veterinary treatment unless the dog is accompanied by an import permit issued by APHIS and is imported into the continental United States or Hawaii within 30 days after the proposed date of arrival stated in the import permit. Health and rabies certificates are required as provided. | Administrative | ||
| ME - Endangered Species - Subchapter 3. Endangered Species; Management and Research. | 12 M. R. S. A. § 12801 - 12810 | ME ST T. 12 § 12801 - 12810 | Maine revised its endangered species law in 2019. "Take" means the he act or omission that results in the death of any endangered or threatened species. There are two types of offenses based on whether the conduct is negligent or intentional. Negligent acts concerning an endangered species result in a Class E crime with a fine of $1,000 which may not be suspended. Intentional acts concerning an endangered species result in a Class D crime with a fine of $2,000 which may not be suspended. Each type of taking lists what is prohibited with regard to endangered species, including hunting, possessing, and feeding/baiting. Section 12810 also covers offenses against delisted species (of which the bald eagle is specifically listed). | Statute | |
| FL - Endangered - Endangered and Threatened Species Act | West's F. S. A. § 379.2291 - 2311 | FL ST § 379.2291 - 379.2311 (formerly FL ST § 372.072 - 074) | These Florida statutes define endangered and threatened species and provide the State's intent to protect these species. Under statute, the intentional killing or wounding of a listed species incurs a third degree felony. Interestingly, the state has a reward program for the arrest and conviction of those who violate state endangered species laws. | Statute | |
| People v. Hock | 919 N.Y.S.2d 835 (N.Y.City Crim.Ct., 2011) | 2011 WL 1225699 (N.Y.City Crim.Ct.) |
Defendant was denied his motion to set aside convictions under New York animal cruelty statute. The Criminal Court, City of New York, held that the 90 day period for prosecuting a Class A misdemeanor had not been exceeded. It also held that the jury was properly instructed on the criminal statute that made it a misdemeanor to not provide an animal with a sufficient supply of good and wholesome air, food, shelter, or water. It would be contrary to the purpose of the law and not promote justice to require that all four necessities be withheld for a conviction. |
Case | |
| Pagel v. Yates | 471 N.E.2d 946 (Ill.App. 4 Dist.,1984) | 128 Ill.App.3d 897, 84 Ill.Dec. 180 (Ill.App. 4 Dist.,1984) |
Horse owner sued breeder for negligence and conversion after breeder returned the wrong mare. On issue of damages, Appellate Court held that evidence was insufficient to support the jury award because 1) evidence of value of mare’s offspring four years after conversion was irrelevant and prejudicial; 2) trial court's instruction to jury allowed recovery for the horse's unborn offspring as well as fair market value of horse in foal, which permitted a double recovery; and 3) owner could not recover his expenses after he learned of switch and made no effort to resolve the problem because he had duty to avoid further loss. |
Case | |
| Sentencia C-148/22 - Colombia | Sentencia C-148/22 | El abogado Gabriel Andrés Suárez Gómez presentó una demanda de inconstitucionalidad ante la Corte Constitucional, argumentando que la pesca recreativa violaba el principio de precaución, el derecho a un medio ambiente sano y la prohibición de crueldad animal. Siguiendo el precedente creado con la sentencia C-045 de 2019, que prohíbe la caza deportiva, la Corte Constitucional de Colombia decidió el 2 de mayo del 2022 que las disposiciones relativas a la pesca recreativa contenidas en diversas leyes nacionales eran inconstitucionales, prohibiendo efectivamente esta práctica en todo el territorio. La corte determinó que pescar con fines recreativos, sin ningún otro propósito relevante como comercial o de sustento, constituye una forma de crueldad animal. Específicamente, la corte enfatizó que el mandato de protección animal se deriva del principio de la constitución ecológica, la función social de la propiedad y la dignidad humana. Además, se señaló que, en este contexto, tanto el legislativo como la corte han reconocido previamente a todos los animales como seres sintientes. La corte sostuvo que, aunque no es posible definir con certeza absoluta las consecuencias dañinas de la pesca recreativa en términos de principios de conservación y bienestar animal o la degradación de los recursos hidrobiológicos, existe información científica relevante que debe ser considerada para evitar efectos perjudiciales en los peces y el hábitat. Respecto a la sintiencia animal, tras un exhaustivo análisis, la corte enfatizó que hay razones convincentes para considerar que los peces pueden sentir dolor, y el mandato de protección animal requiere tratar a los seres sintientes con dignidad. De manera similar, según la FAO, actualmente no existe ningún método capaz de eliminar completamente el maltrato a los peces, y hay impactos ambientales que deben ser considerados seriamente junto con los beneficios económicos propuestos a favor de la pesca recreativa. Esta situación llevó a la Corte Constitucional a activar el principio de precaución. La corte determinó que hay un deber de proteger a los animales que implica proteger tanto el equilibrio ecosistémico como a los animales sintientes individuales con valor intrínseco. Esta protección se diferencia y pondera en función del tipo de especie involucrada, ya sea doméstica o silvestre. Además, el deber de protección animal lleva consigo un efecto vinculante indiscutible, que requiere evaluaciones de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad en su aplicación tanto por parte de legisladores como de jueces. Tras un extenso análisis de los efectos positivos y negativos que conllevaría la prohibición de esta actividad, la corte concluyó que la pesca recreativa constituye una forma de crueldad animal que viola el derecho a un medio ambiente sano, específicamente la prohibición contra la crueldad animal de acuerdo con leyes y jurisprudencia constitucional que carecían de respaldo constitucional al no estar fundamentadas en límites permisibles constitucionalmente para el maltrato animal, como (a) la libertad religiosa; (b) los hábitos alimenticios; (c) la investigación médica y experimentación; y (d) prácticas culturales arraigadas. Teniendo en cuenta los intereses de aquellos afiliados a la actividad, que se verían significativamente afectados por la invalidación de las leyes sujetas a esta opinión, y que han estado llevando a cabo actividades bajo leyes previamente consideradas constitucionales, la corte decidió posponer los efectos de la decisión por un año. Esto con el propósito de permitir que aquellos afectados adversamente por ella se adapten a las nuevas circunstancias. | Case | ||
| Jackson v. Georgalos | 133 A.D.3d 719 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) | 2015 WL 7269769 (N.Y. App. Div. Nov. 18, 2015) | Plaintiff appealed an order granting defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The personal injury action arises from an incident where defendants' dog, who was barking at the time, jumped on the screen door causing the door to open, whereupon the dog ran out of the house. When the plaintiff turned to get away from the dog, her ankle twisted, causing her to fall on the steps and become injured. To recover in New York on such an action, a plaintiff must prove that the dog had vicious propensities and that the owner of the dog, or a person in control of the premises where the dog was, knew or should have known of such propensities. The court held that plaintiff did not raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant was aware of the dog's alleged propensity to run out of the house and chase after people. Defendants' motion summary judgment and dismissal was affirmed. | Case | |
| US - Migratory Birds - Migratory Bird Permits; Regulations for Double-Crested Cormorant Management | 2003 WL 22295159 (F.R.) |
The purpose of this depredation order is to reduce the occurrence and/or minimize the risk of adverse impacts to public resources (fish, wildlife, plants, and their habitats) caused by double-crested cormorants. |
Administrative |