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Displaying 6161 - 6170 of 6637
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NJ - Horse Slaughter - 4:22-25.5. Prohibition upon slaughter of horses for human consumption; punishment | N. J. S. A. 4:22-25.5 | NJ ST 4:22-25.5 | This New Jersey law enacted in 2012 makes it a disorderly persons offense to knowingly slaughter a horse for human consumption. Additionally, it makes the knowing sale or barter of horseflesh for human consumption a disorderly persons offense. Violation incurs a fine of not less than $100 and a term of imprisonment of not less than 30 days. | Statute | |
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| MD - Habitat - Subtitle 7. State Chesapeake Bay and Endangered Species Fund | MD Code, Natural Resources, § 1-705 | MD NAT RES § 1-705 | Maryland law specifically allocates funds for the habitat protection, conservation, and propagation of endangered and threatened species. This fund has a provision that designates this fund for the monitoring, surveying, and protection of bald eagle nest sites in addition to other wildlife. | Statute | |
| State v. Devon D. | 90 A.3d 383 (Conn.App, 2014) | 150 Conn.App. 514 (2014) | The defendant, Devon D., appeals from the judgments of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of eleven offenses, in three separate files with three different docket numbers, pursuant to three separate informations, involving three different victims. Devon asserted that the prosecution as to the charges concerning C1 should have been separated from the charges as to C2 and C3, and that the evidence from C1’s case should not have been cross-admissible as to C2 and C3, an argument the Connecticut Appellate Court accepted as justifying reversal. Devon also argued on appeal that “the court improperly permitted the state to have a dog sit near C1 while she testified to provide comfort and support to her.” The appellate court concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion in permitting the use of the dog to comfort and emotionally support C1 while she testified without requiring the state to prove that this special procedure was necessary for this witness. At trial, defense counsel specifically told the trial court he was not making a confrontation clause claim as to the presence of the dog, and the appellate court therefore considered such a claim waived. Despite the absence of statutory authority for permitting a facility dog, the appellate court did conclude that the trial court had “inherent general discretionary authority” to permit such a dog, but also determined that this discretion was abused under the facts of the case. The judgments are reversed and the cases are remanded for new trials. | Case | |
| Lopez v. State | 720 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. App. 1986). |
The court convicted the defendant of cruelty to animals where the defendant left his dog in the car on a hot, sunny, dry day with the windows only cracked an inch and a half. Such action was deemed "transporting or confining animal in a cruel manner." |
Case | ||
| Gilman v. Nevada State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners | 89 P.3d 1000 (Nev. 2004) | 2004 WL 1109610 (Nev.), 120 Nev. 263 (2004) |
The Slensky's took their ill beagle to Defendant's Animal Hospital for routine vaccinations and examinations due to the dog's loose stools for four days. X-rays of the dog were taken, and when the dog was returned to the Slensky's, where it then collapsed. Defendant instructed them to take the dog to the emergency clinic, where it later died. The family filed a complaint with the Nevada State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners, and Defendant was later convicted of gross negligence and incompetence, an ethics violation, and for using an unlicensed veterinary technician. His license was suspended and he was placed on probation. The Court held that Defendant: (1) could be assessed costs of the proceeding; (2) he could not be assessed attorney's fees; (3) the Board could award expert witness fees above the statutory cap; (4) the Board failed to justify the imposition of costs for an investigator; and (5) statutes did not permit the employment of an unlicensed veterinary technician. |
Case | |
| CA - Animal Control - Chapter 20.5. Animal Control Officer Standards Act. | West's Ann.Cal.Health & Safety Code § 26220 - 26230 | This comprises the Animal Control Officer Standards Act. The law requires the Board of Directors of the California Animal Welfare Association to develop and maintain standards for various classes of CACOs. The standards for education, training, and certification shall be adopted by administrative rule of the board, and shall not be less rigorous than those described in this chapter. The board shall maintain a registry of each application for a certificate of registration under this chapter. | Statute | ||
| MS - Dog - Consolidated Dog Laws | Miss. Code Ann. § 19-5-50; § 19-25-83; § 19-5-3; § 21-19-9; § 21-21-5; § 37-7-342; § 41-53-1 - 13; § 45-3-52; § 49-7-42; § 69-29-2; § 73-39-89; § 95-5-19 - 21 | MS ST § 19-5-50; § 19-25-83; § 19-5-3; § 21-19-9; § 21-21-5; § 37-7-342; § 41-53-1 - 13; § 45-3-52; § 49-7-42; § 69-29-2; § 73-39-89; § 95-5-19 - 21 | These Mississippi statutes comprise the state's dog laws. Included are provisions relating to hunting with dogs, local dog ordinances, and liability of owners for damage done by dogs. | Statute | |
| CA - Exotic pets - § 671. Importation, Transportation and Possession of Live Restricted Animals | 14 CA ADC s 671 | 14 CCR § 671 | California prohibits possession of enumerated species without a permit. Permits are not granted for private pet possession. | Administrative | |
| ID - Equine Activity Liability - CHAPTER 18. EQUINE ACTIVITIES IMMUNITY ACT. | I.C. § 6-1801 - 1802 | ID ST § 6-1801 - 1802 | This Idaho statute provides that an equine activity sponsor or an equine professional shall not be liable for any injury to or the death of a participant or equine engaged in an equine activity and no participant may maintain an action against an equine activity sponsor or professional. Statutory definitions are provided, including "participant," "equine," and who is considered an "equine sponsor" or "equine professional. Liability is not limited by this statute where the equine professional knowingly provided faulty tack or equipment, failed to make reasonable and prudent efforts to determine the ability of the participant to engage safely in the equine activity, owns or otherwise is in lawful possession of the land or facilities upon which the participant sustained injuries because of a known, dangerous latent condition, or if he or she commits an act or omission that constitutes willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the participant or intentionally injures the participant. | Statute |
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