Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| New Legal Perspectives: The Synergy of Law and Science to Protect the Rights of Nature Agenda |
|
Policy | |||
| Marino v. Nat'l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin. | 33 F.4th 593 (D.C. Cir. 2022) | 2022 WL 1548489 (D.C. Cir. May 17, 2022) | Plaintiff animal welfare organizations sued the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and its parent agency, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, seeking to enforce conditions in permits held by SeaWorld. The permits authorize the capture and display of orcas and require display facilities to transmit medical and necropsy data to the NMFS following the death of an animal displayed under the terms of a permit. In 1994, the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) was amended such that it shifted authority to oversee conditions of marine mammals at exhibitors from NMFS to the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). After three pre-1994 orcas died at SeaWorld, plaintiffs tried to convince NMFS that it still had the authority to enforce the pre-1994 rules related to release of records, but NMFS contended that its authority was extinguished in 1994. Plaintiffs brought suit, arguing that the NMFS's policy rests upon an arbitrary and capricious interpretation of the MMPA, and that its refusal to enforce the permit conditions was also arbitrary and capricious. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit for lack of standing. On appeal here, the court examined plaintiffs' standing under the three-part Lujan test. The court found a lack of redressability for the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs fail to allege any facts from which the court could infer the relief they seek would likely cause the NMFS to redress their alleged harms. In fact, because the MMPA language on permits is permissive, NMFS has discretion whether to enforce them. This is coupled with the fact that there is no evidence that third-party SeaWorld will turn over the reports even if NMFS were to direct them. Therefore, this court held that the district court did not err in determining that the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue this case. Affirmed. | Case | |
| Brooks v. Jenkins | 220 Md. App. 444, 104 A.3d 899 (Md. Ct. Spec. App., 2014) | 2014 WL 7148925 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Dec. 16, 2014) | County deputies went to a home with a warrant to arrest a couple's son. While many facts in this case were in dispute, the undisputed result was that a deputy shot the family's chocolate Labrador retriever. While the couple left the house to take the dog to the vet, the deputies entered the house—contrary to the couple's express instructions— and arrested the son. The couple filed a complaint in the Circuit Court seeking damages, on a number of theories, for the wounding of the dog and the officers' alleged unlawful entry into their home. After a trial, the couple prevailed against the deputies and the jury awarded damages totaling $620,000 (reduced, after remittitur, to $607,500). The deputies appeal. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals held the issue of whether deputy acted with gross negligence in shooting dog was for the jury; CJ § 11–110 did not limit the couple's total recovery for the constitutional tort to the capped value of their pet's vet bills; the $200,000 jury award in non-economic damages to the couple on their constitutional tort claim was not excessive in light of the evidence; the deputies were entitled to immunity from the constitutional trespass claim; and the couple could not recover emotional damages on the common law trespass claim. The lower court's decision was therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. | Case | |
| Veterinary and Pet Damages Issues | Policy | ||||
| Wildearth Guardians v. Kempthorne | 592 F.Supp.2d 18 (D.D.C.,2008) | 2008 WL 5333414; 69 ERC 1328 |
In its suit for declaratory and injunctive relief alleging that Defendant, the Secretary of the Interior, failed to comply with his mandatory duty under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) to make a preliminary 90-day finding on two ESA listing petitions brought by Plaintiff, Plaintiff moved for leave to amend its Complaint to include a new claim against Defendant stemming from Defendant’s denial of an additional petition submitted by Plaintiff requesting that a small subset of species which had been included in one of the petitions at issue in the original Complaint be given protection on an emergency basis. The United States District Court, District of Columbia granted Plaintiff’s motion to amend the Complaint to clarify that only a total of 674 species are covered by the two non-emergency petitions, rather than the 681 as stated in the original Complaint, but denied Plaintiff’s motion for leave to supplement its Complaint with a new claim, finding that Defendant’s decision not to issue emergency listings is committed to agency discretion by law, and thus precludes judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act. |
Case | |
| Initiative and Referendum Institute v. Walker | 450 F.3d 1082 (10th Cir. 2006) | 62 ERC 1644, 28 A.L.R.6th 755 |
Several plaintiffs - including six wildlife and animal advocacy groups, several state legislators and politicians, and more than a dozen individuals - bring a facial First Amendment challenge to the Utah constitution supermajority requirement for initiatives related to wildlife management. District court held the plaintiffs had standing, but dismissed the claims on their merit. On appeal, the court affirmed the lower court's decision. |
Case | |
| NJ - Assistance Animals - Assistance Animal/Guide Dog Laws | N.J.S.A. 2A:42-109; 10:5-5; 10:5-29.1 - 11; 39:4-37.1; 27:25-5b; 48:3-33; App. A:9-43.2; 2C:29-3.1, 3.2; 48:3-33; 18A:46-13.3; 36:2-213 | NJ ST 2A:42-109; 10:5-5; 10:5-29.1 - 11; 39:4-37.1; 27:25-5b; 48:3-33; App. A:9-43.2; 2C:29-3.1, 3.2; 18A:46-13.3; 36:2-213 | The following statutes comprise the state's relevant assistance animal and guide dog laws. | Statute | |
| AK - Veterinary reporting - 12 AAC 68.100. Confidential relationship. | 12 AK ADC 68.100 | Alaska Admin. Code tit. 12, § 68.100 | This Alaska regulation appears to allow permissive reporting of suspected animal abuse by veterinarians. | Administrative | |
| Hernandez-Gotay v. United States | 985 F.3d 71 (1st Cir. Jan. 14, 2021) | 2021 WL 128466 | Plaintiffs filed suit to enjoin the enforcement and challenge the constitutionality of Section 12616 of the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 (“Section 12616”), which bans the “sponsor[ship]” and “exhibit[ion]” of cockfighting matches in Puerto Rico. The district court upheld Section 12616 as a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power. On appeal here, the court first determined whether the plaintiffs had sufficient standing to challenge the law. It concluded that plaintiff Ángel Manuel Ortiz-Díaz, the owner of two cockfighting venues and a breeder and owner of more than 200 gamecocks, has standing to challenge Section 12616. Ortiz faces a credible threat of prosecution under Section 12616 because he regularly sponsors and exhibits cockfighting matches. Finding standing, the court considered plaintiffs' claim that Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause in enacting Section 12616. The court found that cockfighting is an activity that substantially affects interstate commerce and Congress passing Section 12616 was a legitimate exercise of Commerce Clause power. Finally, plaintiffs contend that Section 12616 infringes on their First Amendment freedoms of speech and association. In rejecting this argument, the court held that plaintiffs failed to identify the necessary "expressive element" in cockfighting activities that would render it subject to First Amendment protections and, even if they made such a showing, Section 12616 is a permissible restraint on such speech. Finally, nothing in Section 12616 infringes on the associational right to assemble since it does not prevent individuals from gathering to express their views on cockfighting. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. | Case | |
| U.S. v. Senchenko | 133 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 1998) | 28 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,506, 48 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 746, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 198, 98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 253 |
During the two year period alleged in the indictment, between September 1993 and September 1995, government agents found or were directed to four illegal bear snares in Colville National Forest, Washington that were later linked to defendant. The Lacey Act provision that makes it felony to knowingly engage in conduct that involves intent to sell wildlife with market value in excess of $350 encompasses several types of conduct in furtherance of commercial activity (transporting, selling, receiving, acquiring, and purchasing wildlife) and government could aggregate value of parts related to such conduct to arrive at requisite $350 value, because defendant's various acts formed a single continuing scheme. |
Case |
