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Title Citation Alternate Citation Summary Type
PA - Hunting, Internet - § 7641. Computer-assisted remote harvesting of animals 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7641 18 Pa. Stat. and Consol. Stat. Ann. § 7641 (West) This statute prohibits computer-assisted remote hunting and the operation of computer assisted hunting facilities in the state of Pennsylvania. Violation is a misdemeanor of the third degree. Statute
State v. Lesoing-Dittoe 693 N.W.2d 261 (Neb. 2005) 269 Neb. 317 (2005)

A married couple owned a pet dog that had a history of injuring other dogs.  The married couple's dog injured a neighbors dog and, under a Nebraska Statute, was ordered to be destroyed.  The Supreme Court of Nebraska reversed the decision holding the penalty was unreasonable.

Case
LA - Dog - Consolidated Dog Laws LSA-R.S. 13:5544 - 45; LSA-R.S.3:2451 - 2778; LSA-R.S. 56:124.1, 141; LSA-R.S. § 40:1269.1 - 4; LSA-R.S. 49:165 These statutes comprise Louisiana's dog laws. Included among the provisions are dangerous dog laws, impoundment provisions, and the relevant licensing requirements. Statute
DE - Exotic Pets - CHAPTER 72. POSSESSION OF MAMMALS OR REPTILES EXOTIC TO DELAWARE 3 Del.C. § 7201 - 7203 DE ST TI 3 § 7201 - 7203 This Delaware law requires a permit to possess, sell, or import any non-native wild animal. No such permits will be granted for non-native venomous snakes. Statute
Slavin v. US 403 F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 2005)

Plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the Animal Welfare Act after it created a regulation that prohibited the interstate or foreign commerce transport of birds that would be used in fighting ventures.   She argued that the regulators did not consider whether fighting ventures were legal in the state where the birds were being transported to.   However, the regulation was considered constitutional since under terms of section 2156(b), only the foreign and interstate transport of the birds was prohibited.  

Case
Jones v. State 473 So. 2d 1197 (Ala. App. 1985)

Defendant was convicted of unlawfully owning, possessing, keeping or training a dog or dogs with intent that such dog or dogs be engaged in an exhibition of fighting with another dog, and he appealed. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that: (1) dogfighting statute was not unconstitutionally vague; (2) testimony of animal cruelty investigator was sufficient for jury to conclude that defendant owned dogs after effective date of antidog-fighting statute; (3) evidence as to poor conditions of dogs and their vicious propensities exhibited while lodged at animal shelter was relevant to issue of defendant's intent to fight the dogs; and (4) evidence gained by police officer pursuant to search warrant was not inadmissible.

Case
Commonwealth v. Russo 218 N.E.3d 116, review granted, 493 Mass. 1104, 223 N.E.3d 741 (2023) 103 Mass.App.Ct. 319, 2023 WL 5962931 (Mass. App. Ct. Sept. 14, 2023) This is a case regarding an animal cruelty charge brought against defendant, the owner of an elderly, terminally ill dog. First, defendant’s family brought the fourteen-year-old dog to an animal hospital. The staff at the hospital examined the dog, which had a large mass on his side, and recommended that the dog have surgery to remove the mass. Defendant did not authorize the surgery, and instead took the dog home. Three weeks later, defendant brought the dog back to the animal hospital, where the staff noticed that his condition had worsened significantly. At this point, the veterinarian recommended humane euthanasia to end the dog’s suffering, but defendant declined and requested the surgery. The veterinarian declined, claiming the dog would not survive the surgery, and defendant took the dog home saying they would have another vet euthanize the dog. The veterinarian reported defendant to the Animal Rescue League of Boston, who conducted a welfare check on the dog and found it in very poor health. When the Animal Rescue League asked defendant to euthanize the dog or get him medical attention, defendant declined and insisted the dog would die at home. Defendants were charged with violating the animal cruelty statute, defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint was granted, and this appeal followed. The question on appeal is whether defendant’s conduct in refusing to euthanize the dog constitutes animal cruelty under the statute. The Commonwealth argues that the animal cruelty statute covers the conduct of one who has charge of an animal but, rather than inflicting the harm directly, “authorizes or permits” the animal “to be subjected to” harm, and that keeping the dog in a state of suffering rather than euthanizing the dog fits this definition. However, after examining case law, the court could not find a case in which a person's failure to euthanize an animal was interpreted as “subjecting” an animal to harm, and did not want to extend the statute that far. The court affirmed the holding of the lower court. Case
Whittier Terrace Associates v. Hampshire 532 N.E.2d 712 (Mass. 1989)

Defendant was a person with a psychiatric disability and living in public housing. Defendant claimed to have an emotional and psychological dependence on her cat. The court held that the housing authority discriminated against defendant under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act for failure to waive the no pets policy as a reasonable accommodation for the mental disability. The court noted that there must be a narrow exception "to the rigid application of a no-pet rule, involving no untoward collateral consequences," because the handicapped person could fully receive the benefits of the program if provided the accommodation.

Case
IA - Dog License - 351.27. Right to kill tagged dog I. C. A. § 351.27 IA ST § 351.27 This Iowas statute makes it lawful for any person to kill a dog, wearing a collar with a rabies vaccination tag attached, when the dog is caught in the act of worrying, chasing, maiming, or killing any domestic animal or fowl, or when such dog is attacking or attempting to bite a person. Statute
Daskalea v. Washington Humane Soc. 275 F.R.D. 346 (D.C., 2011) 2011 WL 3555761 (D.C., 2011)

Pet owners sued after their pets were seized, detained, injured, or destroyed by the Humane Society. Pet owners’ attempts to certify a class failed because the claims were not typical. The members of the proposed class allegedly suffered a wide range of deprivations, were provided with different kinds of notice, and claimed distinct injuries. The class certification motion was also denied because the proposed members sought individualized monetary relief.

Case

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