Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| KY - Trade - Buying and selling protected wildlife | KRS § 150.180; 150.390; 150.990 | KY ST § 150.180; 150.390; 150.990 | These statutes relate to trade in wildlife. The first statute prohibits the trade in protected wildlife. The next law prohibits the hunting of bears. Finally, the Kentucky statute providing punishment for violation of aforementioned statutes is provided. | Statute |
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| People v. Harris | --- P.3d ---- 2016 WL 6518566 (Colo.App.,2016) | 2016 COA 159 (Colo.App.,2016) | Harris was convicted for twenty-two counts of cruelty to animals after dozens of malnourished animals were found on her property by employees of the Humane Society. On appeal, Harris raised two main issues: (1) that the animal protection agent who was an employee of the Humane Society was not authorized to obtain a search warrant to investigate her property and (2) that the mistreatment of the twenty-two animals constituted one continuous course of conduct and that the lower court violated her rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause by entering a judgment on twenty-two counts of animal cruelty. The Court of Appeals reviewed the issue of whether the animal protection agent had the authority to obtain a search warrant to investigate the property and determined that the agent did not have the proper authority. The Court looked to the state statute that specifically stated that only “state employees” were able to investigate livestock cases. In this case, the animal protection agent was employed by the Humane Society and was not a state employee; therefore, he did not have the authority to obtain a search warrant to investigate the property. However, the Court found that there was no constitutional violation with regard to the search warrant because it was still obtained based on probable cause. For this reason, the Court denied Harris’ request to suppress evidence that was submitted as a result of the search warrant. Finally, the Court reviewed Harris’ argument regarding her rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court found that under the statute dealing with animal cruelty, the phrases “any animal” and “an animal” suggests that a person commits a separate offense for each animal that is mistreated. Essentially, the Court held that the language of the statute “demonstrates that the legislature perceived animal cruelty not as an offense against property but as an offense against the individual animal.” As a result, Harris’ rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause were not violated and the Court upheld the lower court’s decision. | Case |
| Federation of Japan Salmon Fisheries Cooperative Association v. Baldridge | 679 F. Supp. 37 (1987) |
Petitioners, Japanese fishing federation, fisherman's association, and environmental group, filed motions for a preliminary injunction against respondent Secretary of Commerce who entered a final decision that approved the federation for an incidental take permit under the MMPA and adopted regulations that authorized the taking of Dall's porpoise within the fishery conservation zone. |
Case | |
| Hammer v. American Kennel Club | 803 N.E.2d 766 (N.Y., 2003) | 1 N.Y.3d 294; 771 N.Y.S.2d 493, 2003 N.Y. Slip Op. 19691 (2003) |
Plaintiff sought both declaratory and injunctive relief against the American Kennel Club (AKC) for use of standards in dog show competitions for Brittany Spaniel dogs that require the docking of their tails. The issue in this appeal is whether Agriculture and Markets Law § 353 grants plaintiff, who wishes to enter his dog and compete without penalty in breed contests, a private right of action to preclude defendants from using a standard that encourages him to "dock" his Brittany Spaniel's tail. The Court of Appeals concluded that it would be inconsistent with the applicable legislative scheme to imply a private right of action in plaintiff's favor because the statute does not, either expressly or impliedly, incorporate a method for private citizens to obtain civil relief. In light of the comprehensive statutory enforcement scheme, recognition of a private civil right of action is incompatible with the mechanisms chosen by the Legislature. |
Case |
| MI - Cruelty - Chapter 750. Michigan Penal Code. | M. C. L. A. 750.51 | MI ST 750.51 | This Michigan law provides that no railroad company shall permit the confinement of animals in railroad cars for longer than 36 consecutive hours without unloading for rest, water, and feeding of at least 5 consecutive hours unless prevented by a storm, or other "accidental causes." Any company, owner or custodian of such animals, who does not comply with the provisions of this section, can be fined between $100 and $500 for each and every such offense. However, when animals are carried in cars where they have proper food, water, space and opportunity for rest, the provisions of this section that require unloading do not apply. | Statute |
| HI - Endangered Species - Chapter 195D. Conservation of Aquatic Life, Wildlife, and Land Plants | H R S § 195D-1 - 32 | HI ST § 195D-1 to 32 | Hawaii endangered species law prohibits any taking, transport or commerce in designated species. It further outlines conservation programs that mandate continued research on listed species. Broad arrest and search and seizure provisions are given to law enforcement officials to enforce these acts. Violation of the regulations result in a misdemeanor conviction with both criminal fines and administrative fines that graduate for subsequent convictions. | Statute |
| A night monkey in a soiled cage looking out from plastic hideout | Slideshow Images | |||
| State v. Silver | 391 P.3d 962 (2017) | 283 Or.App. 847 (2017) |
In this case, the defendant was found guilty on multiple counts of animal abuse after failing to provide minimally adequate care for his herd of alpacas. The defendant was charged with a felony count (Count 1) and a misdemeanor count (Count 6) of first-degree animal abuse. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by not merging the multiple guilty verdicts into a single conviction. The state agreed that the trial court did err in its decision not to merge the verdicts; however, the state argued that the mistake should not require resentencing. The defendant argued that the court should follow its previous decisions and order a remand for resentencing. Ultimately, the court remanded the case for resentencing under ORS 138.222(5)(b). The state argued that language of ORS 138.222(5)(b) should be interpreted not to include merger errors. The court disagreed with this argument and relied on its decision in previous cases that interpreted the language of the statute more broadly. Additionally, the court held that if the state’s disapproval of the ORS 138.222(5)(b) is something that should be dealt with by the legislature and not the court. |
Case |
| NY - Hunting, Internet - 11-1906 On-line shoots prohibited. | McKinney's E. C. L. § 11-1906, McKinney's E. C. L. § 71-0923 | N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law §§ 11-1906, 71-0923 | This statute prohibits online shooting in the state of New York. Violation of the statute is punishable by a fine of not more than 2,500 dollars. | Statute |