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Displaying 81 - 90 of 6637
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Conservancy v. USFWS | 677 F.3d 1073 (C.A.11 (Fla.)) | 2012 WL 1319857 (C.A.11 (Fla.)) |
In this case, many environmental advocacy groups petitioned the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to designate critical habitat for a species, the Florida panther, which was listed as endangered under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in 1967. The petition was denied. Claiming the agency's action was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act, the groups filed a citizens suit under the ESA in district court. At district, the group's complaints were dismissed and the groups subsequently lost on appeal. |
Case | |
| South Africa - Biodiversity - National Environmental Management | No. 10 of 2004: National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act, 2004. | The objectives of this Act are, within the framework of the National Environmental Management Act, to provide for the management and conservation of biological diversity within the Republic and of the components of such biological diversity; to provide for the use of indigenous biological resources in a sustainable manner; and to provide for the fair and equitable sharing among stakeholders of benefits arising from bioprosgecting involving indigenous biological resources. Other objecitves of this Act are to give effect to ratified international agreements relating to biodiversity which are binding on the Republic; to provide for co-operative governance in biodiversity management and conservation; and to provide for a South African National Biodiversity Institute to assist in achieving the objectives of this Act. | Statute | ||
| AK - Trusts - § 13.12.907. Honorary trusts; trusts for pets | AS § 13.12.907 | AK ST § 13.12.907 | This Alaska statute provides that trusts for the continuing care of designated domestic animals are valid, provided they are a duration of 21 years or less. The trust terminates when a living animal is no longer covered by the trust. Any remaining trust funds do not go to the trustee, but rather transfer by the order stipulated in the statute. | Statute | |
| US - Slaughter - Humane Slaughter of Livestock Regulations | 9 C.F.R. 313.1 - 313.90 | These regulations outline the requirements for the humane treatment of livestock prior to and during slaughter. Included are the requirements for pens, holding, and transportation areas, and the special circumstances for transporting and holding "downed" (nonambulatory) livestock. The regulations emphasize the minimization of "excitement and discomfort" to the livestock prior to transportation or slaughter. Of special note are the requirements for humane methods of slaughter, including the use of carbon dioxide gas, captive bolt "stunners" and projectiles, gunshot, and electrical current. | Administrative | ||
| Ecuador - Farm animals - Organic Code of agricultural health | Ley Organica de Sanidad Agropecuaria de Ecuador | The organic code of agricultural health of 2017 has as its primary objective to 1) prevent the entry, dissemination, and establishment of pests and diseases; promote animal welfare; and 2) control and eradicate pests and diseases that affect plants and animals and that could represent a phytosanitary and animal health risk. This law creates the Regulatory agency for Phytosanitary and Zoosanitary Control. This agency is responsible for regulating and controlling animal health and welfare, plant health, and food to maintain and improve the adequate conditions of agricultural production. | Statute | ||
| ME - Lien, care - § 3352. Pasturage, food and shelter | 10 M.R.S.A. § 3352 | ME ST T. 10 § 3352 | This Maine law provides that a person who pastures, feeds, or shelters animals by contract or consent of the owner has a lien for the amount due. The lien may be enforced in the same manner as liens on goods in possession. | Statute | |
| U.S. v. Zak | 486 F.Supp.2d 208 (D.Mass., 2007) | 2007 WL 1427442 (D.Mass.) |
Defendant pleaded guilty to three counts under the MBTA after agents determined that he killed 250 great blue herons; he then went to trial on the remaining counts under the MBTA and BGEPA related to his killing of a juvenile bald eagle on his commercial fish growing operation. On appeal, defendant contended that he cannot be found guilty under the MBTA unless the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew the bird he was shooting was protected and intentionally shot it with that knowledge (defendant stated that he shot a "big brown hawk'). The court disagreed, finding the overwhelming authority requires no such specific scienter on the part of the actor. With regard to defendant's contention that the government failed to prove the "knowingly" prong of the BGEPA, the court was equally unpersuaded. The evidence demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly shot the eagle as it sat perched on the dead pine tree on the edge of his property, regardless of whether he knew the juvenile bird was an eagle or, as he said, “a big brown hawk.” |
Case | |
| Topical Introductions | Topical introductions contain a collection of legal materials (cases, laws, and articles) for a specific topic with a short summary and detailed legal analysis. Topics range from dog issues (like dog bite laws, lost dogs, custody issues involving pets in divorce) to complex federal laws such as the U.S. Endangered Species Act or the Animal Welfare Act. | Basic page | |||
| Canada - Northwest Territories Statutes/Nunavut - Dog Act | R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. D-7, s. 1 | This set of laws comprises the Northwest Territories Dog Act. Under the Act, owners may not allow their dogs to run loose and must provide them with sufficient food and water. Further, the law provides that no person shall punish or abuse a dog in a manner or to an extent that is cruel or unnecessary or drive a dog or dog team on a sidewalk situated on the street or road of a settlement. The law also sets forth the procedure for the impoundment and release of dogs. For the latest version of this Act, see the pdf. | Statute | ||
| Amparo en Revisión 163/2018 - Mexico | AMPARO EN REVISIÓN 163/2018 | This decision concerns the review of a writ of Amparo filed in 2016, which looks at the constitutionality of cockfighting and whether it should be considered a cultural practice. The President of the Mexican Commission for Cockfighting Promotion and Efraín Rábago Echegoyen filed a writ of Amparo with a District Court of Veracruz, Mexico, against the governor and Congress of the state of the same state. Plaintiff argued that a newly enacted state decree banning cockfighting infringed upon fundamental rights, including the right to culture, right to property, freedom of work, and the right to equality and non-discrimination. Despite the Plaintiff’s arguments, the District Court affirmed the decree’s constitutionality, which amended Veracruz’s animal protection law. Subsequently, the plaintiffs sought a review of the Amparo with the Supreme Court of Justice, which accepted the case and conducted a de novo review. In affirming the lower court decision, the judge used the proportionality test around the alleged violation of rights to culture, property, and freedom of work. The judge found that the defendant’s arguments had no legal basis. Regarding the right to culture, after an exhaustive analysis of the meaning of this right, the Supreme Court stated that cockfighting did not constitute a violation of this right. The court recognized that this practice was a cultural tradition. However, the question was whether such cultural manifestation was protected under the Constitution. In the case of cockfighting, the cultural expression did not directly affect humans, but rather the animals used and, to the high court, cockfighting was not covered by the right to participate in a cultural life. The court stated that culture is not admirable because it is traditional, but when it carries values and rights that are compatible with human dignity and mutual respect with other humans and nature. This means that the right to culture is not absolute, and, in fact, it is limited. Therefore, “any practice that involves the abuse and unnecessary suffering of animals cannot be considered a cultural expression protected by the Constitution. Regarding the right to property and the right to work, the court stated that these constitutional rights were not absolute and that their scope was limited by public interest. The right to work, in particular, was limited to the legality of the activity, the rights of third parties, and the rights of society in general. In weighing these rights, the court concluded that animal protection was a legitimate reason to limit fundamental rights, in particular, of the plaintiffs in this case because animal welfare is a purpose that is compatible with the purpose of a constitutional democracy. In other words, even though animals are not subjects of rights, their well-being is a legitimate limitation to some human rights. Cockfighting is a practice that inflicts severe physical harm on these birds, typically culminating in the death of at least one of the animals. Due to the nature of this practice, the court deemed that prohibition was the appropriate measure to safeguard the welfare of these animals. | Case |