Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ladnier v. Hester | 98 So.3d 1025 (Miss., 2012) |
Plaintiff motorist sued horse owner for negligence after he collided with the horse that was loose on the highway. Plaintiff sought damages for personal injury. The Court of Appeals sustained summary judgment for horse owner because the motorist produced no evidence that owner 1) had failed to act with reasonable care in enclosing his horses, and 2) that horse had a propensity to escape or cause injury that gave rise to a heightened duty on owner's part. After being granted a writ of certiorari by the Mississippi Supreme Court, the court held that the Plaintiffs had offered sufficient evidence to withstand the horse owner's motion for summary judgment.The case was then reversed and remanded.
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Case | |
| ME - Cat - Consolidated Cat Laws | 7 M. R. S. A. § 3916 - 3919C; 1 M. R. S. A. § 217 | ME ST T. 7 § 3916 - 3919C, 4041; ME ST T. 1 § 217 | These statutes comprise Maine's cat laws. Among the provisions include rabies vaccination requirements, stray cat procedures, and the designation of the "state cat." | Statute |
| US - Horses - Sale of Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros | PL 108-447 |
These amendments to the Wild Horses Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1333, amended by Public Law 108-447, allow for the sale of animals for commercial purposes in some circumstances, specifically when the excess animal is more than 10 years old, or has been unsuccessfully offered for adoption on at least 3 occasions. Once the excess animal is sold, it will no longer be considered a wild free-roaming horse or burro according to this Act. |
Statute | |
| Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. National Marine Fisheries Service | 409 F.Supp.2d 379 (S.D.N.Y.2006) |
The Natural Resources Defense Council sought material from the National Marine Fisheries Service about an incident of mass stranding of whales under the Freedom of Information Act because the Council thought it had to do with navy sonar use. The Service did not want to release the materials, saying they were protected from disclosure because they were discussions of agency decision-making. The court required disclosure of most of the materials because purely factual matters are not protected from disclosure. |
Case | |
| Hammer v. American Kennel Club | 803 N.E.2d 766 (N.Y., 2003) | 1 N.Y.3d 294; 771 N.Y.S.2d 493, 2003 N.Y. Slip Op. 19691 (2003) |
Plaintiff sought both declaratory and injunctive relief against the American Kennel Club (AKC) for use of standards in dog show competitions for Brittany Spaniel dogs that require the docking of their tails. The issue in this appeal is whether Agriculture and Markets Law § 353 grants plaintiff, who wishes to enter his dog and compete without penalty in breed contests, a private right of action to preclude defendants from using a standard that encourages him to "dock" his Brittany Spaniel's tail. The Court of Appeals concluded that it would be inconsistent with the applicable legislative scheme to imply a private right of action in plaintiff's favor because the statute does not, either expressly or impliedly, incorporate a method for private citizens to obtain civil relief. In light of the comprehensive statutory enforcement scheme, recognition of a private civil right of action is incompatible with the mechanisms chosen by the Legislature. |
Case |
| Powell v. Adlerhorst Int'l, Inc. | 2015 WL 6756126 (D. Or. Nov. 4, 2015) (unpublished) | The plaintiff in this case brought suit after suffering a dog bite from a service dog that was purchased from defendant. The defendant was a corporation that purchased dogs from Europe and then sold them to police agencies to be used as service dogs. Plaintiff (a police officer with the Sherwood Police Department) filed suit asserting both a strict product liability and negligence claim for injuries sustained from dog bites. At issue here is whether the dog was defective and unreasonably dangerous at the time the defendant sold it to the City of Sherwood. Defendant moved for summary judgment and the court denied the motion. The court ultimately held that a reasonable jury could find that defendant should have known about the dog’s aggressive behavior before selling it to plaintiff, thus making it liable for damages. | Case | |
| Austin v. Bundrick | 935 So.2d 836 (La.App. 2 Cir. 2006) | 41,064 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/30/06), 2006 WL 1791161 (La.App. 2 Cir.) |
This Louisiana case involves a suit against the owner of a cow (Bundrick) that wandered into the road where it was struck by plaintiff Austin's vehicle. Bundrick and his insurer, Colony Insurance Company, appealed the partial summary judgment finding Bundrick liable for the damages resulting from the accident. In reversing the lower court's order for partial summary judgment and remanding for a trial on the merits, the court noted that it is well settled that when an auto strikes a cow on one of the enumerated "stock law" highways, the burden of proof rests upon the owner of the animal to exculpate himself from even the slightest degree of negligence. |
Case |
| IN - Exotic pet - Chapter 26. Wild Animal Permit. | I.C. 14-22-26-1 to 6 | IN ST 14-22-26-1 to 14-22-26-6 | This set of Indiana laws concerns the keeping of protected and dangerous wild animals. Under the law, a person must obtain a permit to possess these classes of animals. A permit may be suspended if an emergency exists (e.g., the animal is in peril or the animal is in a position to harm another animal). | Statute |
| CO - Assistance Animals - Colorado Assistance Animal/Guide Dog Laws | C. R. S. A. § 12-240-144; § 12-245-229; § 12-255-133; § 18-13-107, § 18-13-107.3, § 18-13-107.7; § 18-9-202; § 18-1.3-602; § 24-34-301; § 24-34-309; § 24-34-801 - 804; § 40-9-109; § 42-4-808 | CO ST § 12-240-144; § 12-245-229; § 12-255-133; § 18-13-107, § 18-13-107.3, § 18-13-107.7; § 18-9-202; § 18-1.3-602; § 24-34-301; § 24-34-309; § 24-34-801 - 804; § 40-9-109; § 42-4-808 | The following statutes comprise the state's relevant assistance animal and service animal laws. | Statute |
| American Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Feld Entertainment, Inc. | 659 F.3d 13 (C.A.D.C., 2011) | 2011 WL 5108581 (C.A.D.C.) |
The Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, affirmed the lower court's finding that plaintiffs lack standing to sue Ringling Brothers and Barnum & Bailey Circus for violation of the Endangered Species Act. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that the use of two training methods for controlling elephants, bullhooks and chaining, constitute a "taking" under the Act. Here, the court found no clear error by the district court as to former employee Tom Rider's standing to sue where Rider's testimony did not prove an injury-in-fact. As to API's standing, the court held that API did not meet either informational standing or standing under a Havens test. |
Case |