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Displaying 61 - 70 of 240
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| KY - Lien, veterinary - 376.470 Veterinarian's lien | KRS § 376.470 | KY ST § 376.470 | This Kentucky law states that any licensed veterinarian who performs professional services for an animal, by contract with, or by the written consent of, the owner or authorized agent shall have a lien on the animal to secure the cost of the service provided. The priority for the liens filed under this law is based upon when the first lien was filed. | Statute |
| State v. Avella | --- So.3d ----, 2019 WL 2552529 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. June 21, 2019) | The Defendant was charged with practicing veterinary medicine without a license and for cruelty to animals. The Defendant made a homemade device attempting to treat his dog for a problem because he did not have the money to take his dog to the vet. The home treatment ended up injuring the dog and he took the dog to a veterinarian for treatment. The veterinarian stated that the dog needed to be taken to an advanced care veterinary facility, however, the Defendant could not do so due to lack of funds. The trial court dismissed the charges brought against the Defendant and the State of Florida appealed. Florida law forbids a person from practicing veterinary medicine without a license. The Defendant was not a veterinarian. The Defendant relied upon statutory exemptions in Florida’s statue that permit a person to care for his or her own animals and claims that he was just trying to help his dog, Thor. The Defendant also argued that the purpose of the statute was to prevent unlicensed veterinary care provided to the public rather than to criminalize the care an owner provides to his or her animals. The Court held that the trial court did not err in dismissing Count I for unlicensed practice of veterinary medicine given the stated purpose of the statute and the statutory exemptions. As for Count II, animal cruelty, the State argued that the Defendant’s conduct in using a homemade tool to remove bone fragments from the dog’s rectum and then failing to take the dog to an advanced care clinic fits under the Florida animal cruelty statute. Although the Defendant argued that he had no intention of inflicting pain upon his dog and was only trying to help him, the Court agreed with the State’s argument that “the statute does not require a specific intent to cause pain but punishes an intentional act that results in the excessive infliction of unnecessary pain or suffering.” Ultimately the Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Count I, reversed the trial court’s dismissal of Count II and remanded for further proceedings on the animal cruelty charge. | Case | |
| City of Houston v. Levingston | 221 S.W.3d 204 (Tx.App.-Hous.(1 Dist.) 2006) |
This opinion substitutes City of Houston v. Levingston, 2006 WL 241127 (Tex.App.-Hous. (1 Dist.)), which is withdrawn. |
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| KS - Veterinary - ARTICLE 8. REGISTRATION OF VETERINARIANS. | K. S. A. 47-801 to 856 | KS ST § 47-801 to 856 | These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. | Statute |
| OR - Veterinary - Chapter 686. Veterinarians; Veterinary Technicians. | O. R. S. § 686.010 - 990 | OR ST § 686.010 - 990 | These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. | Statute |
| Hewitt v. Palmer Veterinary Clinic, PC | 35 N.Y.3d 541, 159 N.E.3d 228 (2020) | No. 28, 134 N.Y.S.3d 312, 2020 N.Y. Slip Op. 05975, 2020 WL 6163313 (N.Y., Oct. 22, 2020) | This is an action for negligence and premises-liability brought by a plaintiff, who was attacked by another patron's dog in the waiting room of defendant veterinary clinic. Plaintiff alleges defendant had a duty to provide a safe waiting area, which was breached by allowing the aggressive dog to attack her. Defendants allege that it had no knowledge of the dog's prior aggressive tendencies, and moved for summary judgment. The Supreme Court granted defendants motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiff appealed. The court found that a lack of notice of the dog's vicious propensities does not alleviate defendant's liability to provide a safe waiting area, and modified the lower court's granting of summary judgment. | Case |
| MS - Veterinarian License - Chapter 39. Veterinarians. Mississippi Veterinary Practice Act. | Miss. Code Ann. § 73-39-77 | MS ST § 73-39-77 (formerly MS ST § 73-39-19) | This Mississippi statutes provides the terms under which a veterinarian can lose his or her license to practice veterinary medicine. | Statute |
| CO - Veterinary - Veterinary Practice Code | C.R.S.A. § 12-315-101 - 210 | CO ST § 12-315-101 - 210 | These are the state's veterinary practice laws. | Statute |
| IA - Veterinary Liens - Chapter 581. Veterinarian's Lien | I. C. A. § 581.1 - 4 | IA ST § 581.1 - 4 | This section of Iowa laws relates to veterinary liens related to treatment of livestock. A veterinarian shall have an agricultural lien as provided in section 554.9102 for the actual and reasonable value of treating livestock, including the cost of any product used and the actual and reasonable value of any professional service rendered by the veterinarian. In order to perfect the lien, the veterinarian must file a financing statement in the office of the secretary of state as provided. “Livestock” means an animal belonging to the bovine, caprine, equine, ovine, or porcine species, ostriches, rheas, emus, poultry, or fish or shellfish. | Statute |
| In the Matter of Kerlin | 376 A.2d 939 (N.J.Super.A.D. 1977) |
Respondent Raymond Kerlin, D.V.M., appealed a decision of the Department of Law and Public Safety, Division of Consumer Affairs, Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners (Board), finding him guilty of "gross malpractice or gross neglect" in the practice of veterinary medicine after an employee at his office (his wife) stated that the office could not treat a deathly ill kitten after the owners requested payment by credit (apparently not accepted at the office). In this case, the court observed nothing in the findings of facts to support a conclusion that respondent was aware of the exchange which occurred between the kitten’s owner and Mrs. Kerlin in time for him to have prevented the situation or to have taken remedial steps. Nothing adduced at trial proved that Dr. Kerlin followed the policy of rejecting requests for emergency treatment on credit. Thus, the court concluded that the State failed to establish that respondent was guilty of a violation or of conduct warranting disciplinary action for "gross malpractice", and the decision of the Board was reversed. |
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