Results
Title |
Author | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RI - Lien - § 34-48-1. Lien on animals for their keep--Transfer of abandoned animals | Gen. Laws, 1956, § 34-48-1 | RI ST § 34-48-1 | This Rhode Island law states that when an agreement has been made between the owner of any animals regarding the price of keeping, the animals shall be subject to a lien for the price of the keeping in favor of the person keeping the animals. The person may detain the animals until the debt is paid and, if not paid within 30 days, he or she may sell the animals at public auction after giving written notice to the owner of the time and place of the sale at least six days before the sale. Additionally, a kennel, as defined in § 4-19-2, or a veterinary hospital which boards or grooms animals for nonmedical purposes, may transfer any abandoned animal in its custody to a Rhode Island licensed nonprofit animal rescue, animal shelter, society for the prevention of cruelty to animals, or adoption organization as defined. | Statute | |
| RI - Immunity - § 4-15-15. Veterinarian's emergency treatment of animals--Immunity from liability | Gen.Laws 1956, § 4-15-15 | RI ST § 4-15-15 | This Rhode Island statute provides that any licensed veterinarian of this state has the right to treat any animal which has become injured upon any public highway of this state or upon any public or private property of this state which is transported to that veterinarian by any person. If in the veterinarian's opinion the injuries sustained by the animal will result in death, the veterinarian has the right to apply euthanasia to eliminate any unnecessary suffering. Further, any animal treated by the veterinarian not reclaimed within 72 hours may be relinquished to the appropriate animal control facility. A veterinarian incurs no civil liability for actions taken in treating such animals. | Statute | |
| Reporting Animal Cruelty | Animal Rescue League | Reporting Animal Cruelty (2018) | The Reporting Animal Cruelty: The Role of the Veterinarian manual for Massachusetts is possible due to the collaborative efforts of Animal Folks, the Animal Rescue League of Boston, and the Cummings School of Veterinary Medicine at Tufts University, with funding by these organizations and the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA). The purpose of this manual is to provide explanations of law and supporting materials so, as a veterinarian, you can develop protocols for your clinic or practice which can guide your actions should you or others face a suspected or known case of animal neglect, cruelty, or abuse. In addition to establishing protocols, information within the manual can also be used by veterinarians when assisting law enforcement in the investigation of animal cruelty cases. This manual is slanted more to smaller companion animals, though many of the principles and procedures described are applicable to horses, farmed animals, exotic animals, and wildlife. | Article | |
| Reicksview Farms, L.L.C. v. Kiehne | 541 F. Supp. 3d 935 (N.D. Iowa 2021) | This case is brought by a farm in the business of raising and breeding pigs. Plaintiff brought suit against a veterinarian and veterinary clinic for several claims, including malpractice. Plaintiff alleges defendant failed to oversee and perform testing for Mhp, leading plaintiff to unknowingly transfer infected pigs to other farms resulting in monetary damages. Defendants moved for summary judgment and were denied, with the court holding that the two year statute of limitations for veterinary malpractice claims does not apply, and the five year statute of limitations for unwritten contract applies. | Case | ||
| Rehn v. Fischley | No. C0-95-813, 1995 Minn. App. LEXIS 1539 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). |
The doctor was a veterinarian and a member of the board of directors for the humane society. The director of the humane society asked her for advice on how to clean cat cages, and the doctor gave advice and donated a bottle of formalin, whereupon the employee who used the formalin suffered permanent lung damage. The employee commenced an action against the doctor and humane society for damages. The court held that although the doctor would not have advised using formalin if she was not a member of the board, this fact did not establish that giving the advice was within the scope of her responsibilities as a board member. |
Case | ||
| Quigley v. McClellan | 214 Cal. App. 4th 1276, 154 Cal. Rptr. 3d 719 (2013) | This is an action for veterinary malpractice brought by the owner of two horses, who alleges defendant veterinarian negligently performed pre-purchase examinations of the two horses. These pre-purchase examinations caused the plaintiff to purchase horses with physical problems that impeded their ability to be used as competition horses. The jury found that the veterinarian was negligent in performing the examinations for one of the horses, and the trial court awarded $46,000 in damages for plaintiff. On appeal, the court held that there was no evidence of an applicable standard of care, and reversed the judgment of the lower court. | Case | ||
| Quesada v. Compassion First Pet Hosps | No. A-1226-19, 2021 WL 1235136 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 1, 2021) | In this unpublished case, plaintiff’s cat “Amor” was euthanized after being diagnosed with heart failure disease and saddle thrombus. At the hospital, plaintiff was visibly affected by the death of his cat, who he was allowed to say goodbye to. Plaintiff also talked and sang to Amor’s body until the body was retrieved. Plaintiff was informed that during the procedure Amor had bitten one of the nurses and that state law required a brain tissue sample to rule out rabies. Plaintiff informed the veterinarian of his wish to display Amor's body for viewing prior to cremation in two different instances. Neither the procedure or alternative procedures were explained to the plaintiff. At the body’s viewing, the plaintiff discovered that his cat had been decapitated. Plaintiff became extremely emotional after discovering his cat’s head had been disposed of as medical waste. As a result of the decapitation, plaintiff developed several severe mental health issues. Plaintiff filed a claim alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and bailment. The case was dismissed for Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff appealed the decision alleging that the lower court had mistakenly applied the standard of the bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress, instead of a direct liability claim and error in dismissing his remaining negligence and bailment claims. The court agreed with the plaintiff and reversed the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. On the count of negligent infliction of emotional distress, the court held that plaintiff’s claim did not fall under the "bystander" liability as his severe emotional distress arose after the passing of his cat and upon seeing his cat's decapitated body. Additionally, the court stated that plaintiff’s “emotional reaction combined with the fact that defendant was twice on notice that plaintiff intended to have a viewing of his cat's body prior to cremation established that defendants owed plaintiff a duty.” Defendants breached this duty by being on notice of plaintiff emotional distress and failing to properly inform plaintiff of the typical procedure of decapitating the cat for rabies testing, inform him of alternative testing procedures, and failing to request that the cat's head be returned after decapitation and prior to the showing. Suffering of plaintiff’s illnesses was still to be determined. The court found that the plaintiff “had pleaded a direct claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” A claim of bailment had also been appropriately pleaded since plaintiff had given defendants control of his cat's body and defendant returned it in a damaged condition. | Case | ||
| Price v. Brown, V.M.D. | 131 Montg. Co. L. R. 150 (1994) | Plaintiff's bull dog went to defendant veterinarian for surgery to correct a prolapsed urethra. The dog died a few days later. The plaintiff then sought to recover the value of the dog on a strict theory of bailment. Defendant filed a preliminary objection asserting that this doctrine was inapplicable and could not afford relief. The court held that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim from which relief could be sought and dismissed the complaint. The court, however, allowed the plaintiff to amend the compliant.In holding to sustain the defendant's preliminary objection, the court reasoned that since veterinarians are part of a professional discipline, in order to recover damages for the injury or the death to an animal entrusted to a veterinarian's care, a plaintiff must prove professional negligence instead of a bailiff arrangement. | Case | ||
| Price v. Brown | 680 A.2d 1149 (Pa. 1996) | 545 Pa. 216 (1996) |
The issue presented in this appeal is whether a complaint based upon an alleged breach of a bailment agreement states a cause of action for injury or death suffered by an animal that has been entrusted to a veterinarian for surgical and professional treatment. The court agreed with the trial court that the purpose for which an animal is entrusted to the care of a veterinarian is a material fact that must be considered in determining whether a plaintiff's complaint states a cause of action as a matter of law, and that Price's complaint failed to state a cause of action for professional negligence. The court held that allegations of breach of a bailment agreement are insufficient to state a cause of action against a veterinarian who has performed surgery on an animal when the animal suffers an injury as a result or does not survive the surgery. |
Case | |
| Posnien v. Rogers | 533 P.2d 120 (Utah 1975) |
The plaintiff sought to recover damages for the defendant's negligence in the diagnosis and the treatment of plaintiff's brood mare, which resulted in the mare's infertility. Plaintiff was required to show that Dr. Rogers did not exercise the care and diligence as is ordinarily exercised by skilled veterinarians doing the same type of work in the community, and that the failure to exercise the required skill and care was the cause of the injury. Experts testified at trial that the care exercised by Dr. Rogers met the standard of care of veterinarians practicing in the area, and had they been treating the mare, the treatment would not have differed substantially from that of Dr. Rogers. The Supreme Court held that the record is clear that the plaintiff failed to sustain his burden that the care of Dr. Rogers did not meet the standard of care of other practitioners practicing in the community. |
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