Results
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Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| UT - Dog Bite - Title 18. Dogs. Chapter 1. Injuries by Dogs. | U.C.A. 1953 § 18-1-1 to 4 | UT ST § 18-1-1 to 4 | This Utah statute provides that every person owning or keeping a dog shall be liable in damages for injury committed by such dog, and it shall not be necessary in any action brought therefor to allege or prove that such dog was of a vicious or mischievous disposition or that the owner or keeper thereof knew that it was vicious or mischievous. This does not apply to dogs used by law enforcement officials. In 2014, a provision for the use of arbitration in personal injury from dog bite cases was added. | Statute |
| VA - Dangerous - § 3.2-6540. Control of dangerous or vicious dogs; penalties | Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-6540 - 6543.1 | VA ST § 3.2-6540 - 6543.1 | These Virginia statutes comprise the state's dangerous dog laws, which were updated in 2021. Any law-enforcement officer or animal control officer who (i) has reason to believe that an animal is a dangerous dog and (ii) is located in the jurisdiction where the animal resides or in the jurisdiction where the act was committed may apply to a magistrate for the issuance of a summons requiring the owner, if known, to appear before a general district court at a specified time. The summons shall advise the owner of the nature of the proceeding and the matters at issue. Section 3.2-6540.1 also defines a vicious dog as "a canine or canine crossbreed that has (i) killed a person, (ii) inflicted serious injury to a person, or (iii) continued to exhibit the behavior that resulted in a previous finding by a court or, on or before July 1, 2006, by an animal control officer as authorized by ordinance that it is a dangerous dog, provided that its owner has been given notice of that finding." | Statute |
| VA - Dangerous - § 3.2-6553. Compensation for livestock and poultry killed by dogs | Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-6553 | VA ST § 3.2-6553 | This Virginia statute states that any person who has any livestock or poultry killed or injured by any dog not his or her own shall be entitled to receive the fair market value of such livestock or poultry not to exceed $750 per animal or $10 per fowl, provided that the claimant has furnished evidence, the animal control officer was notified within seventy-two hours after discovery of the damage, and the claimant has exhausted other legal remedies. However, local jurisdictions may by ordinance waive the last two requirements provided that the ordinance adopted requires that the animal control officer has conducted an investigation and that his investigation supports the claim. | Statute |
| VA - Dogs - Consolidated Dog Laws | Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-5900 - 6590; § 15.2-981; § 18.2-97, 97.1; § 18.2-313.1; § 18.2-403.3; § 29.1-422; § 29.1-516.1; § 32.1-48.1 - .4 | VA ST § 3.2-5900 - 6590; § 15.2-981; § 18.2-97, 97.1; § 18.2-313.1; § 18.2-403.3; § 29.1-422; § 29.1-516.1; § 32.1-48.1 - .4 | These Virginia statutes comprise the state's dog laws. Among the provisions include laws on the sale of dogs, rabies control laws, and sections concerning damage done by dogs. | Statute |
| VA - Exotic Pets - Article 11. Hybrid Canines | Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-6581 - 6584 | VA ST § 3.2-6581 - 6584 | This section provides Virginia's hybrid canine laws (registered or described to a veterinarian, animal control, or other listed authority as a wolf or coyote-dog cross) Under the section, any locality may, by ordinance, establish a permit system to ensure the adequate confinement and responsible ownership of hybrid canines. Violation of an ordinance enacted pursuant to this section is a Class 3 misdemeanor for the first violation and a Class 1 misdemeanor for any subsequent violation. Further, it is the duty of any animal control officer or other officer who may find a hybrid canine in the act of killing or injuring livestock or poultry to kill such hybrid canine forthwith, whether such hybrid canine bears a tag or not. | Statute |
| Van Kleek v. Farmers Insurance Exchange | 857 N.W.2d 297 (Neb., 2014) | 289 Neb. 730 (2014) | Plaintiff agreed to watch a couple’s dog while they were out of town. While plaintiff was caring for the dog, the animal bit her on her lower lip. Plaintiff filed a claim with the couple's insurance company. The insurance company rejected the claim because the plaintiff was also "insured," defined to include “any person ... legally responsible” for covered animals, and the policy excluded coverage for bodily injuries to "insureds." Plaintiff filed an action for declaratory judgment against the insurance company, seeking a determination that the policy covered her claim. The insurance company moved for summary judgment, and the district court sustained the insurance company's motion, reasoning that plaintiff was “legally responsible” for the dog because she fed and watered the animal and let it out of the house while the couple was away. The Supreme Court of Nebraska affirmed and held the insurance company was entitled to summary judgment. | Case |
| Vanater v. Village of South Point | 717 F. Supp. 1236 (D. Ohio 1989) |
Village criminal ordinance, which prohibited the owning or harboring of pit bull terriers or other vicious dogs within village limits, was not overbroad, even though identification of a "pit bull" may be difficult in some situations, as there are methods to determine with sufficient certainty whether dog is a "pit bull.". |
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| Volosen v. State | 227 S.W.3d 77 (Tx.Crim.App. 2007) |
The appellant/defendant mauled a miniature dachshund to death after the dog entered a yard where the appellant kept his chickens. The State of Texas prosecuted the appellant/defendant for cruelty to animals on the ground that the appellant/defendant killed the dog without legal authority. The appellant/defendant, however, argued that section 822.033 of the Texas Health and Safety Code, an entirely different statute, provided that authority. After the appeals court reversed the district court’s decision to convict the defendant/appellant, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that the appellant/defendant had failed to meet his burden of production to show the applicability of his claimed defense and thus reversed the court of appeals’ judgment and remand the case back to that court. |
Case | |
| Volosen v. State | 227 S.W.3d 77 (Tex. Crim. App., 2007) | 2007 WL 1752803 (Tex. Crim. App.) |
Appellant killed neighbor's miniature dachshund with a maul when he found it among his chickens in his backyard, and he defends that Health & Safety Code 822 gave him legal authority to do so. At the bench trial, the judge found him guilty of animal cruelty, but on appeal the court reversed the conviction because it found that the statute gave him legal authority to kill the attacking dog. However, this court held that appellant did not meet his burden of production to show that the statute was adopted in Colleyville, TX and found as a matter of fact that the dog was not "attacking." |
Case |
| Volosen v. State | 192 S.W.3d 597(Tex.App.-Fort Worth, 2006) | 2006 WL 349713 (Tx. 2006) |
In this Texas case, the trial court found Appellant Mircea Volosen guilty of animal cruelty for killing a neighbor's dog. The sole issue on appeal is whether the State met its burden of presenting legally sufficient evidence that Volosen was "without legal authority" to kill the dog. By statute, a dog that "is attacking, is about to attack, or has recently attacked ... fowls may be killed by ... any person witnessing the attack." The court found that no rational trier of fact could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that the dog was not attacking or had not recently attacked chickens in a pen in Volosen's yard; thus, the evidence is legally insufficient to establish that Volosen killed the dog "without legal authority" as required to sustain a conviction for animal cruelty. Judgment Reversed by Volosen v. State , 227 S.W.3d 77 (Tex.Crim.App., 2007). |
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