Results
Title |
Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SD - Bite - Chapter 40-34. Dog Licenses and Regulation (Vicious Dog Provisions) | S D C L § 40-34-13 to 16 | SD ST § 40-34-13 to 16 | This South Dakota statute provides that a vicious dog, defined as any dog which, when unprovoked, in a vicious manner approaches in apparent attitude of attack, or bites, or otherwise attacks a human being including a mailman, meter reader, serviceman, etc. who is on private property by reason of permission of the owner, is a public nuisance. However, no dog may be declared vicious if an injury or damage is sustained to any person who was committing a willful trespass or other tort upon premises occupied by the owner or keeper of the dog, or who was teasing, tormenting, abusing or assaulting the dog or was committing or attempting to commit a crime. | Statute |
| SD - Dogs - Consolidated Dog Laws | S D C L §9-29-12; S D C L § 40-1-41; S D C L § 40-34-1 - 16; S D C L 40-12-1 - 6; S D C L § 41-6-78; § 41-8-15; S D C L § 41-15-14; S D C L § 41-17-18.1 | These South Dakota statutes comprise the state's dog laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, vicious dog laws, and rabies vaccination provisions. | Statute | |
| SD - Marion - Breed - 9.0312 Vicious or Diseased Animals. | MARION, S.D., CITY ORDINANCES § 9.0312 (2002) |
In Marion, South Dakota, it is unlawful to keep, maintain or have in their possession or under their control any vicious animal, which includes Pit Bulls, Doberman Pincers, and Rottweilers. Police are authorized to impound any vicious dog or kill it without impounding it. A violation is a misdemeanor. |
Local Ordinance | |
| SEIDNER v. DILL | 206 N.E.2d 636 (Ind.App. 1965) | 137 Ind.App. 177 (Ind.App. 1965) |
Charles Dill, appellee, brought this action in the Municipal Court of Marion County, Indiana, therein alleging that the defendant-appellant, Harold Seidner, maliciously and intentionally shot and killed plaintiff's dog. The case essentially involved a companion animal that was shot and killed by the defendant neighbor who alleged that the dog was after his livestock. A statute in Indiana provided that a person was authorized to kill a dog “known” for “roaming” that harmed or threatened to harm the livestock. A verdict of six hundred dollars for the wrongful killing of the dog was affirmed. This case, however, was subsequently overruled by Puckett v. Miller , 178 Ind. App. 174 (Ind. App. Ct. 1978). |
Case |
| Shelvey v. Bicknell | 1996CarswellBC1131 |
Both plaintiff (appellant) Shelvey and the defendant (respondent) dog owners were guests of an unnamed third party at that party's beach cabin, where the defendants left their Rottweiler unrestrained on the cabin's deck overnight. The friendly dog jumped over the deck railing to follow the plaintiff to the beach where she was walking; the large, energetic dog bumped her legs while playfully chasing a seagull, knocking her down and leaving her unconscious. The dog had previously knocked its owner and a child down at one time due to its large size and weight. A trial judge earlier found that the defendant owners were not liable to the plaintiff in negligence as the freak accident was not reasonably foreseeable; the Court of Appeal concurred, finding no negligence. Scienter was not argued or discussed at either level. |
Case | |
| Sinclair v. Okata | 874 F. Supp. 1051 (D.Alaska,1994) |
Defendants are able to present a genuine question of fact regarding whether they were on notice of their dog's vicious propensity given their characterization of the four prior biting incidents as "behavioral responses common to all dogs." Defendants' expert concluded that each time, Anchor's responses were "natural" or instinctive. Plaintiffs offer no evidence, through expert testimony or otherwise, to refute the opinion of defendants' expert. |
Case | |
| Sligar v. Odell | 233 P.3d 914 (Wash.App. Div. 1, 2010) | 2010 WL 2674037 (Wash.App. Div. 1), 156 Wash.App. 720 (2010) |
In this Washington case, plaintiff Sligar was bitten on the finger by the Odells' dog after Sligar's finger protruded through a hole in the six-foot high chain link fence that separated their two properties. The court found the dispositive question was whether, pursuant to RCW 16.08.040 and .050 (a law that defines when entry onto the property of the dog owner is for a lawful purpose) Sligar's finger was “lawfully in or on ... the property of the” Odells at the time of the dog bite. The court found that the statute provides that consent may not be presumed where the property is fenced. Concerning the common law negligence claim, Sligar contends that the Odells were negligent in failing to protect her from harm because they failed to erect a solid fence on the property boundary until after the bite occurred. However, the court had previously found that it is not unreasonable to keep a dog in a fenced backyard where the dog has not shown any dangerous propensities. |
Case |
| Smegal v. Gettys | 48 So.3d 431 (La.App. 1 Cir., 2010) | 2010 WL 4272594 (La.App. 1 Cir.) |
Plaintiff Steven Smegal appeals a judgment that found him 50% at fault in a dog bite case. The incident occurred after the dog owned by Smegal's neighbor (Gettys) ran into the street and was hit by a school bus. Smegal approached the injured dog too closely and was bitten on his ankle. The Court of Appeal, First Circuit affirmed the lower court's finding. The court held that Smegal's actions did not constitute provocation where the dog's owners were also approaching the injured dog in an "equally provocative" manner. As to allocation of fault, the court found that while it was Gettys' failure to restrain the dog that was the ultimate cause of the accident, Smegal chose to approach the injured dog despite his training and knowledge as a police officer. Thus, this set of facts supported the trial court's allocation of comparative fault. |
Case |
| Smith v. City of New York | 889 N.Y.S.2d 187 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept.,2009) | 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 08969 |
This New York appeal reversed the lower court's judgment finding Officer Smith strictly liable for dog-bite injuries sustained by infant plaintiffs. The court found that, in the limited time the officer spent with the dog, the dog acted friendly, playful, and "rambunctious." He did not see the dog growl or lunge at the plaintiff and her family, who were sitting in the precinct house. The testimony adduced at trial did not establish that Officer Smith knew or should have known of the dog's vicious propensities. Further, the court found the evidence was insufficient to show that Officer Smith owned the dog. Rather, he took temporary custody of the abandoned dog with the intention to transport him to the ASPCA, and the dog was in his possession for, at most, a few hours. |
Case |
| Smith v. Kopynec | 119 So.3d 835 (La.App. 1 Cir.,2013) | 2012-1472 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/7/13) |
The plaintiff appeals the lower court's dismissal of her claims against defendant-landowners and their insurers. The plaintiff was injured (for the second time) by the defendant-landowners' son's pitbull while walking past their home. While it was undisputed that the landowners did not own the dog, the issue was whether they had a duty to prevent the attack via "custodial liability." Here, the defendant-landowners asserted that they thought the son had gotten rid of the dog after it was confiscated and quarantined by animal control after it first attacked the plaintiff. Thus, this court found that defendant-landowners did not know of the dog's presence on their property and affirmed the trial court's order of summary judgment. |
Case |