Results
Title |
Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Christensen v. Lundsten | 863 N.Y.S.2d 886, 2008 WL 4118071 (N.Y.Dist.Ct.) | 2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 28320 |
In this New York case, the parent of child injured by a dog brought an action seeking to have the dog declared a “dangerous dog” under the relevant law. The Court conducted a trial of the “dangerous dog” petition filed and rendered an oral decision that declared the respondents' Chesapeake Bay Retriever “Nellie” to be a dangerous dog under New York Agricultural and Markets Law § 121. The parties contested the appropriateness of a finding of “negligence” and “strict liability” and the entry of judgment. The District Court held that the court would not resolve issue of negligence because the issue was not properly joined for disposition; however, the owners were strictly liable for child's unreimbursed medical expenses. |
Case |
| Christian v. Petco Animal Supplies Stores, Inc. | 54 A.D.3d 707 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept., 2008) | 2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 06790, 2008 WL 4170162 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.) |
This New York case consists of an action to recover damages for personal injuries. The plaintiffs appeal the granting of the motion of the defendant for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him and the cross motion of the defendants Petco. The infant plaintiff allegedly sustained personal injuries when she was bitten by a dog owned by the defendant Kenneth Coughlin at a Petco store. The court held that the evidence submitted established that the defendants were not aware that this dog had ever bitten anyone or exhibited any aggressive behavior. |
Case |
| City and County of Denver, a Home Rule municipal corporation of the State of Colorado; and John W. Hickenlooper, as Mayor of the | In 2004, the Colorado General Assembly passed changes to the state's dangerous dog laws; part of the law prohibited municipalities from adopting any breed-specific dog laws. Denver previously enacted an ordinance that regulated dogs by breed (Section 8-55). In this current action, the City instituted an action seeking declaratory judgment that Section 8-55 preempts the state law under the Home Rule Amendment. The court found that the regulation of dogs by breed on an intra-city basis was purely a matter of local concern, and thus fell under Home Rule authority. The state was permanently enjoined from taking any action against Denver based on the language of the amended state law. The state then filed a notice of appeal, but subsequently withdrew it. | Pleading | ||
| City of Cleveland v. Lupica | 2004 WL 2340639 (Ohio, 2004) |
Defendant plead no contest to failure to confine and insure her dog after her pit bull attacked a mail carrier. The trial court's decision to have the dog turned over to the city and destroyed was reversed. The Court of Appeals found Defendant's no contest plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently or voluntarily. |
Case | |
| City of Delray Beach v. St. Juste | 989 So.2d 655 (Fla.App. 4 Dist. 2008) | 2008 WL 2261598 (Fla.App. 4 Dist.), 33 Fla. L. Weekly D1456 | In this Florida case, the city of Delray Beach appealed from a judgment for damages in favor of appellee plaintiff, who was injured by two loose dogs. The theory of liability was based on the city's knowledge, from prior complaints, that these dogs were loose from time to time and dangerous. The plaintiff suggested that the city's failure to impound the dogs after prior numerous complaints contributed to the attack. The court concluded that decisions made by the city's animal control officer and police to not impound the dogs were discretionary decisions, and therefore the city was immune. | Case |
| City of Delray Beach v. St. Juste | 989 So.2d 655 (Fla.App. 4 Dist.,2008) | 2008 WL 2261598 (Fla.App. 4 Dist.); 33 Fla. L. Weekly D1456 |
In this Florida case, the city of Delray Beach appeals a judgment for damages in favor of plaintiff, who was injured by two loose dogs. Plaintiff was attacked and severely injured by two large dogs owned by a resident of Delray Beach, when the dogs escaped from the resident's fenced yard. The theory of liability was based on the city's knowledge, from prior complaints and an actual visit by an animal control officer, that these dogs were loose from time to time and dangerous. This court agreed with the city, finding that the decision of an animal control officer was discretionary and therefore immune from liability under these circumstances. |
Case |
| City of Garland v. White | 368 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963). |
Police officers were trespassers and could be held civilly liable for damages when they entered a dog owner's property with the intent to unlawfully kill the dog. Reports had been made that the dog was attacking other animals but because the attacks were not imminent, in progress, or recent, the killing of the dog was not lawful. |
Case | |
| City of Onida v. Brandt | 959 N.W.2d 297 (S.D., 2021) | 2021 S.D. 27 | The City of Onida (the City) filed a petition for declaratory judgment seeking authorization from the circuit court to euthanize two dogs owned by the Appellants as “vicious animals” under Onida ordinances or, alternatively, based upon a determination that the dogs were dangerous under state law (SDCL 7-12-29). The circuit court concluded the City could not require the dogs to be euthanized under the ordinance but found that the requirements of SDCL 7-12-29 were met. Appellants appeal the circuit court's order directing the Sheriff to dispose of the dogs pursuant under state law. In 2020, the appellants' dogs attacked a neighbor's smaller dog just outside of the neighbor's door to their home. The attack caused numerous bite wounds and internal injuries to the smaller dog who eventually died. Prior to this event, there were two other incidents where appellants' dog rushed up to a woman working outside her house barking aggressively and another incident involving the same neighbor's dog who was the victim in the instant case. The sheriff was summoned for the prior incidents, although no formal action was taken and appellants beefed up measures to keep the dogs in their yard. After the attack on the neighbor's dog, the sheriff formally declared the dogs "vicious animals" under the city's ordinance and obtained a TRO to remove the dogs to keep them at a nearby kennel until further disposition from the court. Ultimately, the City filed a petition for declaratory judgment requesting authorization for euthanasia of the dogs. Alternatively, the City sought a determination of dangerousness under SDCL 7-12-29 and requested an order allowing the sheriff to dispose of the dogs. The court found Appellants violated SDCL 40-34-2 by owning a “dog that chases, worries, injures, or kills any ... domestic animal ....” The court further found under the Ordinance that the dogs were improperly unleashed and running at large within city limits and that the dogs were “vicious animals.” However, the court determined the City could not require Appellants to euthanize the dogs under the Ordinance because no “vicious animal” notice had been given to Appellants prior to the fatal attack on the neighbors’ dog. However, the court found that Appellants’ dogs were dangerous under SDCL 7-12-29 and authorized the Sheriff to dispose of the dogs. The circuit court stayed the order pending this appeal. On appeal, the appellants challenge the City's authority to request that the Sheriff dispose of the dogs under SDCL 7-12-29 after the circuit court denied such relief under the Ordinance. Appellants also argue that the circuit court erred in determining the dogs were dangerous and authorizing the Sheriff to dispose of the dogs under SDCL 7-12-29 in absence of a showing that the Department of Health had been consulted. The Supreme Court held that presented on appeal is whether the circuit court could order the Sheriff to dispose of the dogs under SDCL 7-12-29. SDCL 7-12-29 allows a sheriff to take possession of any animal suspected of being dangerous, continue to hold the animal until a formal determination of dangerousness can be made, and dispose of the animal through humane means if it is determined to be dangerous. Appellants claim that the court improperly used a "hybrid" application of both state and local law. This Court disagreed, finding that appellants presented no authority that the sheriff could not act under state law as opposed to city law. Appellants’ second argument is that circuit court erred by entering an order to permit the Sheriff to dispose of the dogs under the statute without first requiring consultation with the Department of Health for the purpose of rabies control. The Court agreed that the text of SDCL 7-12-29 includes both public safety and public health considerations that requires a formal consultation. However, the Court found this error to be harmless and the failure to consult with the Department of Health had any effect on the court's decision, or that it harmed the substantial rights of the Appellants. In fact, it was stipulated that both dogs were vaccinated against rabies and no continuing public health risk existed since the dog victim died 12 months prior at the veterinarian. The Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court ordering that “the Sheriff may now dispose of [Appellants’ two dogs] through humane euthanasia.” | Case |
| City of Pierre v. Blackwell | 635 N.W.2d 581 (S.D. 2001) | 2001 SD 127 |
In this South Dakota case, the owner of a dog declared by an animal control officer to be "dangerous" pursuant to Pierre City Ordinance § 10-3-111 challenged the conviction on the basis that the ordinances themselves were unconstitutional and that his constitutional right to procedural due process has been violated. The court held that the ordinances themselves were constitutional, noting the broad authority municipalities have to regulate pet ownership as a legitimate exercise of police power. The court reversed and remanded for determination on the factual issue of the dog's dangerousness. Specifically, if the City opts for a civil hearing, absent exigent circumstances, the owner of a dog is entitled to a due process hearing on the issue of dangerousness. |
Case |
| City of Richardson v. Responsible Dog Owners of Texas | 794 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. 1990). |
City's animal control ordinance banning the keeping of pit bulls was not preempted by state Penal Code provisions governing the keeping of vicious dogs. |
Case |