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Title Citation Alternate Citation Summary Type
FL - Dogs - Florida Dog /Dangerous Dog Laws West's F. S. A. § 509.233; § 767.01 - 16; § 705.19; § 823.041; § 823.15 - 151; § 877.14 FL ST § 509.233; §§ 767.01 - 16; § 705.19; § 823.041; § 823.15 - 151; § 877.14 These Florida statutes outline the state's dog provisions, which mainly cover dangerous dog/dog bite laws. The owner of any dog that bites any person while such person is on or in a public place, or lawfully on or in a private place, including the property of the owner of the dog, is liable for damages suffered by persons bitten, regardless of the former viciousness of the dog or the owners' knowledge of such viciousness. However, any negligence on the part of the person bitten that is a proximate cause of the biting incident reduces the liability of the owner of the dog by the percentage that the bitten person's negligence contributed to the biting incident. If a dog that has previously been declared dangerous attacks or bites a person or a domestic animal without provocation, the owner is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree. The dog will be impounded for a period of ten days during which time the owner of the dog may request a hearing. Statute
Arellano v. Broward 207 So. 3d 351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) 2016 WL 6992338 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2016)

Plaintiff Lisa Arellano suffered a dog bite and injury to her big toe after being attacked by a guard dog. The Defendant, Broward K–9/Miami K–9 Services, Inc. (“K–9”), owned two guard dogs. The guard dogs escaped K-9 after the business was burglarized, and the chain link fence was cut. The dogs entered Arellano’s neighborhood and she believed that the dogs belonged to one of her neighbors. Arellano fed and sheltered the dogs for about five days, and took steps to find the dogs' owner. However, Arellano also had pet dogs of her own. Eventually, one of the guard dogs attacked one of Arellano's dogs. When Arellano intervened in the attack between the two dogs, she was injured. Eventually, Animal Control determined that K–9 owned the guard dogs. Arellano then brought a statuory damages claim for strict liability against K-9 under Florida’s dog bite statute. The Circuit Court, Miami–Dade County, entered summary judgment in favor of K-9 and determined as a matter of law, that Arellano's actions constituted a superseding, intervening cause, thereby precluding her statutory dog bite claim against the Defendant, K-9.  Plaintiff, Arellano appealed.  The District Court of Appeals, held that triable issues of fact existed as to whether, and to what extent, K-9's liability under the statute should be reduced because of allegedly negligent actions by Arellano. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the circuit court decision and reasoned that Florida's dog bite statute imposes strict liability on dog owners, subject only to a plaintiff's comparative negligence, which in this case must be determined by the trier-of-fact. K-9's liability under the statute should only be reduced because of the allegedly negligent actions of Arellano. The court also reversed the resulting cost judgment in K–9's favor. The case was remanded to the trial court.

Case
Turner v. Ferguson 432 F. Supp. 3d 876 (E.D. Wis. 2020) On March 5, 2017 Lori turner was attacked by her neighbor’s (“Arndt”) dog which required her to receive 11 staples to close the wound on her scalp. She also suffered bites on her shoulder and wrist that would later require surgery. Pursuant to local regulations, the neighbor’s dog was quarantined for a ten-day period. Lori mentioned to officers that the City of Gelndale had recently enacted an ordinance that allowed for an officer to declare a dog vicious which then required the owner of the dog to adhere to certain requirements like securing the dog in a kennel when it was outdoors and maintaining liability insurance for dog bites. On March 14, 2017, Officer Ruppel issued a citation to Ardnt under a Glendale ordinance for damage caused by dogs, however, he did not declare the dog vicious under the vicious-dog ordinance. Officer Ruppel reasoned during deposition that he chose not to do so because he considered Ardnt grabbing the dog by the neck and Lori walking up and petting the dog (prior to Ardnt’s action) provocation. Lori filed suit against the officers she interacted with over the course of the next year claiming that the officers denied her equal protection of the law by refusing to declare Arndt’s dog vicious and by failing to protect her from loose dogs in the neighborhood. Lori had repeatedly contacted the police department over the course of a year about how she did not like the outcome of her dog bite case and about loose dogs in the neighborhood. Lori specifically alleged that the officers treated her with animus. The Court ultimately found that the evidence in the record did not support a class-of-one equal protection claim. Officer Ruppel’s decision to not declare Ardnt’s dog vicious was supported by a rational basis. Additionally, no evidence existed that suggested that the Glendale police department intentionally and irrationally treated Lori’s complaints about loose dogs in the neighborhood differently than it treated similar complaints by other citizens. The Defendant’s motion for summary judgment was granted. Case
RI - Dangerous Dog - § 4-13.1-9. Penalties for violation--Licensing ordinances and fees Gen. Laws, 1956, § 4-13.1-9 RI ST § 4-13.1-9 This Rhode Island statute provides that a vicious dog may be confiscated by a dog officer and destroyed in an expeditious and humane manner after the expiration of a five day waiting period if an owner does not secure liability insurance, have his or her dog properly identified, or properly enclose/restrain the dog. If any dog declared vicious under Sec. 4-13.1-11, when unprovoked, kills, wounds, or worries or assists in killing or wounding any described animal, the owner shall pay a five hundred fifty dollar fine. The dog officer is empowered to confiscate the dog. The statute further provides that municipalities may enact vicious dog licensing ordinances and provide for impoundment of dogs that violate such ordinances. It also outlines other actions owners of vicious dogs must take, including the posting of vicious dog signs and the maintenance of proper insurance. Statute
IN - Dog - Consolidated Dog Laws I.C. 15-17-6-1 - 14; 25-38.1-4-8 ; 15-20-2-1 - 7; 15-17-21-1; 6-9-39-1 - 9; 35-46-3-15; 15-20-3-1 - 4; 14-22-11-1; 14-8-2-89 IN ST 15-17-6-1 - 14; 25-38.1-4-8 ; 15-20-2-1 - 7; 6-9-39-1 - 9; 35-46-3-15; 15-20-3-1 - 4 ; 14-22-11-1; 14-8-2-89; 15-17-21-1 These Indiana statutes comprise the state's dog laws. Included are provisions on rabies, liability of owners for dog bites or damage to livestock, and taxation and registration laws, among others. Statute
Collier v. Zambito 1 N.Y.3d 444 (N.Y. 2004)

Infant child attacked and bit by dog when he was a guest in the owner's home.  After defenses motion for summary judgment was denied, the Appellate Court reversed, and this court affirms.

Case
NC - Edenton - Breed - Vicious Dogs EDENTON, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 90.43

In Edenton, North Carolina, it is unlawful to keep, harbor, own or possess any potentially vicious dog, which includes pit bulls, Rottweilers, and Chows. There are exceptions for dogs registered on the effective date, provided that the owner uses a leash and muzzle on the dog, keeps it properly confined, posts “Beware of Dog” signs,  takes identification photographs, sterilizes the dog, and complies with reporting requirements. Failure to comply may result in seizure and impoundment of the dog.

Local Ordinance
Lewis v. Chovan Slip Copy, 2006 WL 1681400 (Ohio App. 10 Dist.) 2006-Ohio-3100

This Ohio case raises the issue of whether an employee of a pet grooming establishment is a "keeper" under state law, thereby preventing the application of strict liability for injury. The employee was bitten by dog while attempting to assist the establishment's owner and another employee in giving the dog a bath. She then brought an action against dog's owners asserting, among other things, that the owners were strictly liable for her injuries. The court relied on its previous definition of the word "keeper" in the context of R.C. 955.28(B) as "one having physical charge or care of the dogs." Based upon this precedent, the court found that a person who is responsible for exercising physical control over a dog is a "keeper" even if that control is only temporary.

Case
AK - Dogs - Title 3. Agriculture and Animals. Chapter 55. Dogs. AS § 03.55.010 - 070, § 11.56.705 - 715; § 44.09.140 AK ST § 03.55.010 - 070, § 11.56.705 - 715; § 44.09.140 This collection reflects Alaska's dog laws. The primary dog laws give permission to kill dangerous dogs that are running at large or those that are chasing livestock. It also defines a dangerous dog - "Any dog which when unprovoked has ever bitten or attacked a human being is considered vicious . . ." Notably, "[a]ny person may lawfully kill any vicious or mad dog running at large." This section also allows a village council of an unincorporated village to destroy loose dogs in the village or otherwise control dogs to the extent authorized first class cities. Other laws concern the state dog and harming police dogs. Statute
Powell v. Adlerhorst Int'l, Inc. 2015 WL 6756126 (D. Or. Nov. 4, 2015) (unpublished) The plaintiff in this case brought suit after suffering a dog bite from a service dog that was purchased from defendant. The defendant was a corporation that purchased dogs from Europe and then sold them to police agencies to be used as service dogs. Plaintiff (a police officer with the Sherwood Police Department) filed suit asserting both a strict product liability and negligence claim for injuries sustained from dog bites. At issue here is whether the dog was defective and unreasonably dangerous at the time the defendant sold it to the City of Sherwood. Defendant moved for summary judgment and the court denied the motion. The court ultimately held that a reasonable jury could find that defendant should have known about the dog’s aggressive behavior before selling it to plaintiff, thus making it liable for damages. Case

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