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Title Citation Alternate Citation Summary Type
KY - Ecoterrorism - Chapter 437. Offenses Against Public Peace KRS § 437.410 - 429 KY ST § 437.410 - 429 This chapter concerns the protection of animal enterprise facilities in Kentucky. Prohibited acts include exercising control over a facility or its property without consent of the owner, disruption or destruction of property of a facility, entering a facility with the intent to commit a prohibited act, and entering a facility with the intent to disrupt or damage the enterprise and then remaining on the grounds knowing that entry is forbidden. Any person who violates any provision of KRS 437.410 to 437.420 shall be subject to a fine of not more than $5,000 or imprisoned for not less than 6 months but not more than 1 year, or both, for each violation. Statute
ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY, SHY 38, INC. & HOPE SANCTUARY, Plaintiffs, v. LAURA KELLY & DEREK SCHMIDT, Defendants Slip Copy, No. CV 18-2657-KHV, 2020 WL 362626 (D. Kan. Jan. 22, 2020) The Animal Legal Defense Fund (“ALDF”), Center for Food Safety (“CFS”), Shy 38, Inc. and Hope Sanctuary are interest groups that aim to protect and advocate for animals and the environment. These interest groups filed suit on December 4, 2018 against the Governor and Attorney General of Kansas seeking a declaratory judgment that the Kansas Animal and Field Crop and Research Facilities Protect Act was unconstitutional. The Act made it a crime to damage or destroy an animal facility or an animal, exercise control over an animal facility or animal from a facility, take photos or videos at an animal facility that that is not open to the public, and remain at an animal facility against the owner’s wishes. Both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. ALDF desired to conduct an undercover investigation in Kansas but refrained from doing so out of fear of criminal prosecution under the Act. The Plaintiffs alleged that the Act violated their First Amendment right to freedom of speech. To be subject to criminal prosecution under subsection (a) of K.S.A. 47-1827, the ALDF investigator had to cause physical damage to an animal or the animal facility or its property. The Plaintiffs did not allege that the ALDF investigator intended to cause such physical damage so the ALDF investigator was not at risk of criminal prosecution under the provision and, therefore, ALDF did not demonstrate standing to challenge subsection (a). ALDF alleged sufficient injury to support standing to challenge subsections (b), (c), and (d) of the Act. CFS, Shy 38, and Hope Sanctuary also had standing to challenge those subsections. The Court found that subsections (b), (c), and (d) regulated speech rather than conduct and was content-based rather than neutral-based. The Court ultimately concluded that the Plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment on their claim that subsections (b), (c), and (d) violated the First Amendment. The Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on their lack of standing claim for subsection (a) and K.S.A. 47-1828. Case
U.S. v. Fullmer 584 F.3d 132 (C.A.3 (N.J.), 2009) 2009 WL 3273955 (C.A.3 (N.J.))

In an issue of first impression, this Court considered whether the Animal Enterprise Protection Act (AEPA) was unconstitutional either on its face or as-applied to defendants. The defendants in this case were an animal rights organization ("SHAC") and six associated individuals. The defendants engaged in direct action ranging from electronic civil disobedience to destroying property at the homes of individuals associated with Huntingdon Life Sciences (a research corporation that performs animal testing for other companies). Defendants argued that the statute has a chilling effect on speech because protestors will refrain from all speech, even protected speech, due to the ambiguity of what the statute proscribes. Thus the Court found that the government provided sufficient evidence to prove that the defendants conspired to violate the AEPA.

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LA - Ecoterrorism - Chapter 2. Miscellaneous Crimes and Offenses. LA R.S. 14:228, 228.1 This law is Louisiana's interference with animal research facilities or animal management facilities law. It is unlawful for any person to: intentionally release, steal, or otherwise cause the loss of any animal from an animal research facility or an animal management facility. to damage, vandalize, or steal any property from or on an animal research facility or an animal management facility to obtain access by false pretenses for the purpose of performing prohibited acts; to break and enter with the intent to destroy, alter, duplicate, or obtain unauthorized possession of records, data, materials, equipment, or animals; to enter or remain on an animal research facility or an animal management facility with the intent to commit prohibited acts; or to knowingly obtain or exert unauthorized control, by theft or deception, over records, data, material, equipment, or animals. A person violating this law shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not more than one year, or both. A companion section (228.1) prohibits the unauthorized release of any animal, bird, or aquatic species which has been lawfully confined for agriculture, science, research, commerce, public propagation, protective custody, or education. Statute
Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Reynolds 8 F.4th 781 (8th Cir. 2021) This appeal centers around an Iowa statute called the “Agricultural Production Facility Fraud" law that prohibited accessing agricultural production facilities by false pretenses and making false statements as part of an employment application to an agricultural production facility. Animal rights organizations filed a § 1983 action against state and county officials contending the law violated the the First Amendment free speech clause. The district court ruled that both provisions are unconstitutional and entered an injunction against enforcement of the entire statute. Here, the Eighth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court found both the Access Provision and the Employment Provision constitute direct regulations of speech. However, the court held the conclude that the Access Provision's prohibition on assuming false pretenses to obtain access to an agricultural production facility is consistent with the First Amendment. In contrast, the Employment Provision did not survive strict scrutiny because is proscribes speech that is protected by the First Amendment and was not narrowly tailored. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the plaintiffs on Iowa Code § 717A.3A(1)(b), reversed the judgment declaring unconstitutional § 717A.3A(1)(a), vacated the injunction against enforcement of § 717A.3A(1)(a), (2), and (3), and remanded for further proceedings. Case
Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty 71 A.D.3d 734 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.,2010) 2010 WL 818490 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.); 896 N.Y.S.2d 440

Animal rights protestors appealed the decision of the Supreme Court, Westchester County that permanently enjoined the protestors from engaging in protest activity that constituted a private nuisance (to wit, participating in targeted protest at the home of the plaintiff Mark L. Bibi). This court found that the protestors failed to refute the evidence from the lower court that showed the plaintiffs were entitled to a permanent injunction as a matter of law (including evidence of the appellant's federal conviction conspiracy to violate the Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992). While the court did find that the appellant-protestor's incarceration did not render the appeal academic, imposition of the injunction was a reasonable and constitutional restriction on protest activity.

Case
Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Otter 44 F. Supp. 3d 1009 (D. Idaho 2014) 2014 WL 4388158 (D. Idaho, 2014) In a ‘hold your tongue and challenge now’ First Amendment challenge to an Idaho statute that criminalizes undercover investigations and videography at “agricultural production facilities,” the Animal Legal Defense Fund, as well as various other organizations and individuals, (collectively, “ALDF”), brought suit. The State defendants, Governor Butch Otter and Attorney General Lawrence Wasden, moved to dismiss the ALDF's claims. The claims against the Governor were dismissed under 11th Amendment immunity because the ALDF failed to explain the requisite connection between the Governor and enforcement of section 18–7024. The court also found that since the ALDF failed to allege a concrete plan to violate subsection (e), it lacked standing to challenge section 18–7042(1)(e) and the claim in regards to that provision was therefore dismissed. However, the ALDF’s First Amendment, bare animus Equal Protection, and preemption claims survived the motion to dismiss. Case
MO - Ecoterrorism - Chapter 578. Miscellaneous Offenses. Animal Research and Production Facilities V. A. M. S. 578.405 - 578.412 MO ST 578.405 - 578.412 This chapter comprises "The Animal Research and Production Facilities Protection Act." The act prohibits anyone from releasing, stealing, or otherwise intentionally causing the death, injury, or loss of any animal at or from an animal facility. It also prohibits any person from damaging, vandalizing, or stealing any property in or on an animal facility, or obtaining access to an animal facility by false pretenses for the purpose of performing acts not authorized by the facility. Generally, violation is a misdemeanor if the loss is less than $300 and a felony if it exceeds that amount. Any person who has been damaged by a violation of section 578.407 may recover all actual and consequential damages, punitive damages, and court costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees, from the person causing such damage. Statute
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. N. Carolina Farm Bureau Fed'n, Inc. 60 F.4th 815 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 325, 217 L. Ed. 2d 170 (2023), and cert. denied sub nom. Stein v. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc., 144 S. Ct. 326, 217 L. Ed. 2d 170 (2023) Several animal welfare organizations including PETA sought to conduct undercover animal cruelty investigations in North Carolina, but were unable to do so because North Carolina's Property Protection Act prohibited employees from entering nonpublic areas of employer's premises to record or remove information and using that information to breach their duty of loyalty. PETA and other plaintiffs argue that the act violates their protected First Amendment rights and functions as a discriminatory speech restriction. North Carolina argues that the restrictions on speech are incidental, and the act protects against trespass and disloyalty. The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina dismissed the complaint and the organizations appealed. The Court of Appeals then reversed and remanded. On remand here, the District Court held that the information gathered by the animal welfare organizations was protected speech and, thus, subject to strict scrutiny. . Case
Gregg and Linda Schumacher, and Gregg Schumacher Furs, LLC dba as Schumacher Furs and Outerwear, Plaintiffs v. City of Portland, In this Opinion, the judge granted the defendants a total of $96,870.85 in attorneys fees. The action stemmed from a lawsuit filed by the Schumachers for $ 6.6 million dollars against the City of Portland and the named defendants seeking damages for alleged illegal protest activities in front of their fur store. The defendants all prevailed on their Motion to Strike. The court observed that awarding of attorney fees is mandatory under Oregon law when a party prevails in an anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) lawsuit. Thus, the issue at hand was the amount of the attorney fees. The court went through the factors under Oregon law in analyzing the reasonableness of the requested attorney fees. When examining each factor, the court determined that the evidence either was in favor of defendants or was neutral. Notably, the court found that the plaintiffs' claims against defendants were not objectively reasonable because the plaintiffs did not produce any evidence that the prevailing defendants did anything illegal. Pleading

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