Results
| Title |
Author |
Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ouderkirk v. People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. | 2007 WL 1035093 (E.D.Mich.) (Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2007 WL 1035093 (E.D.Mich.)) | Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. |
The plaintiffs in this case own a chinchilla ranch in mid-Michigan. They filed a complaint alleging that PETA lied to them to gain access to their farm, took video footage of their farm operation, and then published an exposé on PETA's website that put the plaintiffs in an unfavorable false light. The court ultimately granted defendant-PETA's motion for summary judgment on all the issues. The court observed that the Ouderkirks gave permission for the taping in an email that makes no reference to any restriction on that consent. Further, the primary use made of the plaintiffs' likenesses by the defendant was to advocate against the chinchilla trade; thus, PETA had a right under the First Amendment to disseminate the information containing the plaintiffs' likenesses. |
Case | |
| Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Herbert | This complaint launches the first legal challenge to any ag-gag law in the United States. In it, the Animal Legal Defense Fund, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Amy Meyer, and others argue that Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-112 is unconstitutionally overbroad, constitutes content-based discrimination in violation of the First Amendment, is preempted by the federal False Claims Act, and violates animal protection groups’ equal protection and due process. | Pleading | |||
| ND - Ecoterrorism - Chapter 12.1-21.1. Animal Research Facility Damage | NDCC 12.1-21.1-01 to 05 | ND ST 12.1-21.1-01 to 05 | This chapter concerns unlawful interference with animal facilities. Under the section, a person may not intentionally damage or destroy an animal facility or the property or animals located therein; exercise control over the animals or property; enter an animal facility not open to the public with the intent on committing prohibited acts; enter a facility and remain concealed to commit prohibited acts; or intentionally release an animal at a facility. Violation is a class B felony if damage is $10,000 or more, a class C felony if the damage is at least $500 to under $10,000, and a class A misdemeanor if damage is less than $500. Entering an animal facility and using or attempting to use a camera, video recorder, or any other video or audio recording equipment is a class B misdemeanor. | Statute | |
| State v. Borowski | 231 Or.App. 511 (2009) | 220 P.3d 100 (Or.,2009) |
Defendants were convicted of interfering with agricultural operations under the anti-picketing provision of a criminal statute. The Court of Appeals held that the anti-picketing provision was not facially over-broad under the free speech or free assembly provision of State Constitution. The provision, which imposed criminal penalties on people engaged in picketing but created an exception for those involved in a labor protest, did not violate the privileges and immunities clause of the State Constitution, but it did violate equal protection rights under the U.S. Constitution. The statutory presumption of severability did not apply in this case. |
Case | |
| MD - Ecoterrorism - Title 6. Crimes Against Property. | MD Code, Criminal Law, § 6-208 | MD CRIM LAW § 6-208 | This law reflects Maryland's "ecoterrorism"/animal research interference law. A person may not break and enter a research facility without the permission of the research facility with the intent to: obtain unauthorized control over research property; alter or eradicate research property; damage or deface research property; move research property in a manner intended to cause harm to it; destroy or remove research property; or engage in conduct that results in the removal of research property. Violation of the law is a felony with imprisonment of up to 5 years or a fine of up to $5,000, or both. | Statute | |
| NC - Ecoterrorism - § 99A-1. Recovery of Damages for Exceeding the Scope of Authorized Access to Property | N.C.G.S.A. § 99A-1, 2 | NC ST § 99A-1, 2 | This law is known as North Carolina’s Property Protection Act and is what many consider to be a new variation of ag-gag law. § 99A-2 imposes a civil punishment for “exceeding the scope of authorized access to property.” A person exceeds access to authority by intentionally gaining access to the non-public areas of another’s premises and removing (and subsequently distributing) documents, recording images or sounds, placing a camera on the premises, conspiring in organized retail theft, or interfering with property. The punishment for violation of the Property Protection Act can result in equitable relief, compensatory damages, costs and fees, and exemplary damages of $5,000 per day that a defendant has acted in violation. The law is effective January 1, 2016. | Statute | |
| MS - Ecoterrorism - Animal Research or Exhibiting Facilities Protection Act | Miss. Code Ann. § 69-29-301 to 69-29-315 | MS ST § 69-29-301 to 69-29-315 | This section comprises Mississippi's Animal Research or Exhibiting Facilities Protection Act. The act prohibits a person, without the effective consent of the owner, to acquire or otherwise exercise control over an animal facility with the intent to deprive the owner of the facility, animal or property and to disrupt or damage the enterprise conducted at the animal facility. A person is also prohibited from entering and remaining concealed at a facility with the intent to damage or disrupt the facility. Violation for damaging a facility is a fine of up to $10,000 and/or imprisonment for up to 3 years. Violation for illegal entry with an intent to damage or disrupt the facility results in a fine of up to $5,000 and/or imprisonment up to 1 year. | Statute | |
| NY - Research, animal - Article 5. Laboratories. Title I. General Provisions: State Laboratories; Approved Laboratories. | McKinney's Public Health Law § 500 - 506 | NY PUB HEALTH § 500 - 506 | The group of statutes provides that the commissioner shall require laboratories and research facilities to treat all animals used in testing humanely, provide food and suitable housing, and that any experiments that inflict or involve pain shall be performed with anesthesia. Each research facility shall be inspected by the commissioner in order to ensure compliance with said rules. In addition, the statutes provide that alternative animal testing methods be utilized when the alternative has been scientifically validated and recommended by the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee for the Validation of Alternative Methods (ICCVAM) and adopted by the appropriate federal agency. | Statute | |
| Proposed Fundraising Bills in Oklahoma and Missouri Would Unconstitutionally Target Animal Rights Charities | Daina Bray, Samantha Hasey & Candace Hensley | 67 Syracuse L. Rev. 217 (2017) | Two proposed state bills out of Oklahoma and Missouri would prohibit an “animal rights charitable organization” from soliciting contributions in-state intended for either out-of-state use or “political purposes.” It is worthwhile to examine the bills and the factual context out of which they arose because of the important constitutional rights that they implicate and the potential chilling effect of this sort of legislation on the ability of nonprofits to advocate for their causes. While today it is “animal rights” groups under attack—by way of the bills discussed herein and other legislation such as so-called “ag-gag” bills, which suffer from some of the same constitutional deficiencies—it is not difficult to imagine scenarios in which other nonprofit groups with a viewpoint unwelcome to a legislature, or to powerful private interests, could be similarly targeted. | Article | |
| Privatizing the Patriot Act: The Criminalization of Environmental and Animal Protectionists as Terrorists | Ethan Carson Eddy | 22 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 261 (Fall, 2005) |
This Article describes the model Animal and Ecological Terrorism Act its permutations currently pending in state legislatures, its proponents, and their motivations. It further explains the legal and rhetorical parallels between the Model Act and the USA Patriot Act. The Article predicts that courts will find the bills' constraints on speech to be undeniably content-based and without a sufficiently compelling state interest. In the end, the Article concludes by explaining how the bills exploit the USA Patriot Act's anti-terrorism rhetoric, and reveal a concerted corporate strategy to manipulate the term “terrorist” and capitalize on its potency, in an anticompetitive effort to secure protectionism from the adverse economic effects of criticism, protests, and boycotts. |
Article |