Results
| Title |
Author |
Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| KY - Ecoterrorism - Chapter 437. Offenses Against Public Peace | KRS § 437.410 - 429 | KY ST § 437.410 - 429 | This chapter concerns the protection of animal enterprise facilities in Kentucky. Prohibited acts include exercising control over a facility or its property without consent of the owner, disruption or destruction of property of a facility, entering a facility with the intent to commit a prohibited act, and entering a facility with the intent to disrupt or damage the enterprise and then remaining on the grounds knowing that entry is forbidden. Any person who violates any provision of KRS 437.410 to 437.420 shall be subject to a fine of not more than $5,000 or imprisoned for not less than 6 months but not more than 1 year, or both, for each violation. | Statute | |
| U.S. v. Fullmer | 584 F.3d 132 (C.A.3 (N.J.), 2009) | 2009 WL 3273955 (C.A.3 (N.J.)) |
In an issue of first impression, this Court considered whether the Animal Enterprise Protection Act (AEPA) was unconstitutional either on its face or as-applied to defendants. The defendants in this case were an animal rights organization ("SHAC") and six associated individuals. The defendants engaged in direct action ranging from electronic civil disobedience to destroying property at the homes of individuals associated with Huntingdon Life Sciences (a research corporation that performs animal testing for other companies). Defendants argued that the statute has a chilling effect on speech because protestors will refrain from all speech, even protected speech, due to the ambiguity of what the statute proscribes. Thus the Court found that the government provided sufficient evidence to prove that the defendants conspired to violate the AEPA. |
Case | |
| LA - Ecoterrorism - Chapter 2. Miscellaneous Crimes and Offenses. | LA R.S. 14:228, 228.1 | This law is Louisiana's interference with animal research facilities or animal management facilities law. It is unlawful for any person to: intentionally release, steal, or otherwise cause the loss of any animal from an animal research facility or an animal management facility. to damage, vandalize, or steal any property from or on an animal research facility or an animal management facility to obtain access by false pretenses for the purpose of performing prohibited acts; to break and enter with the intent to destroy, alter, duplicate, or obtain unauthorized possession of records, data, materials, equipment, or animals; to enter or remain on an animal research facility or an animal management facility with the intent to commit prohibited acts; or to knowingly obtain or exert unauthorized control, by theft or deception, over records, data, material, equipment, or animals. A person violating this law shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not more than one year, or both. A companion section (228.1) prohibits the unauthorized release of any animal, bird, or aquatic species which has been lawfully confined for agriculture, science, research, commerce, public propagation, protective custody, or education. | Statute | ||
| Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty | 71 A.D.3d 734 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.,2010) | 2010 WL 818490 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.); 896 N.Y.S.2d 440 |
Animal rights protestors appealed the decision of the Supreme Court, Westchester County that permanently enjoined the protestors from engaging in protest activity that constituted a private nuisance (to wit, participating in targeted protest at the home of the plaintiff Mark L. Bibi). This court found that the protestors failed to refute the evidence from the lower court that showed the plaintiffs were entitled to a permanent injunction as a matter of law (including evidence of the appellant's federal conviction conspiracy to violate the Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992). While the court did find that the appellant-protestor's incarceration did not render the appeal academic, imposition of the injunction was a reasonable and constitutional restriction on protest activity. |
Case | |
| Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Otter | 44 F. Supp. 3d 1009 (D. Idaho 2014) | 2014 WL 4388158 (D. Idaho, 2014) | In a ‘hold your tongue and challenge now’ First Amendment challenge to an Idaho statute that criminalizes undercover investigations and videography at “agricultural production facilities,” the Animal Legal Defense Fund, as well as various other organizations and individuals, (collectively, “ALDF”), brought suit. The State defendants, Governor Butch Otter and Attorney General Lawrence Wasden, moved to dismiss the ALDF's claims. The claims against the Governor were dismissed under 11th Amendment immunity because the ALDF failed to explain the requisite connection between the Governor and enforcement of section 18–7024. The court also found that since the ALDF failed to allege a concrete plan to violate subsection (e), it lacked standing to challenge section 18–7042(1)(e) and the claim in regards to that provision was therefore dismissed. However, the ALDF’s First Amendment, bare animus Equal Protection, and preemption claims survived the motion to dismiss. | Case | |
| MO - Ecoterrorism - Chapter 578. Miscellaneous Offenses. Animal Research and Production Facilities | V. A. M. S. 578.405 - 578.412 | MO ST 578.405 - 578.412 | This chapter comprises "The Animal Research and Production Facilities Protection Act." The act prohibits anyone from releasing, stealing, or otherwise intentionally causing the death, injury, or loss of any animal at or from an animal facility. It also prohibits any person from damaging, vandalizing, or stealing any property in or on an animal facility, or obtaining access to an animal facility by false pretenses for the purpose of performing acts not authorized by the facility. Generally, violation is a misdemeanor if the loss is less than $300 and a felony if it exceeds that amount. Any person who has been damaged by a violation of section 578.407 may recover all actual and consequential damages, punitive damages, and court costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees, from the person causing such damage. | Statute | |
| Gregg and Linda Schumacher, and Gregg Schumacher Furs, LLC dba as Schumacher Furs and Outerwear, Plaintiffs v. City of Portland, | In this Opinion, the judge granted the defendants a total of $96,870.85 in attorneys fees. The action stemmed from a lawsuit filed by the Schumachers for $ 6.6 million dollars against the City of Portland and the named defendants seeking damages for alleged illegal protest activities in front of their fur store. The defendants all prevailed on their Motion to Strike. The court observed that awarding of attorney fees is mandatory under Oregon law when a party prevails in an anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) lawsuit. Thus, the issue at hand was the amount of the attorney fees. The court went through the factors under Oregon law in analyzing the reasonableness of the requested attorney fees. When examining each factor, the court determined that the evidence either was in favor of defendants or was neutral. Notably, the court found that the plaintiffs' claims against defendants were not objectively reasonable because the plaintiffs did not produce any evidence that the prevailing defendants did anything illegal. | Pleading | |||
| Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter | Not Reported in F.Supp.3d, 2015 WL 4623943 (D. Idaho Aug. 3, 2015) | The Animal Legal Defense Fund, and various other organizations and individuals, challenge Idaho Code § 18–7042 as unconstitutional. Section 18-7042 criminalizes undercover investigations of agricultural production facilities. ALDF alleges that § 18–7042 has both the purpose and effect of stifling public debate about modern agriculture and raises two substantive constitutional challenges against the State: (1) violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment; and (2) violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court first found that § 18–7042 is both content and viewpoint based, and thus, must survive the highest level of scrutiny. The Court held that the law does not survive strict scrutiny because it "would contravene strong First Amendment values to say the State has a compelling interest in affording these heavily regulated facilities extra protection from public scrutiny." Even if the interests in property and privacy of these industries is compelling, the law is not narrowly tailored as it restricts more speech than necessary and poses a "particularly serious threat to whistleblowers' free speech rights." Finally, the Court found that the law also violated the Equal Protection clause because the law was spurred by an improper animus toward animal welfare groups, furthers no legitimate or rational purpose, and classifies activities protected by the First Amendment based on content. ALDF's motion for summary judgment was granted. | Case | ||
| Proposed Fundraising Bills in Oklahoma and Missouri Would Unconstitutionally Target Animal Rights Charities | Daina Bray, Samantha Hasey & Candace Hensley | 67 Syracuse L. Rev. 217 (2017) | Two proposed state bills out of Oklahoma and Missouri would prohibit an “animal rights charitable organization” from soliciting contributions in-state intended for either out-of-state use or “political purposes.” It is worthwhile to examine the bills and the factual context out of which they arose because of the important constitutional rights that they implicate and the potential chilling effect of this sort of legislation on the ability of nonprofits to advocate for their causes. While today it is “animal rights” groups under attack—by way of the bills discussed herein and other legislation such as so-called “ag-gag” bills, which suffer from some of the same constitutional deficiencies—it is not difficult to imagine scenarios in which other nonprofit groups with a viewpoint unwelcome to a legislature, or to powerful private interests, could be similarly targeted. | Article | |
| Privatizing the Patriot Act: The Criminalization of Environmental and Animal Protectionists as Terrorists | Ethan Carson Eddy | 22 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 261 (Fall, 2005) |
This Article describes the model Animal and Ecological Terrorism Act its permutations currently pending in state legislatures, its proponents, and their motivations. It further explains the legal and rhetorical parallels between the Model Act and the USA Patriot Act. The Article predicts that courts will find the bills' constraints on speech to be undeniably content-based and without a sufficiently compelling state interest. In the end, the Article concludes by explaining how the bills exploit the USA Patriot Act's anti-terrorism rhetoric, and reveal a concerted corporate strategy to manipulate the term “terrorist” and capitalize on its potency, in an anticompetitive effort to secure protectionism from the adverse economic effects of criticism, protests, and boycotts. |
Article |