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Displaying 41 - 50 of 369
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GA - Exotic Animals - 40-13-2-.16. Exotic and Pet Birds. | GA ADC 40-13-2-.16, 17 | Ga Comp. R. & Regs. 40-13-2-.16, 17 | This Georgia regulation provides that all exotic animals and all non-traditional livestock entering Georgia must be accompanied by an official Certificate of Veterinary Inspection identifying each animal with unique permanent individual identification. | Administrative | |
| ND - Exotic Pets - Category 3 Species. 48.1-09-06-01. Housing, handling, health, and importation | ND ADC 48.1-09-06-01 | NDAC 48.1-09-06-01 | This North Dakota regulation provides specific rules for Category 3 species of non-traditional livestock. These species include: wild suidae (hogs and pigs); large felids (cats) and hybrids; bears; wolves and wolf-hybrids; venomous reptiles; primates, and nondomestic sheep/goats and their hybrids. Among the provisions include regulations for housing and confinement, importation requirements, and vaccinations. | Administrative | |
| AFADA habeas corpus Cecilia | EXPTE. NRO. P-72.254/15 | “Abogados y Funcionarios de defensa Animal” (AFADA) brought a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of Cecilia, a 30 year old chimpanzee that lived in the Mendoza Zoo alleging that the chimpanzee had been illegitimately and arbitrarily deprived of her right to ambulatory freedom and right to have a dignified life on the part of authorities of the Zoo of the City of Mendoza, Argentina. The court granted habeas corpus to Cecilia, ruling that Cecilia was a living being with rights and instructing defendants to immediately free her and to relocate her to the Great Ape Project Sanctuary in Brazil. Until this moment, only humans illegally detained had been granted this writ. | Case | ||
| DE - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Statutes | 11 Del.C. § 1325 - 1327;16 Del.C. § 3001F - 3009F; 16 Del.C. § 3031F - 3036F; 11 Del.C. § 775 | DE ST TI 11 § 1325 - 1327; DE ST TI 16 § 3001F- 3009F; DE ST TI 16 § 3031F - 3036F; DE ST TI 11 § 775 | These Delaware sections comprise the state's anti-cruelty and animal fighting provisions. Delaware's anti-cruelty section provides that cruelty to animals is when a person intentionally or recklessly subjects any animal (excluding fish, crustacea or molluska) to cruel mistreatment, cruel neglect, or kills or injures any animal belonging to another person. Actively engaging in animal fighting activities is a class F felony while being a spectator at a fight is a class A misdemeanor. | Statute | |
| AZ - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty/Animal Fighting Statutes | A. R. S. § 12-1011; § 13-2910 - 12; § 13-1411 | AZ ST § 12-1011; § 13-2910 - 12; § 13-1411 | The Arizona section contains the state's anti-cruelty and animal fighting provisions. A person commits cruelty to animals if he or she intentionally, knowingly or recklessly subjects any animal under the person's custody or control to cruel neglect or abandonment, fails to provide medical attention necessary to prevent protracted suffering to any animal under the person's custody or control, inflicts unnecessary physical injury to any animal, or recklessly subjects any animal to cruel mistreatment, among other things. Animal is defined as a mammal, bird, reptile or amphibian. Exclusions include hunting and agricultural activities in accordance with those laws and regulations in Arizona. Intentionally attending a dogfight is a felony under this provision whereas attendance at a cockfight is a misdemeanor. | Statute | |
| MT - Endangered Species - Chapter 5. Wildlife Protection. | MCA 87-5-101 to 87-5-132 | MT ST 87-5-101 to 87-5-132 | These Montana statutes provide the short title for the Nongame and Endangered Species Conservation Act, the definitions associated with the Act, and the legislative policy behind the Act. | Statute | |
| US - CITES Regs - Taking, Possession, Transportation, Sale, Purchase, Barter, Exportation, and Importation of Wildlife and Plant | 50 C.F.R. § 23.1 to 92 |
These regulations describe the purpose of CITES, the criteria for listing in the appendices, and the requirements for importing or exporting protected animals or plants. |
Administrative | ||
| US - Endangered Species - Subpart A. Introduction and General Provisions | 50 C.F.R. § 17.1 to .9 | These regulations for the Endangered Species Act (ESA) cover the introductory materials, including the purpose, definitions, and scope of the administrative regulations. They also include regulations related to "pre-Act" wildlife and examples of such possession as well as provisions for Native Alaskans. | Administrative | ||
| WV - Exotic Pet - § 20-2-51. Permit for keeping pets; § 20-2-52. Permits for roadside menageries | W. Va. Code, § 20-2-51; W. Va. Code, § 20-2-52 | WV ST § 20-2-51; WV ST § 20-2-52 | This West Virginia statute provides that the state fish and game director may issue a permit to a person to keep and maintain in captivity as a pet, a wild animal acquired from a commercial dealer or during the legal open season. The fee is charged is two dollars. | Statute | |
| New England Anti-Vivisection Society v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service and Yerkes National Primate Research Center | 208 F. Supp. 3d 142 (D.D.C. 2016) | 2016 WL 4919871 (D.D.C., 2016) | New England Anti-Vivisection Society (NEAVS), a non-profit organization that dedicates itself to animal-welfare, brought suit against the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) for issuing an export permit to Yerkes National Primate Research Center (Yerkes). NEAVS filed suit against FWS arguing that FWS had violated the Endangered Species Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species. NEAVS argued that FWS had violated the acts by allowing Yerkes to export chimpanzees in exchange for making a financial donation that would be put towards a program to help with “habitat destruction and disease, which face wild chimpanzees in East Africa.” The court reviewed the case and determined that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to address the claims made by NEAVS. The court found that NEAVS was not able to establish standing under Article III of the Constitution because NEAVS had not “suffered an injury in fact.” Ultimately, the court held that NEAVS was unable to show that it had a “concrete and particularized injury in fact that is actual or imminent” and that is “traceable” to FWS’ actions. As a result, the court granted summary judgment in favor of FWS. | Case |