Results
Title |
Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Moden v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife | 2008 WL 4763025 (D.Or.) |
Plaintiffs filed claim against the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) alleging arbitrary and capricious agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and failure to perform a nondiscretionary act under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). The United States District Court, D. Oregon, granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss and denied Plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend, and Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ APA and ESA claims, and that it remains without jurisdiction to mandate action by the agency if rulemaking has not been initiated by the FWS at its discretion, regardless of whether a determination resulting from a five year review suggests a listing status should be changed or should remain the same. |
Case | |
| Modesto Irr. Dist. v. Gutierrez | 619 F.3d 1024 (C.A.9 (Cal.), 2010) | 2010 WL 3274499 (C.A.9 (Cal.)) |
Plaintiffs, Modesto Irrigation District and other irrigation and water districts, contended that, in listing the steelhead—a type of Pacific salmon—as "threatened" under the ESA, the National Marine Fisheries Service violated both the ESA and APA. More specifically, Plaintiffs averred that listing the steelhead as a distinct species under the ESA violated the Act because the steelhead and rainbow trout interbreed. The Ninth Circuit disagreed and affirmed the ruling of the District Court. The court noted that while the steelhead and rainbow trout do interbreed, Congress, in enacting the ESA, did not intend to create a rigid limitation on an agency’s discretion to define the "statutorily undefined concept" of a "distinct population segment" ("DPS"). |
Case |
| National Audubon Society, Inc. v. Davis | 312 F.3d 416 (9th Cir. 2002) | 2 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,826 |
This order accompanies the Ninth Circuit's decision in National Audubon v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 2002). |
Case |
| National Wildlife Federation v. Norton | 386 F.Supp.2d 553 (D. Vt. 2005) | 61 ERC 1822 (2005) |
Conservation groups brought action against Final Rule promulgated by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to reclassify the gray wolf from endangered to threatened in most of the United States. The Rule created Eastern and Western Distinct Population segment and simultaneously downlisted them from endangered to threatened under the Endangered Species Act [ESA]. The Final Rule deviated significantly from the Proposed Rule and thus failed to provide adequate notice and opportunity for comment to the public, and the court also found the Final Rule an arbitrary and capricious application of the ESA. |
Case |
| Natural Resources Defense Council v. Evans | 232 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2002) |
Plaintiffs, various environmental organizations and a concerned individual, sought a preliminary injunction against federal officials to prevent the United States Navy's peacetime use of a low frequency sonar system for training, testing and routine operations. The defendants temporarily enjoined from deploying Low Frequency Active Sonar until a carefully tailored preliminary injunction can be issued which would permit the use of Low Frequency Active Sonar for testing and training in a variety of ocean conditions, but would provide additional safeguards to reduce the risk to marine mammals and endangered species. |
Case | |
| Natural Resources Defense Council v. Rodgers | 381 F.Supp.2d 1212 (2005, E.D.Cal.) | 2005 WL 1799398 (E.D.Cal.) |
An environmental organization brought an action against United States Bureau of Reclamation, the National Marine Fisheries Service, and the Fish and Wildlife Service, alleging that agencies failed to examine critical issues in biological opinions (BiOps) before executing water contracts for delivery of California Water Project water to irrigation and water districts. On a cross motion for summary judgment, the District Court held that the agencies failed to conduct adequate adverse modification analyses, failed to conduct adequate jeopardy analyses, and that the conduct of BOR in relying on the issued BiOps was arbitrary and capricious. |
Case |
| Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. National Marine Fisheries Service | 409 F.Supp.2d 379 (S.D.N.Y.2006) |
The Natural Resources Defense Council sought material from the National Marine Fisheries Service about an incident of mass stranding of whales under the Freedom of Information Act because the Council thought it had to do with navy sonar use. The Service did not want to release the materials, saying they were protected from disclosure because they were discussions of agency decision-making. The court required disclosure of most of the materials because purely factual matters are not protected from disclosure. |
Case | |
| New England Anti-Vivisection Society v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service and Yerkes National Primate Research Center | 208 F. Supp. 3d 142 (D.D.C. 2016) | 2016 WL 4919871 (D.D.C., 2016) | New England Anti-Vivisection Society (NEAVS), a non-profit organization that dedicates itself to animal-welfare, brought suit against the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) for issuing an export permit to Yerkes National Primate Research Center (Yerkes). NEAVS filed suit against FWS arguing that FWS had violated the Endangered Species Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species. NEAVS argued that FWS had violated the acts by allowing Yerkes to export chimpanzees in exchange for making a financial donation that would be put towards a program to help with “habitat destruction and disease, which face wild chimpanzees in East Africa.” The court reviewed the case and determined that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to address the claims made by NEAVS. The court found that NEAVS was not able to establish standing under Article III of the Constitution because NEAVS had not “suffered an injury in fact.” Ultimately, the court held that NEAVS was unable to show that it had a “concrete and particularized injury in fact that is actual or imminent” and that is “traceable” to FWS’ actions. As a result, the court granted summary judgment in favor of FWS. | Case |
| New Mexico Department of Game and Fish v. United States Department of the Interior | 854 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2017) | Defendant, The United States Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) released two Mexican gray wolf pups on federal land in New Mexico without a permit. Their goal was to increase the recovery of the wolf population more rapidly. The Plaintiff, New Mexico Department of Game and Fish ("Department") brought action against FWS and the United States Department of Interior. The Department requested declaratory and injunctive relief to prohibit FWS from releasing more Mexican gray wolves within New Mexico’s borders. Other wildlife organizations and various states also intervened as Defendants. The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, entered an order granting the Department a preliminary injunction. The Defendants appealed. The United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, reversed and remanded. The Court held that: (1) the Department failed to establish a significant risk of irreparable injury to its wildlife management efforts, and (2) the Department failed to establish a significant risk of irreparable injury to New Mexico’s sovereignty. | Case | |
| New Mexico Farm and Livestock Bureau , et. al. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, et. al. | 952 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2020) | The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service ("Service") designated 764,207 acres in New Mexico and Arizona as critical habitat for the jaguar pursuant to the Endangered Species Act. The area was divided into six individual units. Units 5 and 6 were the ones at issue. Plaintiffs filed suit contending that the Service’s designation of Units 5 and 6 as critical habitat was arbitrary and capricious. The district court ruled in favor of the Service and this appeal followed. There was no concrete evidence that jaguars were present in Units 5 and 6 at any time before 1995. The Service’s reliance on sightings in 1995, 1996, and 2006 to support a conclusion of occupation in 1972 was not based on expert opinion. It was purely speculative. The Court agreed with the Plaintiffs that the Service’s designation of Units 5 and 6 as occupied critical habitat was arbitrary and capricious. The Court further found that in order for an unoccupied area to be designated as a critical habitat, the Service must first find that the designation of the occupied areas is inadequate to ensure conservation of the species. The Service addressed all units together, finding that to the extent they were occupied, they were essential for the conservation of the species. The Court ultimately found that the Service did not follow its own regulations or give a rational explanation for failing to do so and as a result, its designation of Units 5 an 6 as critical habitat was arbitrary and capricious. The decision of the district court was reversed and remanded. | Case |