Results
Title |
Author | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| New York Revised Statutes 1874: Chapter 12: Sections 1-8 | N.Y. Rev. Stat. ch. 12, §§ 1-8 (1874) | Chapter 12, entitled "An act relating to animals," concerns New York's Law about the treatment of animals from 1874. | Statute | ||
| New Zealand - Animal Welfare - Code for Layer Hens 1999 | Code of Animal Welfare No. 18 | In New Zealand, hens are kept under conditions ranging from large commercial enterprises where the birds are totally reliant on humans for all their daily requirements to free-ranging hens which have access to outdoor runs or pasture. Provided those concerned with the day-to-day care of the hens treat them with skill and consideration, their welfare can be safeguarded under a variety of management systems. The code takes account of five basic requirements: freedom from thirst, hunger and malnutrition, the provision of appropriate comfort and shelter, the prevention, or rapid diagnosis and treatment, of injury, disease or infection, freedom from distress, and the ability to display normal patterns of behavior. | Statute | ||
| New Zealand - Animal Welfare - Code for Layer Hens 2012 | This code sets the minimum standards for the care and management of layer hens under all forms of management used in New Zealand. The purpose of this code is to provide guidance to the owners of layer hens and to persons who are in charge of them about the standards they must achieve in order to meet their obligations under the Animal Welfare Act 1999. | Statute | |||
| New Zealand - Anmal Welfare - New Zealand Code for Meat Chickens | The purpose of this code is to set out the minimum standard of care that owners of meat chickens (broilers) and persons who are in charge of them must achieve order to meet their obligations under the Animal Welfare Act 1999 (the Act). The minimum standards in this code have a legal effect under the Act (see Appendix II: Legislative Requirements). Example indicators do not have a legal effect but can be used to demonstrate whether minimum standards are being met. This code also includes information and recommended best practices which are intended to encourage all those responsible for implementing the code to adopt a standard of husbandry, care and handling exceeding that required by minimum standards. | Administrative | |||
| NEW ZEALAND’S ANIMAL WELFARE ACT: WHAT IS ITS VALUE REGARDING NON-HUMAN HOMINIDS? | Paula Brosnahan | 6 Animal L. 185 (2000) | New Zealand's Animal Welfare Act has been touted as a world first in great ape protection, and that may be true. However, it has also been depicted as an act conferring basic legal rights on great apes, and that is an exaggeration. Challenging the legal status of great apes in any jurisdiction requires sound, factual propositions. Therefore, the background and breadth of New Zealand's protections must be understood before proponents of change employ them as precedent. This essay offers a brief history of the non-human hominid provisions of New Zealand's Animal Welfare Act. | Article | |
| Newell v. Baldridge | 548 F.Supp. 39 (D.C. Wash. 1982) |
Newell was a tropical fish importer who became involved in a mislabeling scheme to import endangered sea turtles. On appeal, Newell claimed he lacked the requisite knowledge or intent because he did not directly handle the imported sea turtles, he could not have known that they were mislabeled. The court held that substantial evidence in the record supports the findings below that Newell knew or should have known of the mislabeling of the shipments of sea turtles. Further, the court upheld the imposition of $1,000 penalty for each violation of the Lacey Act because of the mulit-violation, mislabeling scheme and the vital public interest in deterring illegal wildlife trade. |
Case | ||
| Newport v. Moran | 721 P.2d 465 (Or.App.,1986) | 80 Or.App. 71 (Or.App.,1986) |
In this Oregon case, an action was brought to recover damages for injuries after defendant's dog ran into plaintiff and knocked her down. The lower court entered a verdict against the defendant and she appealed. The Court of Appeals held that, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, there was find no evidence that would put defendant on notice that the dog had a potentially dangerous propensity to run into people. Further, without some reason to foresee that the dog was likely to run into people, there was no common-law duty to confine the dog. The evidence also did not warrant submission of the case to the jury on the theory of negligence per se for violation of the dog control ordinance because this risk was not one anticipated by the ordinance. Reversed. |
Case | |
| News Archives | This page provides archives of the news items that appeared on the website's front page. The month and year of the news story is listed. | Basic page | |||
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