Results
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Title |
Author | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Loban v. City of Grapevine | Not Reported in S.W.3d, 2009 WL 5183802 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth,2009) |
In this unpublished Texas case, Appellant Jason Loban appeals the trial court's judgment awarding appellee City of Grapevine $10,670.20 in damages. In 2006, Appellant's dogs were declared "dangerous" under the City's municipal ordinance. On appeal, Appellant argued that the trial court's award of $10,670.20 in damages to the City should be reversed because the City did not plead for monetary relief, the issue was not tried by consent, and there was no evidence to support the award. This Court agreed. In finding the monetary judgment void, the Court observed that the City did not put any request for a monetary award in its pleadings and there was no evidence in the record of the amount of the fine. |
Case | ||
| Lockett v. Hill | 51 P.3d 5 (Or.App.,2002) | 182 Or.App. 377 (Or.App.,2002) |
In this Oregon case, plaintiff sued defendant after defendant's pit bulls mauled plaintiff's cat to death while they were running loose on plaintiff's property. The trial court found that defendant was negligent and awarded plaintiffs $1,000 in compensatory damages but denied plaintiffs' claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress and loss of companionship. Plaintiff sought appeal of the trial court's denial of damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) and loss of companionship. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the cat owner was not entitled to recover damages for emotional distress. |
Case | |
| Lockett v. Hill |
Defendant's pit bulls killed plaintiff's cat while she watched. This is an appellate brief about non-economic damages. |
Pleading | |||
| Loman v. Freeman | 890 N.E.2d 446 (Ill., 2008) | 229 Ill.2d 104 (Ill., 2008) | This case concerns surgical procedures performed on a racehorse that rendered the horse unfit for future racing. The horse's owners brought this action against the veterinarians who performed the surgical procedure, alleging negligence and conversion. The circuit court dismissed and the court of appeals reversed the decision of the lower court. At the state supreme court, the court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court. The court found that defendant was permanently deprived of the use of the horse due to its lameness from the surgery, which sustained the claim of conversion. | Case | |
| Long v. Noah's Lost Ark, Inc. | 814 N.E.2d 555 (Ohio 2004) |
Owner of lion cub sued animal shelter for refusing to return the cub to him, alleging breach of contract, conversion, replevin, fraud, and intentional misrepresentation. The Trial Court granted summary judgment for plaintiff and defendant appealed. On appeal, the Court affirmed for plaintiff, as plaintiff had established that he was the legal owner of the lion and was entitled to possession. |
Case | ||
| Long v. The State of Texas | 823 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) |
Appellant, who was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death, raised 35 points of error in a direct appeal in which he challenged the trial court's voir dire rulings and its evidentiary rulings. The court held that the admission into evidence of photographs was within the discretion of the lower court, which properly determined that the photographs served a proper purpose in enlightening the jury. |
Case | ||
| Long-Term Outcomes in Animal Hoarding Cases | Colin Berry, M.S., Gary Patronek, V.M.D., Ph.D., and Randall Lockwood, Ph.D. | 11 Animal L. 167 (2005) | Animal hoarding is a form of abuse that affects thousands of animals each year, yet little is known about how cases are best resolved, the effectiveness of prosecution, and how sentences relate to the severity of the offense. This lack of information has hampered effective resolution and the prevention of recidivism. This study obtained information about the hoarder, animals, charges, prosecution, sentencing, and recidivism for fifty-six cases identified through media reports. The results showed a disparity between the ways different jurisdictions handled hoarding cases, as well as a lack of communication between agencies. Cases generally lacked follow-up, and it was difficult to determine compliance with court-ordered psychological evaluations and counseling. Additionally, none of the shelters that were ordered to receive restitution has yet received it. Shortcomings in state anti-cruelty statutes contributed to poor outcomes, and current prosecutorial approaches often left officials struggling between the conflicting goals of aggressively prosecuting hoarders and avoiding further institutionalization of the animals. Unfortunately, lenient treatment of hoarders in exchange for immediate custody of the animals appeared to contribute to recidivism. More rapid identification of offenders as hoarders and more creative sentencing involving long-term monitoring could simultaneously speed resolution of cases and avoid extending the suffering of animal victims. | Article | |
| Longhi v. APHIS | 165 F3d 1057 (6th Cir. 1999) |
APHIS was unsuccessful in asserting that an applicant who is part of one license as a partnership can not apply for another as a corporation. |
Case | ||
| Looking for a Good Home: Balancing Interests in the Disposition of Impounded Animals to Owners and Rescues | Francesca Ortiz | 67 Syracuse L. Rev. 115 (2017) | This Article explores the scope of governmental authority to interfere with or terminate the property rights of pet owners in the interest of efficiency and effectiveness. Part I sets out the regulatory framework for local animal control programs, describing the process for handling and disposing of stray animals and the provisions designed to help reunite owners with their pets. Part II then turns to the issue of post-redemption ownership, discussing the recognized reach of the law and its limitations as well as the cases that have contemplated termination of an owner’s rights to a pet. Part III explores the policy reasons that support a clear demarcation of when ownership of an unclaimed, impounded animal should be established in the government, making possible a clear transfer of title from a public shelter to an adopter or transferee, and Part IV suggests means by which a local government might increase the possibility of reuniting an owner with a pet within the appropriate timeframe to avoid the conflicts created by late-redeeming owners. | Article | |
| Looking for a Nexus Between Trust Compassion, and Regulation: Colorados Search for Standards of Care for Private, Non-Profit Wildlife Sanctuaries | Katherine A. Burke | 12 Animal L. 39 (2005) | In 2004, the Colorado legislature amended its wildlife statutes, formally recognizing the existence of private, non-profit wildlife sanctuaries under the jurisdiction of the Colorado Division of Wildlife (CDOW). Opponents to the 2004 amendments and CDOW staff have repeatedly expressed concerns that private sanctuaries should not be authorized in the absence of regulations and enforcement mechanisms sufficient to protect the animals and the people who come into contact with them. In implementing the sanctuary statute, CDOW has followed a familiar pattern, relying on the accreditation program of the American Association of Zoological Parks and Aquariums (AZA) to provide the basis of its regulations. In doing so, CDOW has failed to understand that the AZA standards are wholly inappropriate for sanctuaries; they are inadequate to protect the safety of animals and humans; and they are overly burdensome and even diametrically opposed to the status and goals of private, non-profit wildlife sanctuaries. Instead, CDOW could have acknowledged the stringent, comprehensive, extensive standards promulgated by The Association of Sanctuaries (TAOS), which are carefully tailored to the operations of sanctuaries. This article considers the plight of Colorado wildlife sanctuaries, which is by no means peculiar to the state of Colorado, and carefully examines the standards promulgated by the AZA and by TAOS. The article concludes that the TAOS accreditation program would have provided a significantly better basis for sanctuary regulation, and that by failing to take advantage of this, CDOW has missed an important opportunity to create a nexus between trust, compassion, and regulation. | Article |