Results
Title |
Author | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Forest Guardians v. Veneman | 392 F.Supp.2d 1082 (D.Ariz.,2005) |
District Court held that United States Forest Service could issue permits that allow cattle on lands near waterways where spikedace and loach minnows live, both species are listed as "threatened" species, even though this grazing could delay their recovery. |
Case | ||
| Forgotten Victims of War: Animals and the International Law of Armed Conflict | Saba Pipia | 28 Animal L. 175 (2022) | The present article analyses the protection of animals in times of armed conflict. The primary objective of this article is to explore the relationship between animal law and international humanitarian law and to find out to what extent rules of animal welfare law can be applied during armed conflict and how international humanitarian law can protect animals. For this purpose, the article firstly provides an overview of legal scholarship, as well as a summary of existing international humanitarian law norms protecting animals. The article also discusses if existing models of protection of non-human victims of war, such as natural environment and cultural heritage, analogously, can be applied to include animals under the protection of international humanitarian law. Furthermore, possible scenarios of animal victimhood during wars are outlined and finally, the article offers several practical suggestions on how animal welfare law can become part of the international law of armed conflict. | Article | |
| Fortgang v. Woodland Park Zoo | 387 P.3d 690 (Wash. Jan. 12, 2017) | 2017 WL 121589, 187 Wash. 2d 509, 92846-1, 2017 WL 121589, at *1–11 (Wash. Jan. 12, 2017) |
To address the Zoo's growing size and complexity, Defendant Woodland Park Zoo Society (WPZS) entered into an “Operations and Management Agreement” (Agreement) with the City of Seattle. The Agreement gave WPZS exclusive rights and responsibilities regarding many areas such as the care, sale, and purchase of the Zoo's animals. The Agreement also contained several provisions addressing public oversight of the Zoo. Plaintiff Alyne Fortgang requested several categories of records, all pertaining to the Zoo's elephants. She filed the request under the Public Records Act (PRA), which requires every government agency to make records available for public inspection and copying. The Zoo's director of Communications and Public Affairs responded to Fortgang's request by asserting that the PRA did not apply because WPZS was a private company. Fortgang filed a lawsuit and alleged that WPZS violated the PRA by refusing to disclose certain records. The trial court granted WPZS's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action on the ground that WPZS was not an agency subject to PRA disclosure requirements. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed the Court of Appeals and held that the Telford test was the proper analytical framework for evaluating the private entity’s disclosure requirement. The Supreme Court reasoned that under the Telford analysis, WPZS was not the functional equivalent of a government agency. The court stated that although the second Telford factor was inconclusive, all the other factors weighed against PRA coverage: (1) WPZS did not perform an inherently governmental function by operating the Zoo; (2) the City did not exercise sufficient control over the Zoo's daily operations to implicate PRA concerns; (3) WPZS was created solely by private individuals and not government action and (4) because operating a zoo is not a nondelegable, “core” government function, the case did not involve the privatization of fundamentally public services. The Court of Appeals' decision was affirmed. |
Case | |
| Francis v. City of Indianapolis | 958 N.E.2d 816 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011, table, unpublished) | 2011 WL 5877241, 2011 Ind. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1605 | A dog rescue organization was cited with a violation of the city code for having a dog at large. One rescue dog escaped and lunged at a neighbor. Francis argued that the trial court erred in applying strict liability, challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, and challenged the constitutionality of the municipal ordinance. The trial court also found that a violation of the ordinance also imposed restrictions on Francis; she could no longer operate the animal rescue shelter and could only own or keep two dogs. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. | Case | |
| Franciscus v. Sevdik | 2016 PA Super 52 (Feb. 29, 2016) | 2016 WL 787905 | Five-year-old Femina asked the dog walker, Ms. Dailey, if she could pet Julius, the pit bull. When she bent over to do so, the dog jumped up and bit her on the chin. The Plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Franciscus commenced this negligence action to recover damages for injuries sustained by their daughter, Femina. They filed the action against Mr. Sevdik, the owner of the dog, Ms. Dailey, the dog walker, and Mr. Steigerwald, the individual owner and operator of Fetch Pet Care of West Hills/South Hills. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that summary judgment granted by the trial court in favor of Ms. Dailey and Fetch Pet Care was improper. The Court reasoned that the dog was entrusted to these Defendants by Mr. Sevdik and the dog was in their control when the injury occurred. Since the Defendants knew the dog jumped on people, was to be muzzled when walked, and was not to be walked along routes where there were people, specifically children and other dogs, they had a duty to use reasonable care to protect others from harm while the dog was in their control. While the court stated it did not need to reach the issue of whether the trial court erred in refusing refusing to take judicial notice of dangerous propensities of pit bulls, it noted that Pennsylvania law does not recognize a presumption that pit bulls as a breed are dangerous or have dangerous propensities. The order was vacated and the case was remanded. | Case | |
| Frank v. Animal Haven, Inc. | 107 A.D.3d 574 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept.,2013.) | 967 N.Y.S.2d 370, 2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 04711 |
Plaintiff was bitten by the dog that she adopted from Animal Haven, Inc. and sued that entity for personal injuries stemming from the bite. In affirming the decision to dismiss the complaint, this court noted that the adopting parties signed a contract a the time of adoption where they undertook a "lifetime commitment" for the responsible care of the dog. While the contract stipulated that Animal Haven had the right to have the dog returned if the plaintiff breached the contract, this did not reserve a right of ownership of the dog. Further, the contract also explicitly relieved Animal Haven of liability once the dog was in the possession of the adoptive parties. |
Case | |
| Fraudulent Service Dogs | The above map highlights the states that have laws against the use of fraudulent service dogs. As of 2025, there are 34 states with what can be termed true bans on the fraudulent representation of pets as service animals. States without these laws may have laws that prohibit the fraudulent representation of assistance animals in housing, but those laws are not included on this map and can be found here. In all states, violation of these laws are misdemeanor offenses or civil infractions and some states require community service with an organization that serves the disabled as part of sentencing upon conviction. | State map | |||
| Free Exercise Does Not Protect Animal Sacrifice: The Misconception of Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah and Constitutional Solutions for Stopping Animal Sacrifice | Shannon L. Doheny | 2 Journal of Animal Law 121 (2006) |
In 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a First Amendment religious free exercise challenge brought by a Florida Santerían church in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah. However, Lukumi may be the most misunderstood legal precedent in recent history. The decision is often cited for the proposition that religious practitioners have a constitutional right to engage in animal sacrifice. This is far from the truth. Lukumi was decided in a unique context, and its holding was not based on the merits of animal sacrifice. This article will demonstrate that Lukumi does not force government to acquiesce to animal sacrifice, or the “litter” it creates. |
Article | |
| FREE SPEECH, ANIMAL LAW, AND FOOD ACTIVISM | Howard F. Lyman | 5 Animal L. i (1999) | Howard Lyman discusses a case that provides an example of using the law to force activists to use their scarce resources in court to defend the right of free speech. | Article | |
| Free v. Jordan | 10 S.W.2d 19 (Ark. 1928) | 178 Ark. 168 (1928) |
In a replevin action to recover possession of a lost dog from its finder, the court reversed and remanded the case so a jury could determine whether the statute of limitations was tolled due to the defendant's alleged fraudulent concealment of his possession of the dog. |
Case |