Results
Title |
Author | Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Domestic Violence | Emilie Ridge |
Brief Summary of the Cycle of Domestic Violence and Animal Abuse |
Topical Introduction | |
| Domestic Violence and Pets: List of States that Include Pets in Protection Orders | Rebecca F. Wisch | Animal Legal & Historical Center | This document lists the states that include pets in domestic violence protection orders with links to the actual statutes. As of 2025, 41 states as well as D.C. and Puerto Rico have enacted such laws. Also, see the Map of Pets in Domestic Violence Orders linked below. | Article |
| Don't Buy the Doggy in the Window: Ending the Cycle That Perpetuates Commercial Breeding With Regulation Of The Retail Pet Industry | Katherine C. Tushaus | 14 Drake J. Agric. L. 501 (2009) |
This Note discusses the problems with legislation and legal barriers created to battle the problems puppy mills pose to dogs bred in the United States. It then considers the applicability of legislation aimed at dealing with puppy mills at the retail level as a possible cure to the inadequacies of American regulation. This Note discusses the need for uniform regulation that goes to the heart of what sustains puppy mills, the supply and demand created by retail in the pet industry, using the model of legislation introduced in Australia, the NSW Animals (Regulation of Sale) Bill. |
Article |
| Don't Feed the Animals: Queso's Law and How the Texas Legislature Abandoned Stray Animals, A Comment on H.B. 2328 and the New Tex. Penal Code § 42.092 | Jeremy Masten | 60 Baylor L. Rev. 964 (Fall 2008) |
This Comment considers Queso's Law, its amendments to section 42.092 of the Texas Penal Code, and the impact of those amendments on animal cruelty law in Texas. Part II discusses the historical background of animal cruelty laws both in Texas, prior to the 80th Legislature, and elsewhere. Part III discusses animal cruelty law in the wake of Queso's Law, including the elements of the offense as well as constitutional and policy concerns. Part IV proposes a solution to the concerns raised by Queso's Law. Finally, the Comment concludes that the expanded definition of animal created by Queso's Law is too broad and that slightly re-wording the definition to create a “custody carve-out” would better protect the interests of feral animals. |
Article |
| DON'T FENCE ME IN--APPLICATION OF THE UNLAWFUL INCLOSURES OF PUBLIC LANDS ACT TO BENEFIT WILDLIFE | 5 Animal L. 1 (1999) | The Bureau of Land Management and the Forest Service manage millions of acres of public land across the United States. Most of this land serves more than one purpose-grazing, mining, recreation, timber, wildlife-and thus must remain available for these uses. Historically, the Unlawful Inclosures Act (UIA) preserved access for ranchers and homesteaders. More recently, the UIA has also protected access for wildlife whose movements are impeded by fences or other illegal obstructions. This article argues that such protection should be extended to the Sonoran pronghorn antelope in the southwestern United States. | Article | |
| Donald HENDRICK and Concerned Citizens for True Horse Protection, Plaintiffs v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (USDA), and Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (Aphis), Defendants. | Slip Copy, 2007 WL 2900526 (W.D.Ky.) |
This matter is before the Court on the motion of Defendant United States Department of Agriculture's Motion to Dismiss. The Horse Protection Act (HPA) is federal legislation which outlaws the practice of “soring” (harm to the feet or limbs of horses in order to enhance the attractiveness of a light-stepped or high-stepping gait during horse-show performances), which is a particular concern for the breed of Tennessee Walking Horses. Plaintiffs seek to have the Court define “sore” and “scar” beyond the definitions provided in the regulations (specifically the “scar rule”). The court found, however, that any alleged or threatened injury based on the HPA or the Scar Rule has not yet occurred. Mere uncertainty about the HPA and Scar Rule alone does not create an injury in fact. |
Case | |
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Basic page | ||
| Doris Day Animal League v. Veneman | 315 F.3d 297 (D.C. Cir. 2003) | Animal rights group brought action challenging validity of regulation exempting breeders who sell dogs from their residences from licensure under Animal Welfare Act. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, J., held that regulation was invalid, and appeal was taken. The Court of Appeals, Randolph, Circuit Judge, held that regulation was reasonable interpretation of Congressional intent. | Case | |
| Dorman v. Satti | 678 F.Supp. 375 (D.Conn.,1988) | The federal district court here considered the constitutionality of Connecticut’s Hunter Harassment Act (Conn.Gen.Stat. Section 53a-183a) of 1985. The plaintiff was arrested under the Act after she approached hunters who were hunting waterfowl in public lands adjacent to her property and attempted to verbally dissuade them from hunting. The charge was ultimately dismissed, but plaintiff brought a Section 1983 action to adjudicate the constitutionality of the Act. In finding the Act unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, the Court found that it criminalized constitutionally protected speech. Specifically, the Court found that the Act failed to define “interference” and did not adequately limit the reach of “acts in preparation” to hunt. | Case | |
| Douglas Furbee, et al. v. Gregory L. Wilson, et. al. | 144 N.E.3d 801 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) | Shelly Linder lived in an apartment complex with a no-pet policy. Linder asked if she could have an emotional-support animal and provided a letter from a licensed family and marriage therapist, which stated that Linder had a disability and required an emotional-support animal to help alleviate her symptoms. The letter did not identify a specific disability and the landlord subsequently requested more information from Linder. Linder did not provide any additional information and instead brought her cat into her apartment as her emotional-support animal. The landlord charged Linder a fine after discovering the cat on the premises and gave her seven days in which to remove the cat. Linder failed to comply which led to Linder’s eviction. The Indiana Civil Rights Commission filed a complaint against the landlord on behalf of Linder in Delaware Circuit Court alleging that the landlord failed to accommodate her request for an emotional-support animal in turn violating the Indiana Fair Housing Act. The trial court denied summary judgment for the landlord and this appeal followed. The landlord conceded that Linder was disabled and requested a reasonable accommodation, however, the landlord argued that it was not given enough information from which to “meaningfully” review Linder’s request. The Delaware Court of Appeals agreed that the Landlord did not have sufficient information to meaningfully review Linder’s request and because Linder did not inform the Landlord about her disability and her need for the cat, she was acting in bad faith. The Court ultimately reversed and remanded the case to the trial court. | Case |
