Results
Title |
Author | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Com. v. Kneller | 987 A.2d 716 (Pa., 2009) | 2009 WL 5154265 (Pa.,2009), 605 Pa. 132 (2009) |
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania took up this appeal involving the defendant's criminal conspiracy to commit cruelty to animals after the defendant provided a gun and instructed her boyfriend to shoot and kill their dog after the dog allegedly bit the defendant’s child. The Supreme Court vacated the order of the Superior Court and remanded the case to the Superior Court (--- A.2d ----, 2009 WL 215322) in accordance with the dissenting opinion of the Superior Court's order. The Court further observed that the facts revealed no immediate need to kill the dog and that there was "unquestionably malicious beating of the dog" prior to it being shot. |
Case | |
| Com. v. Linhares | 957 N.E.2d 243 (Mass.App.Ct., 2011) | 80 Mass.App.Ct. 819 (2011); 2011 WL 5517133 (Mass.App.Ct.) |
Defendant intentionally hit a duck with his car and was convicted of cruelty to animals. The conviction was upheld by the Appeals Court because all that must be shown is that the defendant intentionally and knowingly did acts which were plainly of a nature to inflict unnecessary pain. Specific intent to cause harm is not required to support a conviction of cruelty to animals. |
Case | |
| Com. v. Raban | 31 A.3d 699 (Pa.Super., 2011) | 2011 PA Super 212 (2011); 2011 WL 4582435 (Pa.Super.) |
Defendant was convicted of violating the dog law for failing to properly confine his dog after it escaped from his property and attacked another dog. On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed, holding that 1) scienter was not a necessary element of the violation because the statutory mandate to confine a dog was stated absolutely, and 2) a dog attack is not a de minimis infraction that would preclude a conviction. |
Case | |
| Com. v. Seyler | 929 A.2d 262 (Pa.Cmwlth., 2007) | 2007 WL 2033260 (Pa.Cmwlth.) |
This Pennsylvania case construes the term "owner" for purposes of the state's Dog and Rabies Laws. Gretta R. Seyler appeals from an order of the trial court, which found her guilty of two counts each of violating Dog Law and guilty of two counts of violating Section 8 of the Rabies Prevention and Control in Domestic Animals and Wildlife Act after a pit bull jumped out of a window of her home and attacked a neighbor. First, the court found that there was no question that Seyler was caring for the dogs at the time the incident occurred or was permitting them to remain “on or about” the premises occupied by her. Although Seyler argues that the record clearly indicates that the two dogs were owned by her adult sons, the court found that the argument is without much force, as no paperwork showing the sons' ownership of the dogs was introduced at the hearing. Further, the court observed that the plain and unambiguous intent of Sections 8 of the Rabies Act and 305 of the Dog Law is that dogs be vaccinated and confined at all times. Thus, if the person having the property interest in a dog does not perform that function, then the statutes clearly require one harboring or caring for the dog, here Seyler, to perform it. |
Case | |
| Com. v. Trefry | 51 N.E.3d 502 (Mass. App. Ct., 2016), review denied, 475 Mass. 1104, 60 N.E.3d 1173 (2016) | 89 Mass. App. Ct. 568 (Mass. App. 2016), 2016 WL 3262665 | The Defendant Trefry, left her two sheepdogs, Zach and Kenji, alone on the property of her condemned home. An animal control officer noticed that Kenji was limping badly and took him to a veterinarian. Both dogs were removed from the property three days later. The Defendant was convicted of two counts of violating statute G.L. c. 140, § 174E(f ), which protects dogs from cruel conditions and inhumane chaining or tethering. The Defendant appealed. The Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Barnstable held that: (1) neither outside confinement nor confinement in general is an element of subjecting dogs to cruel conditions as prohibited by statute; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support finding that the defendant subjected her dogs to cruel conditions. The Appeals Court reasoned that the defendant subjected her dogs to cruel conditions in violation of the statute because by the time they were removed, the dogs were “incredibly tick-infested” and “matted,” and Kenji had contracted Lyme disease and sustained a soft shoulder injury to his leg. An animal control officer also testified that the defendant's home was cluttered on the inside and overgrown on the outside. The yard also contained items that posed a danger to the animals. There was also sufficient evidence to infer that, while the dogs could move in and out of the condemned house, the dogs were confined to the house and fenced-in yard. The area to which the dogs were confined presented with every factor listed in § 174E(f)(1) as constituting “filthy and dirty” conditions. Also, "Zach's and Kenji's emotional health was further compromised by being left alone virtually all day every day" according to the court. Therefore the Defendant’s conviction was affirmed. | Case | |
| Com. v. Zalesky | 906 N.E.2d 349, (Mass.App.Ct.,2009) | 74 Mass.App.Ct. 908; 2009 WL 1351751 (Mass.App.Ct.) |
In this Massachusetts case, the defendant was convicted of cruelty to an animal, in violation of G.L. c. 272, § 77. On appeal, the defendant contended that the evidence was insufficient to establish his guilt; specifically, that the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that his actions exceeded what was necessary and appropriate to train the dog. A witness in this case saw defendant beat his dog with a plastic "whiffle" bat on the head about 10 times. The defendant told the officer who arrived on the scene that he had used the bat on previous occasions, and did so to “put the fear of God in [the] dog.” At trial, a veterinarian testified that the dog suffered no trauma from the bat, but probably experienced pain if struck repeatedly in that manner. The court found that defendant's behavior fell under the ambit of the statutes because his actions were cruel, regardless of whether defendant viewed them as such. Judgment affirmed.
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Case | |
| Combating Animal Cruelty with Environmental Law Tactics | De Anna Hill | 4 Journal of Animal Law 19 (2008) |
Many individuals and citizen groups view federal and state anti-cruelty statutes as inadequate in protecting animals and in providing sufficient remedies. Unlike animal cruelty statutes like the Animal Welfare Act (AWA), many of the federal environmental statutes provide citizen suit provisions or otherwise allow interested parties to sue for enforcement. Citizen suit provisions in environmental statutes increase accessibility of the courts to the public. There are many instances where citizens groups have filed federal environmental citizen suits against federal agencies and private facilities that would be considered by many to be actively involved in or to have facilitated acts of animal cruelty. Animal protectionists have attempted and continue to attempt to further protection of animals by filing or supporting suits under environmental law against federal agencies and private facilitators of animal cruelty. |
Article | |
| Comm'n on Hum. Rts. & Opportunities ex rel. Pizzoferrato v. Mansions | --- A.3d ----, 231 Conn. App. 121 (2025) | The Connecticut Appellate Court reversed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, Wendy and Rudy Pizzoferrato, holding that they failed to establish their housing discrimination claim under General Statutes § 46a-64c. The case arose when the defendants, The Mansions, LLC, initially approved the Pizzoferratos’ request for an accommodation to keep two emotional support dogs—despite a "no pets" policy—but later rescinded approval for the second dog, demanding additional documentation to justify its necessity. The trial court found that the defendants violated fair housing laws by constructively denying the accommodation request, ruling that Wendy had a mental disability under § 46a-51(20) either because she had a "record of" generalized anxiety disorder or was "regarded as" disabled by the defendants, and that two dogs were necessary for her equal enjoyment of the dwelling. On appeal, the Appellate Court agreed that Wendy qualified as disabled under the "record of" prong based on her therapist’s diagnosis, even if imperfectly documented, but rejected the trial court’s conclusion that two dogs were "necessary" under the statute. Relying on federal precedent, particularly Vorchheimer v. Philadelphian Owners Assn., the court held that "necessary" means indispensable, not merely preferable, and the plaintiffs failed to show that both dogs were essential rather than simply beneficial. Because the defendants offered to allow one dog—an alternative that would have satisfied Wendy’s needs—the court found no violation of fair housing laws and reversed the judgment. The decision clarifies that while housing providers must reasonably accommodate disabilities, plaintiffs must demonstrate that requested accommodations are truly essential, not just advantageous, to secure legal protection. | Case | ||
| Commentary: Bermudez v. Hanan | John Ensminger | Animal Legal & Historical Center |
This article provides commentary on the case of Bermudez v. Hanan, 2013 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4397, 2013 NY Slip Op 51610(U), which concerned dog bite liability for a therapy dog. |
Article | |
| Commercial Breeding of Companion Animals and Sale of Pets | Policy |