Results
Title |
Author | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Callahan v. Woods | 736 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1984) |
Plaintiff alleged the requirement that his infant daughter receive a social security number as a prerequisite to obtain public benefits infringed on his free exercise of religion. Since the court held that the the social security number requirement substantially interfered with plaintiff's free exercise of religious beliefs, the compelling interest test was applied to determine constitutionality of the regulation. This substantial burden/compelling interest test became the model for infringement of religious exercise claims, including those under the BGEPA. For application of this test to religious challenges to the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act . |
Case | ||
| Calling off the Hunt: The Morality of Supporting a Ban on Commercial Whaling | Tyler Dewey | Animal Legal & Historical Center |
This note examines the current deadlock in the IWC, discusses the shift from conservation towards preservation, and argues for a continuation of the moratorium based on moral and ethical concern for whales as whales. Part I traces the history of whaling and whale regulation. Part II discusses the current regulatory scheme. Part III analyzes the Preservationist position as it concerns whales. It builds from a discussion of the uncertain science concerning whale populations and stock recovery, to a discussion of the pain and suffering inflicted on whales by current whale practices, and finishes by arguing that whales, as unique and intelligent mammals, deserve protection as such. |
Article | |
| Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station | 632 P.2d 1066 (Hawaii, 1981) | 63 Haw. 557 (1981) |
The plaintiffs' dog died after being left in a hot van during transport from the Hawaii Quarantine Station to the veterinarian's office. The court held that it was not necessary for plaintiffs to witness the dog's death to recover for serious mental distress and that medical testimony was not necessary to substantiate plaintiffs' claims of emotional distress. In affirming the trial court's award for damages for the loss of property (the dog), the court held that the trial "court correctly applied the standards of law . . . and the issues of whether the damages were proximately caused by the defendant and have resulted in serious emotional distress to the plaintiffs are therefore within the discretion of the trier of fact." |
Case | |
| Campbell v. Supervalu | 2007 WL 891682 (N.D.Ind.) | North District Court of Indiana dismissed a claim that Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) preempted the plaintiff's state law claims. While a past court decision held that FMIA preempted state attempts to regulate meat inspection, this case was distinguishable because the suit focused on an alleged act of negligence that fell outside inspection of meat and because the state is not placing additional or different requirements then those set by FMIA. | Case | ||
| CAN NONHUMAN ANIMALS FIND TORT PROTECTION IN A HUMAN-CENTERED COMMON LAW? | Enger McCartney-Smith | 4 Animal L. 173 (1998) | The question of 'Rights allocation" typically hinges on society's distinction between legal and moral entitlement. Although many rights find support in both categories, not all rights grounded in societal morality are likewise accorded legal status. The animal rights movement, particularly in the last three decades, has advanced the recognition of nonhuman animals' moral entitlements, but corresponding legal rights have been slow to follow. This Comment explores this gap in nonhuman animals' rights allocation with an eye toward establishing a basis for a private right of intentional tort action. Through appeal to predominant tort jurisprudential theories, in conjunction with an examination of our scientifically and experientially grounded understanding of nonhuman animals, the Comment concludes that there is room in our current legal system for direct recognition of, and compensation for, intentional injurious behavior aimed at nonhuman animals | Article | |
| Can the Injured Pet Owner Look to Liability Insurance for Satisfaction of a Judgment? The Coverage Implications of Damages for the Injury or Death of a Companion Animal | Mark Sadler | 11 Animal L. 283 (2005) | Much has been written in recent years regarding the important role pets play in our society and the legal consequences that have developed from that relationship. Both our courts and legislatures have recognized, in certain circumstances, the ability of a pet owner to recover from a wrongdoer in the event of negligent or intentional conduct that results in the death or injury of a companion animal. However, securing a damages award and recovering on a judgment secured may present the aggrieved pet owner with two entirely different challenges. Liability insurance coverage is critical to the latter concern. Although results can vary considerably by jurisdiction, questions such as the definition of covered damages and the operation of the intentional acts exclusion are likely to play a key role in any analysis. This paper provides a broad overview of some of the larger issues regarding coverage applicability, and illustrates the possible application of these principals by applying them to the facts of cases which have found damages for pet owners where their animals have been injured or killed as a result of negligent, reckless or intentional conduct. | Article | |
| Can We Stand for It? Amending the Endangered Species Act with an Animal-Suit Provision | Katherine A. Burke | 75 U. Colo. L. Rev. 633 (2004) |
This article argues that the intent of the ESA would be realized if the standing requirements under the act were expanded to include an animal-suit provision in addition to the citizen-suit provision. The article begins with a brief discussion of the legislative history and the statutory requirements of the ESA, and then delineates the doctrine of standing generally. It concludes that the enactment of an animal-suit provision in the ESA would be consistent with the intent behind the ESA, would be a valid exercise of congressional power, would satisfy the principles inherent in the Court's approach to standing, and could be comfortably realized through next friend representation of qualified animal plaintiffs. |
Article | |
| Canada | Jacquelyn Shaw |
Brief Summary of the Canadian Legal System
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Topical Introduction | ||
| Canada | Policy | ||||
| Canada - Alberta - Alberta Statutes. Animal Protection Act | R.S.A. 2000, c. A-41, s. 1 | This set of laws from Alberta, Canada comprises the Animal Protection Act. The Act states that no person shall permit or cause an animal to be in distress. Specifically, a person who owns or is in charge of an animal must ensure that the animal has adequate food and water, must provide the animal with adequate care when the animal is wounded or ill, and must provide the animal with reasonable protection from injurious heat or cold as well as adequate shelter, ventilation and space. A person who contravenes this Act is guilty of an offence and liable to a fine of not more than $20,000 in addition to restrictions on owning animals for a specified period of time. The Act also outlines the power of both peace officers to take animals in distress into their custody and humane societies to provide care for seized animals. | Statute |
