Full Title Name:  CAN NONHUMAN ANIMALS FIND TORT PROTECTION IN A HUMAN-CENTERED COMMON LAW?

Summary: The question of 'Rights allocation" typically hinges on society's distinction between legal and moral entitlement. Although many rights find support in both categories, not all rights grounded in societal morality are likewise accorded legal status. The animal rights movement, particularly in the last three decades, has advanced the recognition of nonhuman animals' moral entitlements, but corresponding legal rights have been slow to follow. This Comment explores this gap in nonhuman animals' rights allocation with an eye toward establishing a basis for a private right of intentional tort action. Through appeal to predominant tort jurisprudential theories, in conjunction with an examination of our scientifically and experientially grounded understanding of nonhuman animals, the Comment concludes that there is room in our current legal system for direct recognition of, and compensation for, intentional injurious behavior aimed at nonhuman animals