United States

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Titlesort ascending Summary
ANIMAL CONSORTIUM This article will show that sufficient relational interest can exist between a human and companion animal and that this interest is widely accepted in our culture; therefore, financial recovery for the disruption of this relationship is a fair burden to place upon actors in today's world. This proposal does not seek to give any legal rights to companion animals; instead, this is a proposal to allow the law to acknowledge the depth and reality of the bond between humans and animals that exists in millions of families across the country. First, this article sets out the existing categories of damage for recovery when a defendant's tortious actions result in the death of a companion animal. Integral to this discussion is the reality that companion animals are considered property. Courts most often are unwilling to extend financial recovery to include the emotional loss of the owner of an animal. Second, this article will examine the history of the concept of consortium to show how the legal system has come to accept that the compensable harm is not limited to economic consequences, nor is it limited to husband and wife relationships. Third, this article will present information to support the position that companion animals are emotionally and psychologically important to the human members of many families. Fourth, this article will show that animals have already jumped out of the property box in a number of fact patterns, and therefore, it is appropriate to raise their status in this context as well. Fifth, this article will consider the application of the concept of animal consortium in detail as an extension of the common law cause of action. Finally, acknowledging some of the difficulties that courts may have in implementing this proposal, a legislative draft is proposed to accomplish the recovery sought by this article.
Andrus v. L.A.D.


Patron sued dog owner for damages after an alleged attack.  The Court of Appeals, in reversing a finding for the patron, held that the patron did not establish that the dog posed an unreasonable risk of harm, which precluded a strict liability finding, and, that patron did not prove that the dog owner was negligent.  Reversed.

Andrus v. Allard


The Court holds that the narrow exception in the BGEPA for "possession and transportation" of pre-existing eagles and eagle artifacts does not extend to sale of the those lawfully obtained artifacts.  The legislative history and plain language of the statute is clear on Congress' intent to prohibit any commerce in eagles.  This prohibition on commerce in eagle artifacts does not constitute an unconstitutional taking because the ability to sell the property is but one strand in the owner's bundle of property rights.  The denial of one property right does not automatically equate a taking.  For further discussion on the prohibition in commerce of pre-existing eagle artifacts, see

Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act.

Andrews v. City of West Branch Iowa
Anderson v. State Department of Natural Resources


A paper manufacturing company sprayed pesticides on their tree grove, but accidentally over sprayed killing some of plaintiff's commercial bees.  The commercial beekeeper sued the paper manufacturing company and the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the paper company.  The Supreme Court of Minnesota ultimately reversed the grants of summary judgment on the commercial beekeeper's negligence claims and affirmed dismissal of the nuisance claims. 

Anderson v. State (Unpublished)


After shooting a pet dog to prevent harm to Defendant's own dog, Defendant challenges his animal cruelty conviction.  Defendant argues that since he was attempting to kill the dog, he did not intend to torture or mutilate the dog within the meaning of the statute.  The court affirms his conviction, reasoning that the evidentiary record below supported his conviction.

Anderson v. Evans


Concerned citizens and animal conservation groups brought an action against United States government, challenging the government's approval of quota for whale hunting by Makah Indian Tribe located in Washington state.  On appeal by the plaintiffs, the Court of Appeals held that the failure of the government to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement before approving a whale quota for the Makah Tribe violated National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).  The court also found that the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) applied to tribe's proposed whale hunt, as the proposed whale takings were not excluded by the treaty with the tribe.

Anderson v. Evans


Advocacy groups challenged governments approval of quota for whale hunting by the Makah Indian Tribe.  The Court of Appeals held that in granting the quota, the government violated the NEPA by failing to prepare an impact statement, and, that the MMPA applied to the tribe's whale hunt.  REVERSED.

Anderson v. Creighton


Suit was brought against FBI agent seeking damages resulting from warrantless search of residents' home.

Anderson v. City of Camden


Defendant Animal Control officers took Plaintiffs' two dogs pursuant to a pick-up order issued by a Magistrate of Kershaw County. The two dogs had a history of attacking other dogs and of running loose. Plaintiffs filed Fourth Amendment and South Carolina Tort Claims Act claims against Defendants. Court granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment because they did not violate a clearly established constitutional law, and were, therefore, entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claim.

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