Cases

Case name Citationsort ascending Summary
Sentencia C-467/16 Sentencia C-467/16 This lawsuit seeks the unconstitutionality of articles 665 and 658 of the Civil Code that define "movable objects" and "real property by destination." The plaintiff alleges that these categorizations are against the Constitution's environmental orientation and international agreements. The court upheld the validity of these articles and stated that such categorizations were not against legally considering animals as sentient beings deserving of protection against pain and suffering. In other words, the protection of animals is not affected by this language. "Animals are included in the category of property because property rights may be exercised over them, and animals are often the subjects of legal transactions. Therefore, categorizing animals as property responds to a necessity and does not affect the regulation in other provisions to develop the duty to protect animals as sentient beings (Law 1774, 2016)."
Sentencia C-439, 2011 Sentencia C-439, 2011 This is an unconstitutionality claim against Article 87 of Ley 769, 2002 (Trafic Code), relating the transportation of animals on vehicles of public transportation. Article 87 of Ley 769, established that only guide dogs could travel in this type of transportation when accompanying a blind person. The Plaintiff argued that this Article, which prohibited the transportation of animals on vehicles like buses and taxis, violated the right to equality, rights to personal and family privacy, right to free development of personality, freedom of locomotion, and private property. The court concluded that there was a violation to the right to free development of personality, freedom to locomotion, and to private property of the owners of domestic animals. The court added domestic animals as an exception to article 87, of Ley 769, meaning that this prohibition still remains for specimens of the wild fauna. Domestic animals now can travel on vehicles of public transportation, so long they are transported in conditions of health, safety, comfort and tranquility according to the applicable rules. The court also considered that a pertinent regulation was necessary to establish the requirements to transport animals on public vehicles.
Sentencia C-367, 2006 Sentencia C-367, 2006 Decision C-367 decides on the unconstitutionality of some of the provisions of the Taurine Regulatory Statute. The Court held the provisions constitutional, but added a limitation to the participation of minors in the practice of bullfighting. With this decision, children under 14 cannot participate in the “cuadrillas.” The term “cuadrillas” is used to describe the group of people that accompany and assist the matador in the bullring throughout the duration of the bullfight. Sentencia C-367 imposes the principle of impartiality on the behavior of Mayors. Mayors have to act in strict accordance to the Law and the Constitution, and must be impartial when it comes to making decisions that affect this activity. According to this principle, “Mayors have the duty to act, recognizing that the purpose of the different procedures is to assure and guarantee the rights of all the people without any level of discrimination.” The Court also reaffirmed that Congress has complete power to legislate on bullfighting on the national level.
Sentencia C-283, 2014 Sentencia C-283/14 This is an unconstitutionality claim against Articles 1º, 2º and 3º of Ley 1638, 2013 that prohibit the use of native and exotic wild animals in circuses. Plaintiffs argued that these Articles violated numerous provisions of the Constitution, including the right to work, right to choose a profession, rights to culture and recreation, and a violation to the freedom private initiative of the owners of the circuses. In decision C-283, the court held that Congress has the power to prohibit certain cultural manifestations that involve animal cruelty. The Court stated that “culture needs to be permanently reevaluated so it can adapt to human evolution, to guarantee of rights and the fulfillment of duties. Especially when the purpose is to eliminate the traces of a marginalized society that has excluded certain individuals and collectives.” The court also stated that the duty to protect animals is not absolute, as its application can be limited by values, principles and constitutional norms in specific cases that are contradictory to the principales. The judge must analyze each case under a reasonableness test, in a way that cultural manifestations can work harmoniously with the rights, principles, and duties established in the legal system. The Court held Article 1 of Ley 1638, 2013 constitutional, and refrains from deciding on the constitutionality of Articles 2 and 3, for lack of evidence to render a decision.
Sentencia C-148/22 - Colombia Sentencia C-148/22 Attorney Gabriel Andrés Suárez Gómez filed an unconstitutionality complaint with the Constitutional Court, arguing that recreational fishing violated the precautionary principle, the right to a healthy environment, and the prohibition of animal cruelty. Following the precedent created with C-045, 2019, prohibiting sport or trophy hunting, the Colombian Constitutional Court held on May 2, 2022, that the provisions concerning recreational fishing contained in various national laws were unconstitutional, effectively banning this practice in the entire territory. The court found that fishing for the sole purpose of recreation without any other relevant purposes like commercial or sustenance constitutes a form of animal abuse. Specifically, the court emphasized that the mandate of animal protection stems from the principle of the ecological constitution, the social function of property, and human dignity. Moreover, it was pointed out that, in this context, both the Legislature and the Court have previously recognized all animals as sentient beings. The court held that while it is not possible to define with absolute certainty the harmful consequences of recreational fishing in terms of conservation and animal welfare principles or the degradation of hydrobiological resources, there is relevant scientific information that must be considered to avoid harmful effects on fish and the habitat. Regarding animal sentience, after an exhaustive analysis, the court emphasized that there are compelling reasons to consider that fish can feel pain, and the mandate of animal protection requires treating sentient beings with dignity. Similarly, according to the FAO, there is currently no method capable of fully eliminating the mistreatment of fish, and there are environmental impacts that must be seriously considered alongside the economic benefits proposed in favor of recreational fishing. This situation led the Constitutional Court to activate the precautionary principle. The court held that there is a duty to protect animals, which implied a prohibition of animal cruelty. This duty protects both the ecosystemic balance and individual sentient animals with intrinsic value. This protection is differentiated and weighted based on the type of species involved, whether domestic or wild. Moreover, the duty of animal protection carries an indisputable binding effect, requiring assessments of reasonableness and proportionality in its application by both legislators and judges. After an extensive analysis of the positive and negative effects that the prohibition of this activity would carry out, the court concluded that recreational fishing constitutes a form of animal cruelty that violates the right to a healthy environment, specifically the prohibition against animal cruelty in accordance with laws and constitutional jurisprudence that lacked constitutional support as it is not grounded in constitutionally permissible limits for animal mistreatment, such as (a) religious freedom; (b) dietary habits; (c) medical research and experimentation; and (d) deeply rooted cultural practices. Considering the interests of those affiliated with the activity, who would be significantly impacted by the invalidation of the laws subject to this opinion, and who have been conducting activities under laws previously deemed constitutional, the court decided to defer the effects of the decision for one year. This was with the purpose of allowing those adversely affected by it to adapt to the new circumstances.
Sentencia C-148/22 - Colombia Sentencia C-148/22 El abogado Gabriel Andrés Suárez Gómez presentó una demanda de inconstitucionalidad ante la Corte Constitucional, argumentando que la pesca recreativa violaba el principio de precaución, el derecho a un medio ambiente sano y la prohibición de crueldad animal. Siguiendo el precedente creado con la sentencia C-045 de 2019, que prohíbe la caza deportiva, la Corte Constitucional de Colombia decidió el 2 de mayo del 2022 que las disposiciones relativas a la pesca recreativa contenidas en diversas leyes nacionales eran inconstitucionales, prohibiendo efectivamente esta práctica en todo el territorio. La corte determinó que pescar con fines recreativos, sin ningún otro propósito relevante como comercial o de sustento, constituye una forma de crueldad animal. Específicamente, la corte enfatizó que el mandato de protección animal se deriva del principio de la constitución ecológica, la función social de la propiedad y la dignidad humana. Además, se señaló que, en este contexto, tanto el legislativo como la corte han reconocido previamente a todos los animales como seres sintientes. La corte sostuvo que, aunque no es posible definir con certeza absoluta las consecuencias dañinas de la pesca recreativa en términos de principios de conservación y bienestar animal o la degradación de los recursos hidrobiológicos, existe información científica relevante que debe ser considerada para evitar efectos perjudiciales en los peces y el hábitat. Respecto a la sintiencia animal, tras un exhaustivo análisis, la corte enfatizó que hay razones convincentes para considerar que los peces pueden sentir dolor, y el mandato de protección animal requiere tratar a los seres sintientes con dignidad. De manera similar, según la FAO, actualmente no existe ningún método capaz de eliminar completamente el maltrato a los peces, y hay impactos ambientales que deben ser considerados seriamente junto con los beneficios económicos propuestos a favor de la pesca recreativa. Esta situación llevó a la Corte Constitucional a activar el principio de precaución. La corte determinó que hay un deber de proteger a los animales que implica proteger tanto el equilibrio ecosistémico como a los animales sintientes individuales con valor intrínseco. Esta protección se diferencia y pondera en función del tipo de especie involucrada, ya sea doméstica o silvestre. Además, el deber de protección animal lleva consigo un efecto vinculante indiscutible, que requiere evaluaciones de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad en su aplicación tanto por parte de legisladores como de jueces. Tras un extenso análisis de los efectos positivos y negativos que conllevaría la prohibición de esta actividad, la corte concluyó que la pesca recreativa constituye una forma de crueldad animal que viola el derecho a un medio ambiente sano, específicamente la prohibición contra la crueldad animal de acuerdo con leyes y jurisprudencia constitucional que carecían de respaldo constitucional al no estar fundamentadas en límites permisibles constitucionalmente para el maltrato animal, como (a) la libertad religiosa; (b) los hábitos alimenticios; (c) la investigación médica y experimentación; y (d) prácticas culturales arraigadas. Teniendo en cuenta los intereses de aquellos afiliados a la actividad, que se verían significativamente afectados por la invalidación de las leyes sujetas a esta opinión, y que han estado llevando a cabo actividades bajo leyes previamente consideradas constitucionales, la corte decidió posponer los efectos de la decisión por un año. Esto con el propósito de permitir que aquellos afectados adversamente por ella se adapten a las nuevas circunstancias.
Sentencia C-148, 2022 Sentencia C-148, 2022 In this opportunity, the Colombian Constitutional Court deemed national recreational fishing regulations unconstitutional three years after banning recreational hunting. Specifically, the Court determined that provisions pertaining to this matter, contained in the Code of Natural Renewable Resources, the General Statute of Animal Protection, and the Fishing Statute, violated the government's constitutional obligation to protect the environment, the right to environmental education, and the prohibition of animal cruelty. The Court recognized constitutional limitations on the prohibition of animal cruelty that were based on religious freedom, eating habits, medical research and experimentation, and deeply rooted cultural manifestations. Consequently, the Court held that fishing for recreational purposes was a cruel practice that did not fall within any of these exceptions.
Sentencia C-115/06 Sentencia C-115/06 In this opportunity, the Court held that bullfighting represents a cultural manifestation and artistic expression of human beings that the legal system must protect. Therefore, bullfighting could not be considered a violent act in terms of article 12 of the Constitution because the prohibition of torture and cruel treatment or punishment presumes an act to be violent when it is against a human being. In turn, bullfighting cannot be considered a violent act because here, there is no treatment that is incompatible with human dignity.
Sentencia C-041, 2017 Sentencia C-041, 2017 Sentencia C-041 is one of the most important court decisions on bullfighting. On this occasion, the court held unconstitutional Article 5 of Ley 1774 of 2016 that referred to the Article 7 of the Statute of Animal Protection. Article 7 contains the seven activities that involve animals for entertainment that are exempted from the duty of animal protection. The practices permitted correspond to rejoneo, coleo, bullfighting, novilladas, corralejas, becerradas and tientas (all variations of bullfighting), cockfighting and all the related practices. Even though the court held that the legislature had fallen into a lack of constitutional protection towards animals, and stated that bullfighting was cruel and inhumane, it deferred the effects of its sentence and gave Congress a two-year period to decide whether bullfighting and the other exception established in Article 7 of the Statute of Animal Protection will continue to be legally allowed. If after this period, the Congress has not legislated on the matter, decision C-041, 2017 will take full effect and bullfighting along with all the practices established in Article 7 will be considered illegal.
Council of the State, Sentencia 22.592 of May 23, 2012 Sentencia 22.592 of May 23, 2012 Appeal, brought by the Plaintiff, who sought compensation for negligence on the part of the municipality of Anserma for the wrongful death of her husband, who died in the corrals of the slaughterhouse of Anserma when a bull charged him, causing him to fall and hit his head. The Plaintiff alleged that the slaughterhouse facilities were in poor condition, which was the cause of her husband’s death. If the facilities have been in good condition, he would not have had the accident. The court analyzed whether the damage was a result of the municipality's negligence as it did not maintained the facilities in a safe condition, or, if alternatively, it was an unfortunate accident not imputable to the Defendant. The court concluded that the Plaintiff did not present enough evidence to prove that the conditions of the facilities were the cause of the death of her husband. The court also found that the municipality was not in charge of the cattle in the slaughterhouse. Therefore, the damages were not imputable to the municipality. Furthermore, the court found the deceased was not an employee of the municipality, he was an independent employee that was hired by the slaughterhouse workers to assist them during the slaughter of cattle. The Court affirms the decision of the lower court and declares an exception of unconstitutionality of the expression “and if he alleges that he was not able to avoid the damage, he will not be heard.” of the Article 2354 of the Civil Code In its reasoning, the court determined that the accident was a result of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk on the part of the deceased, and not a result of the behavior of the animal. The court addressed Article 2354 of the Civil Code, that established that the caretaker of a fierce animal that does not report any benefit for the owner will be responsible for the damages the animal may cause, but if he alleges that if the damages were unavoidable, he will not be heard. The court declared unconstitutional the line “ and if he alleges that he was not able to avoid the damage, he will not be heard.” The court stated that it was inappropriate to address this scenario that involves responsibility derived from the behavior of animals under the parameters in the Civil Code that treated animals as goods. As today, it was of common acceptance that animals are sentient beings. Animals just as disabled people and other beings had dignity in themselves. They have a vital purpose, so much that they can enter a direct and permanent relationship with humans. The court continues to say that without this idea, the notion of legal capacity and the recognition of fundamental rights for legal persons could not exist. Animals should not be compared to objects or things, as they have dignity. The court recognized that animals and other living beings have their own value, and that even if it is acceptable that they are used for the human’s own benefit, it does not prevent us from recognizing that they are living beings, endowed with own value, and therefore subject to some rights.
Sentencia 09333-2022-00667T - Ecuador Sentencia 09333-2022-00667T Este es el caso de cuatro gatos llamados Luna, Manchas, Sonic y Tiger y dos perros, Pantera y Noah que estaban dentro de las propiedades confiscadas por las autoridades en un caso de tráfico de drogas. El abogado Kevin Prendes Vivar presentó un recurso de habeas corpus en representación de los cuidadores de los animales, alegando que los animales estaban siendo retenidos ilegalmente por el "Secretario Técnico de Gestión Inmobiliaria del Sector Público" o "Inmobiliar", la agencia gubernamental que confiscó las propiedades. El demandante argumentó que los animales, como sujetos de derechos según la decisión de la Corte Constitucional 253-20-JH/22, estaban en un estado de soledad que los ponía en riesgo de problemas de salud y bienestar, ya que estos animales tenían un apego emocional a sus cuidadores. Los animales son seres sensibles diferentes de otros objetos, y su detrimento se refleja en su salud física y emocional, causando condiciones como depresión y ansiedad, condiciones que podrían poner fin potencialmente a su vida. Los animales estaban siendo retenidos por 'Inmobiliar', y los demandantes no habían recibido ninguna información sobre la condición de los animales. Además, los demandantes estaban preocupados por la condicion de los animales ya que no tenian conocimiento acerca de su alimentacion. Especialmente porque 'Inmobiliar' no tenía presupuesto para alimentar a los animales sujetos a confiscaciones. Según loa demandante, los animales eran miembros de su familia, y sus hijos sufrían sin ellos. El tribunal provincial de Guyanas concedió el habeas corpus, sosteniendo que los animales son sujetos de derechos, encontrando que 'Inmobiliar' había violado los derechos de los animales al considerarlos propiedad personal embargable. Por lo tanto, el tribunal determinó que su confiscación era ilegal, arbitraria e ilegítima. Para proteger sus derechos a la vida, la libertad y la integridad, ordenó a 'Inmobiliar' devolver los animales a sus cuidadores. En su análisis, el tribunal afirmó que, según el caso de Estrellita, los animales no deberían ser protegidos únicamente desde una perspectiva del ecosistema o desde la perspectiva de las necesidades humanas, sino más bien desde su individualidad y su valor intrínseco. El tribunal también instruyó a la entidad gubernamental a no considerar más a las "mascotas" como semovientes en futuros procedimientos judiciales, y a distribuir, a través del correo electrónico institucional, a todos sus funcionarios la decisión de la corte constitucional 253-20-JH/22, ordenándoles leerla y analizarla. Esta decisión fue apelada por 'Inmobiliar' y la sala especializada en lo penal de la Corte Provincial de Justicia de Guyanas anuló la decisión que otorgaba el habeas corpus a favor de los animales, afirmando que este mecanismo legal no era apropiado en el caso de animales domésticos. En su fallo, el tribunal ordenó la devolución de los animales a "Inmobiliar". Esta decisión ha sido enviada a la Corte Constitucional para su revisión. Si la corte la selecciona, decidirá si un recurso de habeas corpus es apropiado en casos relacionados específicamente con animales de compañía.
ROL:293-15 “La arrastrada de Freirina” RIT No. 323-2014 This is the case of a pregnant dog dragged by a truck. The defendants also assaulted and threatened two people that witnessed the event and attempted to stop it. The court found the three defendants guilty of animal cruelty and sentenced them to 61 days in jail and a fine of 2 UTM for these charges. Additional jail time and penalties were given on the charges of assault, threatening, and damage to property.
Resolución 063/2018 - Mexico Resolución 063/2018 - Mexico The Human Rights Commission of the state of Guerrero, Mexico (Comisión de los Derechos Humanos del Estado de Guerrero) is the administrative authority responsible for overseeing human rights violations and issuing public recommendations and complaints when such violations are attributed to state and municipal authorities and public employees (See Comisión de los Derechos Humanos del Estado de Guerrero). In response to a complaint filed by members of the civil association “Responsible Citizen,” a professor, and students from the Master’s in Law program at the Autonomous University of Guerrero, the Commission addressed concerns against the director of the Zoochilpan Zoo. The complaint alleged violations of the Rights of Nature (recognized in Guerrero’s constitution since 2014) and the right to a healthy environment due to subpar conditions in which the zoo housed its animals. The complainants requested an inspection of the zoo to corroborate the conditions in which the animals were kept, which negatively affected their physical and mental health. During the inspection, the Commission observed animals of diverse species cohabiting, a pond with dirty water, and animals living in small enclosures. In addition, the President of the Institute for Handling and Conservation of Biodiversity stated that the zoo did not meet the standards of the Association of Zoos, breeders, and aquariums (AZCARM). Recommendations were issued, citing substandard conditions such as underweight animals, dirty enclosures, and improper feeder placement. As a result of these inspections, the Commission concluded that the animals were housed in inadequate conditions, violating Art 43, fractions I, XI, and XVII of the state anti-cruelty law. Moreover, it noted that these conditions could impact the human rights to a healthy environment for both visitors and zoo staff. The Commission’s recommendations are as follows: (1) The Secretary of the Environment and Natural Resources of the State is advised to develop and implement the recommendations issued by the President of the Institute for the Management and Conservation of Biodiversity and the General Attorney for Environmental Protection to guarantee the respectful and dignified treatment of the exhibited animals, their protection, and health, and to provide a healthy environment to humans; (2) The Commission recommended ongoing training for the zoo’s staff to cultivate a culture of protection and the dignified, respectful treatment of exhibited animals. This measure also aligns with the protection of the Rights of Nature, acknowledging animals as integral parts of it; (3) The Zoo Director is advised to implement both legal and administrative measures to ensure their animals’ dignified and respectful treatment. This included developing a budget that allocates funds for creating the necessary infrastructure, providing adequate food, and establishing optimal health conditions. These measures would allow wildlife to live in conditions similar to those of their species.
Resolución 063/2018 - Comisión Derechos Humanos del Estado de Guerrero, Mexico Resolución 063/2018 Resolution 063/2018 by the Human Rights Commission of Guerrero, Mexico addresses concerns raised by members of the civil association "Responsible Citizen" and a professor and students from the Master's in Law program at the Autonomous University of Guerrero against the Director of Zoochilpan Zoo. The complaint alleged violations to the state animal protection statute, the Rights of Nature (Recognized in the constitution since 2014), and the right to a healthy environment due to inadequate conditions for the animals. After an inspection, the commission noted various issues such as animals of diverse species living together, dirty water in a pond, and animals in small enclosures. The zoo also failed to meet the standards of the Association of zoos, breeders, and aquariums "AZCARM," leading to recommendations for improvement. Resulting from these inspections, the commission found that the animals were housed inadequately, violating the state anti-cruelty law. They also highlighted potential impacts on the human right to a healthy environment for visitors and zoo staff. The Commission's recommendations include advising the Secretary of the Environment to implement recommendations for the welfare of exhibited animals, suggesting ongoing training for zoo staff to ensure dignified treatment, and advising the Zoo Director to implement legal and administrative measures for the animals' well-being, including budget allocation for necessary infrastructure and optimal conditions.
Republic v. Teischer Republica v. Teischer, 1 Dall. 335 (Penn. 1788)

The Defendant had been convicted in the county of Berks upon an indictment for maliciously, wilfully, and wickedly killing a Horse; and upon a motion in arrest of Judgment, it came on to be argued, whether the offence, so laid, was indictable? The court affirmed the trial court's conviction of defendant for killing a horse.

R v. Shand R. v. Shand, 2007 ONCJ 317 In R v Shand 2007 ONCJ 317 (CanLII), the court examined the necessary elements required to established the “willful” mens rea component present in Canadian Federal Criminal Statute s. 429. The accused was charged with three counts of animal cruelty contrary to s.446 of the Criminal Code in relation to a dog in her care. The court found that on two of the counts that the accused was had acted "wilfully" because she was either "reckless or indifferent as to her dog's condition."
R v D.L. R. v. D.L., 1999 ABPC 41 In R v D.L. (1999 ABPC 41) the phrase “wilfully and without lawful excuse” found in s.446 was at issue. In this case, two individuals were charged under s. 445(a) s.446 (1)(a) for killing a cat after the cats’ owner told them to “get rid of it” which they took to mean kill it. The judge in this case found that having permission to kill an animal was not a sufficient “lawful excuse” and did not lawfully give the authority to cause unnecessary pain and suffering to the animal. The accused was found not guilty on count 1 and guilty on count 2.
R v. Menard R v. Menard 1978 CarswellQue 25 The accused in R v. Menard had a business euthanizing animals by use of motor exhaust which caused pain and burns to the mucous membranes of the animals he was euthanizing. In a decision written by future Canadian Supreme Court Chief Justice, Lamer J. overturned a decision from the lower courts and reinstated the original conviction. Lamer J. statements about the animal-human relationship have been influential in Canadian Animal case law.
Proyecto de Resolución del Amparo en Revisión 630/2017 - Mexico Proyecto de Resolución del Amparo en Revisión 630/2017 This is a draft of a withdrawn “Amparo” decision, but it is relevant as it highlights the connection between the human right to a healthy environment and the duty to protect animals. In particular, it sheds light on how this right influences the legal assessment of bullfighting’s legality. In this case, the plaintiff, Promociones y Espectáculos Zapaliname, S.A. de C.V., a company whose purpose is to organize bullfighting events, initiated a legal action, known as an “Amparo” against various individuals and governmental entities in the state of Coahuila. The complaint specifically targeted the State Governor, the State Congress, the Secretary of the Government, the State Director of the Official Newspaper, the State Secretary of the Environment, and the State Deputy Director of the Official Newspaper. The plaintiff alleged before the Coahuila’s Second District Court that the 2015 amendment to the law for the protection and dignified treatment of animals in Coahuila, which prohibited bullfighting and similar practices, as well as other associated regulations, infringed upon their rights to employment, property, and cultural expression. The court dismissed the case regarding article 20, fraction XIV of Coahuila’s law for the protection and dignified treatment of animals due to lack of legal interest as the application of these provisions was not substantiated and because such provisions were hetero-applicative. Therefore, the provisions were not applicable. The court also dismissed the “Amparo” regarding Article 20, fraction XIV of the same law. The plaintiff appealed the opinion before the Collegiate Court on Administrative and Civil Matters of the Eighth Circuit, which ordered transferring the case to the Fourth Collegiate Circuit Court of the Auxiliary Center of the Tenth Region. This court upheld the lower court’s decision, deeming the legal action non-justiciable. In addition, the court requested the revision of the case and transferred the case to the Supreme Court of Justice. The Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice heard the case de novo. In this opportunity, the court upheld the constitutionality of article 20, fraction XIV of Coahuila’s animal protection law. The judge held that, “[t]he protection of species is immersed within the very concept of the environment, since animals are part of those elements that comprise it.” The judge held that the right to a healthy environment encompasses the protection of animals, an element of the environment. With this decision, the court moves away from a pure property conception of animals. Moreover, the court underscores the existence of various laws that recognize the need to treat animals humanely and prohibit cruel treatment towards them. These laws include the Federal Animal Health Law, the General Law of Ecological Balance and Environmental Protection, the General Wildlife Law, and the Mexican Official NOM-033-SAG/ZOO-2014. It is important to note that, despite the absence of a national anti-cruelty law in Mexico, these regulations serve as a foundation for animal welfare, even though Mexico does not have a national anti-cruelty law. The court further states that this legal framework shows that the constitutional right to a healthy environment enables the ban on bullfighting established in the amendment of the Coahuila law the plaintiff seeks to invalidate. Such a law is a means to fulfill the general laws enacted to protect and treat animals with dignity. By allowing this cruel practice, the court also asserted that animals suffer and die for the sake of entertainment, which causes a detriment to the general societal interest to protect the human rights to a healthy environment related to the protection and conservation of species established in Article 4 of the Constitution. In addition, the court further stated that invalidating this amendment would constitute a regression that would diminish the need for governments to adopt gradual measures to protect animals.
Proyecto Amparo en revisión 630, 2017 Proyecto Amparo en revisión 630, 2017 This is a draft of a withdrawn "Amparo" decision, but it is relevant as it highlights the connection between the human right to a healthy environment and the duty to protect animals. In particular, it sheds light on how this right influences the legal assessment of bullfighting's legality. In this case, plaintiff, Promociones y Espectáculos Zapaliname, S.A. de C.V., a company specializing in organizing bullfighting events, filed a legal action against various governmental entities and individuals in the state of Coahuila, in Mexico. The plaintiff challenged the 2015 amendment to Coahuila's animal protection law, which prohibited bullfighting and similar practices, on the grounds that it violated their rights to work, property, and cultural expression. The lower court dismissed the case regarding Article 20, Section XV of the animal protection law due to a lack of legal interest and because these provisions were not applicable to the case. The court also rejected the Amparo concerning Article 20, Section XIV of the same law. The case was appealed and eventually transferred to the Supreme Court of Justice. The Second Chamber of the Supreme Court, after hearing the case de novo, upheld the constitutionality of Article 20, Section XIV of Coahuila's animal protection law. The judge emphasized that the right to a healthy environment includes the protection of animals as an element of the environment, moving away from viewing animals purely as property. The court highlighted the presence of various laws recognizing the need for humane treatment of animals and prohibiting cruelty, even though Mexico lacks a national anti-cruelty law. This legal framework justified the ban on bullfighting and supported the broader legislative objective of protecting and treating animals with dignity. The court argued that allowing bullfighting caused suffering and death for the sake of entertainment, which was detrimental to the societal interest of protecting the environment and species conservation, as established in Article 4 of the Constitution. It also stressed the importance of governments adopting gradual measures to protect animals, and regressing on these measures would be undesirable.
Sentencia 09333-2022-00667T - Ecuador Proceso No. 09333-2022-00667T This is the case of four cats (Luna, Manchas, Sonic, and Tiger) and two dogs (Pantera and Noah) that were inside the properties seized by the authorities in a drug trafficking case. Attorney Kevin Prendes Vivar filed a habeas corpus petition for the animals' caretaker, stating that the animals were illegally kept by the "Technical Secretary of Real Estate Management of the Public Sector" or "Inmobiliar," the government agency that seized the properties. The claimant argued that in accordance with the Constitutional Court decision 253-20-JH/22 (Estrellita case), the companion animals in the case are subjects of rights, that were left unattended, exposing them to potential health and well-being concerns, given their emotional attachment to their caretakers. The provincial court of Guyanas granted the habeas corpus, holding that animals are subjects of rights, finding that Inmobiliar had violated the animals' rights by considering them seizable personal property.
Pedroni, Matías Andrés c/ Capello Marina Alejandra s/ Medidas Precautorias – Familia Poder Judicial de la Nación, Juzgado Civil 7, Fallo 23536/2021 This case involves a divorced couple that shared two dogs, Burke and Roma. The divorced couple had an arrangement where they shared custody of the dogs. After a domestic violence accusation filed by Marina Alejandra Capello (the respondent) that resulted in a restraining order, Matías Andrés Pedroni (the petitioner) was no longer allowed to see the dogs. The petitioner filed an injunction asking the judge to grant visitation rights (provisional communication regime in Argentina) so he could see the dogs. The petitioner argued that the capricious decision not to let him see the dogs caused him pain, anguish, and concern because Roma and Burke were his family. The judge concluded that from a non-anthropocentric speciest view, Burke and Roma were non-human members of the family created by the parties and that the love for the dogs did not end with the divorce. On the contrary, it had transcended the relationship of the couple. Therefore, neither party could be forced to forget about their relationship with their dogs, severing the solid emotional bond based on years of living together.
Orangutana, Sandra s/ Habeas Corpus Orangutana, Sandra s/ Habeas Corpus This decision was decided on an appeal of the writ of habeas corpus brought on behalf of an orangutan named Sandra after it was denied in its first instance. Pablo Buompadre, President of the Association of Officials and Attorneys for the Rights of Animals (AFADA) brought a writ of habeas corpus against the Government of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires and the City Zoological Garden of Buenos Aires on behalf of the hybrid of two different orangutan species, Sandra. AFADA sought the immediate release and relocation of Sandra to the primate sanctuary of Sorocaba, in the State of Sao Paulo in Brazil. AFADA argued that Sandra had been deprived illegitimately and arbitrarily of her freedom by the authorities of the zoo, and that her mental and physical health was at the time deeply deteriorated, with imminent risk of death. For the first time, basic legal rights were granted to an animal. In this case, Argentina’s Federal Chamber of Criminal Cassation ruled that animals are holders of basic rights. The Court stated that “from a dynamic and non-static legal interpretation, it is necessary to recognize [Sandra] an orangutan as a subject of rights, as non-human subjects (animals) are holders of rights, so it imposes her protection."
“ASOCIACIÓN DE FUNCIONARIOS Y ABOGADOS POR LOS DERECHOS DE LOS ANIMALES Y OTROS C/ GCBA S/ AMPARO” Orangutana Sandra-Sentencia de Cámara- Sala I del Fuero Contencioso Administrativo y Tributario CABA Courtroom I of the Chamber of Appeals in Contentious Administrative and Tax Matters of the City of Buenos Aires ruled that the technical reports presented by the experts for the improvement of the orangutan Sandra’s living conditions showed enough evidence to conclude that it was not in the best interest of the orangutan to transfer her to a sanctuary or to transfer her to her natural habitat. Thus, the court accepted and ordered a series of measures in order to guarantee her welfare conditions.
Gonzalez v. South Texas Veterinary Associates, Inc. Not Reported in S.W.3d, 2013 WL 6729873 (Tex. App. Dec. 19, 2013), review denied (May 16, 2014) Plaintiff acquired an indoor/outdoor cat with an unknown medical and vaccination history. Plaintiff took cat to defendant for treatment and the cat received a vaccination. The cat soon developed a golf-ball-sized mass that contained a quarter-sized ulceration which was draining “matter” on the cat's right rear leg. When plaintiff returned the cat to the defendant, defendant diagnosed the cat with an infection, prescribed an antibiotic for treatment, and instructed Gonzalez to return if the cat's symptoms did not improve. When the cat's symptoms did not improve, plaintiff took the cat to another veterinarian who diagnosed the cat with vaccine-associated sarcoma. The cat had to be eventually euthanized. Acting pro se, the plaintiff filed suit, alleging that defendant failed to: (1) inform her of vaccine-associated sarcoma risk; (2) adhere to feline vaccination protocols; and (3) properly diagnose vaccine-associated sarcoma in the cat, which resulted in the loss of her life. On appeal, plaintiff asserted that the trial court erred by granting defendant's no-evidence and traditional motions for summary judgment. After examining the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff and disregarding all contrary evidence and inferences, the court concluded that the plaintiff brought forth more than a scintilla of probative evidence establishing the relevant standard of care to prove her malpractice claims. The trial court, therefore, erred by granting the no-evidence summary judgment. On the traditional summary judgment claim, the court held that that the defendant's evidence did not conclusively prove that a veterinarian complied with the applicable standard of care in light of another veterinarian's report to the contrary. The trial court, therefore, erred by granting defendant's traditional motion for summary judgment. The case was reversed and remanded.
Loban v. City of Grapevine Not Reported in S.W.3d, 2009 WL 5183802 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth,2009)

In this unpublished Texas case, Appellant Jason Loban appeals the trial court's judgment awarding appellee City of Grapevine $10,670.20 in damages. In 2006, Appellant's dogs were declared "dangerous" under the City's municipal ordinance. On appeal, Appellant argued that the trial court's award of $10,670.20 in damages to the City should be reversed because the City did not plead for monetary relief, the issue was not tried by consent, and there was no evidence to support the award. This Court agreed. In finding the monetary judgment void, the Court observed that the City did not put any request for a monetary award in its pleadings and there was no evidence in the record of the amount of the fine.

McElroy v. Carter Not Reported in S.W.3d, 2006 WL 2805141 (Tenn.Ct.App.)

In this Tennessee case, a man shot and wounded a cat owned by his neighbor as the animal exited from the bed of the man's prized pickup truck. The cat died from its wounds shortly thereafter. The neighbor sued for the veterinary bills she incurred for treatment of the cat's injuries. The truck owner counter-sued for the damage the cat allegedly caused to his truck by scratching the paint. After a bench trial, the court awarded the truck's owner $6,500 in damages, which it offset by a $372 award to the neighbor for her veterinary bills. The Court of Appeals reversed that decision finding that as a matter of law the cat's owner cannot be held liable for not keeping her cat confined when the damage the cat allegedly caused was not foreseeable.

City of Houston v. Levingston Not Reported in S.W.3d, 2006 WL 241127 (Tex.App.-Hous. (1 Dist.))

A city veterinarian who worked for the Bureau of Animal Regulation and Care (BARC) brought an action against the city, arguing that he was wrongfully terminated under the Whistleblower’s Act. The vet contended that he reported several instances of abuses by BARC employees to the division manager. In upholding the trial court’s decision to award Levingston over $600,000 in damages, the appellate court ruled the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the veterinarian was terminated due to his report . Contrary to the city’s assertion, the court held that BARC was an appropriate law enforcement authority under the Act to report violations of section 42.09 of the Texas Penal Code committed by BARC employees. Opinion Withdrawn and Superseded on Rehearing by City of Houston v. Levingston , 221 S.W.3d 204 (Tex. App., 2006).

McAdams v. Faulk (unpublished) Not Reported in S.W.3d, 2002 WL 700956 (Ark.App.)

Dog owner brought dog to veterinarian’s office where someone choked the dog, causing injuries that led to its death. The Court of Appeals held that the owner stated a veterinary malpractice claim against veterinarian because owner alleged that dog was choked while in veterinarian's care, that veterinarian failed to diagnose neck injury that proved fatal, performed unnecessary treatment out of greed, and refused to provide owner with medical explanation of dog's condition and death, all in violation of the veterinary licensing statute. The Court also held that violating the cruelty to animals statute was evidence of negligence, and that damages included economic loss, compensation for mental anguish, including future anguish. and punitive damages.

Maldonado v. Franklin Not Reported in S.W. Rptr., 2019 WL 4739438 (Tex. App. Sept. 30, 2019) Trenton and Karina Franklin moved into a subdivision in San Antonio, Texas in September of 2017. Margarita Maldonado lived in the home immediately behind the Franklins’ house and could see into the Franklins’ backyard. Maldonado began complaining about the Franklins’ treatment of their dog. The Franklins left the dog outside 24 hours a day, seven days a week no matter what the weather was like. Maldonado also complained that the dog repeatedly whined and howled which kept her up at night causing her emotional distress. Maldonado went online expressing concern about the health and welfare of her neighbor’s dog, without naming any names. Mr. Franklin at some point saw the post and entered the conversation which lead to Mr. Franklin and Maldonado exchanging direct messages about the dog. Maldonado even placed a dog bed in the backyard for the dog as a gift. In December of 2017, the Franklins filed suit against Maldonado for invasion of privacy by intrusion and seclusion alleging that Maldonado was engaged in a campaign of systemic harassment over the alleged mistreatment of their dog. While the suit was pending, Maldonado contacted Animal Control Services several times to report that the dog was outside with the heat index over 100 degrees. Each time an animal control officer responded to the call they found no actionable neglect or abuse. In June of 2018, Maldonado picketed for five days by walking along the neighborhood sidewalks, including in front of the Franklins’ house, carrying signs such as “Bring the dog in,” and “If you’re hot, they’re hot.” The Franklins then amended their petition adding claims for slander, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and trespass. The trial court granted a temporary injunction against Maldonado, which was ultimately vacated on appeal. Maldonado filed a Anti-SLAPP motion and amended motion to dismiss the Franklins’ claims as targeting her First Amendment rights. The trial court did not rule on the motions within thirty days, so the motions were denied by operation of law. Maldonado appealed. The Court began its analysis by determining whether Maldonado’s motions were timely. Under the Texas Citizen’s Participation Act (TCPA) a motion to dismiss must be filed within sixty days of the legal action. The sixty-day deadline reset each time new factual allegations were alleged. Due to the fact that the Franklins had amended their petition three times and some of the amended petitions did not allege any new factual allegations, the only timely motions that Maldonado filed were for the Franklins’ claims for slander and libel. The Court then concluded that Maldonado’s verbal complaints to the Animal Control Service and online posts on community forums about the Franklins’ alleged mistreatment of their dog were communications made in connection with an issue related to a matter of public concern and were made in the exercise of free speech. Therefore, the TCPA applied to the Franklins’ slander and libel claims. The Court ultimately concluded that although Maldonado established that the TCPA applied to the slander and libel claims, the Franklins met their burden to establish a prima facie case on the slander and libel claims. Therefore, the Court ultimately concluded that Maldonado’s motion to dismiss the slander and libel claims were properly denied. The Court affirmed the trial court’s order and remanded the case to the trial court.
Lindsey v. Texas State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners Not Reported in S.W. Rptr., 2018 WL 1976577 (Tex. App., 2018) In 2015, Kristen Lindsey, who is a licensed veterinarian, killed a cat on her property by shooting it through the head with a bow and arrow. Lindsey had seen the cat fighting with her cat and defecating in her horse feeders and believed the cat to be a feral cat. However, there was evidence that the cat actually belonged to the neighbor and was a pet. Lindsey posted a photo of herself holding up the dead cat by the arrow. The photo was shared repeatedly and the story ended up reported on several news outlets. The Board received more than 700 formal complaints and more than 2,700 emails about the incident. In 2016 the Texas State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners (the Board) initiated disciplinary proceedings against Lindsey seeking to revoke her license and alleging violations of the Veterinary Licensing Act and Administrative Rules. While the proceeding was pending, Lindsey filed a petition for declaratory judgment and equitable relief in the trial court. The grand jury declined to indict her for animal cruelty. Due to this, Lindsey asserted that the Board lacked the authority to discipline her because she had not been convicted of animal cruelty and her act did not involve the practice of veterinary medicine. The administrative law judges in the administrative-licensing proceeding issued a proposal for decision and findings of fact and conclusions of law which the Board adopted and issued a final order suspending Lindsey's license for five years (with four years probated). Lindsey then filed a petition for judicial review in trial court after the Board denied her motion for a rehearing. The trial court affirmed the Board's final order. This case involves two appeals that arise from the disciplinary proceeding filed against Lindsey by the Board. Lindsey appeals the first case (03-16-00549-CV) from the trial court denying her motion for summary judgment and granting the Board's motion for summary judgment and dismissing her suit challenging the Board's authority to bring its disciplinary action. In the second case (17-005130-CV), Lindsey appeals from the trial court affirming the Board's final decision in the disciplinary proceeding. Even though Lindsey was not convicted of animal cruelty, the Court of Appeals held that the Board possessed the authority to determine that the offense of animal cruelty was sufficiently connected to the practice of veterinary medicine. Lindsey also did not have effective consent from the neighbor to kill the cat. The Board had sufficient evidence that Lindsey tied her profession to the shooting of the cat through the caption that she put on the photo that was posted on social media. The Court of Appeals ultimately overruled Lindsey's challenges to the Board's authority to seek disciplinary action against her veterinary license in both appeals as well as her challenges regarding the findings of fact and conclusions by the administrative law judges. The Court affirmed the judgment in both causes of action.
Smith v. Com. Not Reported in S.E.2d, 2013 WL 321896 (Va.App.,2013)

The defendant was charged for violation of Virginia’s Code § 3.2–6570(F) after he shot the family dog; he was later convicted by a jury.  Upon appeal, the defendant argued the trial court erred in denying his proffered self-defense jury instructions. The appeals court agreed, reasoning that more than a scintilla of evidence supported giving the proffered self-defense instructions, that determining whether this evidence was credible and actually supported a conclusion that the defendant acted in self-defense or defense of others was the responsibility of the jury, not that of the trial court, and that the proffered jury instructions properly stated the law. The case was thus reversed and remanded.

Britton v. Bruin Not Reported in P.3d, 2016 WL 1019213 (N.M. Ct. App., 2016) In this case, plaintiff appealed a decision by the district court denying her petition for a writ of mandamus. Plaintiff petitioned the court for a writ of mandamus to stop the City of Albuquerque's effort to control a large population of feral cats in its metropolitan area by “trapping, neutering them, and then returning them” to the location at which they were found. The district court denied the petition for a writ of mandamus because the court held that there was “a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.” Also, the court held that because the city’s program did not result in any unconstitutional action, the writ of mandamus was not appropriate. The court affirmed the district court’s ruling, looking only at whether or not there was “a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.” The court did not address the issue of whether or not the city’s population control effort was appropriate and should continue. The district court's order denying Petitioner's application for a writ of mandamus is affirmed.
Brinton v. Codoni Not Reported in P.3d, 2009 WL 297006 (Wash.App. Div. 1,2009)

This unpublished Washington case stems from an attack on plaintiff's dog by a neighbor's dog. Plaintiff sued for damages, alleging negligence and nuisance. The trial court ruled on partial summary judgment that the plaintiff's damages were limited, as a matter of law, to the dog's fair market value. The plaintiff argued that she was entitled to damages based on the dog's intrinsic value (i.e., utility and service and not sentimental attachment) and her emotional distress. On appeal, this court held that since the plaintiff failed to carry her burden of showing that her dog had no fair market value, the trial court properly limited damages to that value. Further, because the plaintiff's nuisance claims were grounded in negligence, she was not entitled to damages beyond those awarded for her negligence claim.

Sexton v. Brown Not Reported in P.3d, 147 Wash.App. 1005, 2008 WL 4616705 (Wash.App. Div. 1)

In this Washington case, Valeri Sexton and Corey Recla sued Kenny Brown, DVM, for damages arising from the death of their dog. Plaintiffs alleged a number of causes of action including negligence, breach of bailment, conversion, and trespass to chattels. The incident occurred after plaintiff's dog ran away while plaintiff was camping Marblemount area. Another party found the Yorkshire terrier and took it to defendant-veterinarian's office, the Pet Emergency Center (PEC). After being examined first by a one veterinarian, defendant-veterinarian Brown took over care and determined that the dog suffered from a life threatening condition; he then told the finders that if they did not want to pay for further care, they could have the dog euthanized. This court affirmed the trial court's decision that the medical malpractice act does not apply to veterinarians. It also affirmed the dismissal of Sexton's breach of bailment claim, finding that Brown was not a finder under relevant Washington law. The court did find that there were material issues of fact about the measure of damages, and reversed the decision to limit damages to the fair market or replacement value of the dog. Further, the court found genuine issues of material fact about whether Brown's actions were justified when viewed under the requirements of Washington's veterinary practice laws.

Keep Michigan Wolves Protected v. State, Dep't of Nat. Res. Not Reported in N.W.2d2016 WL 6905923 (2016) Plaintiff, Keep Michigan Wolves Protected (KMWP), appealed an order of the Court of Claims concluding that PA 281 does not violate Michigan's Constitution or statutes, and the granting of summary disposition in favor of defendants, the State of Michigan, the Department of Natural Resources, and the Natural Resources Commission. The issue began in 2011 when the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service removed gray wolves from the federal list of endangered species, returning management of wolf populations to Michigan. In 2012, the governor of Michigan signed PA 520 into law, which added the wolf to the definition of "game" animals. Plaintiff KMWP organized a statewide referendum petition drive to reject PA 520 at the November 4, 2014 general election, which would have rendered PA 520 ineffective unless approved by a majority of voters. In 2013, Michigan's Governor signed into law PA 21 and PA 22, which granted the Natural Resources Commission (NRC) authority to manage wolves. In addition, the laws also gave qualified members of the military free game and fish licenses. Another petition drive was initiated by plaintiff and required signatures were collected to place the issue on the November 2014 ballot. However, in December 2013, before this, Citizens for Professional Wildlife Management (CPWM) circulated a petition to initiate the Scientific Fish and Wildlife Management Act also known as PA 281. This new law would reenact PA 520 and 21, giving the NRC authority for designating game animals, offering free military hunting and fishing licenses, and appropriating $1 million to manage invasive species. In May of 2014, the CPWM certified this initiative petition and submitted directly it to the Legislature to enact or reject the law. The Legislature adopted the law, which became known as PA 281. Notably, at the November 2014 election, a majority of voters rejected PA 520 and PA 21. Regardless, PA 281, which included the voter-rejected designation of the wolf as a game species, was signed into law and the NRC designated wolves as a game species effective March 2015. Following this, plaintiff filed the underlying complaint that challenged the constitutionality of PA 281, specifically that it violated the Title–Object Clause of Michigan's Constitution, Const 1963, art 4, § 24, which states that (1) a law must not embrace more than one object, and (2) the object of the law must be expressed in its title. The Court of Claims granted defendants' summary disposition motion, holding the the general purpose of PA 281 is to “manage fish, wildlife, and their habitats” and that all of the law's provisions relate to this purpose, and concluded that the law did not violate the single-object requirement of the Title–Object Clause. The Court of Appeals found that some provisions of PA 281 did not violate the Title-Object Clause including (1) free licenses to military and (2) appropriating $1 million to respond to the threat of invasive fish species. However, the court did find that the free licenses to members of the military has no necessary connection to the scientific management of fish, wildlife, and their habitats violating the single-object rule of the Title-Object Clause. While the court noted that there is a severability option with provisions of laws that violate the Title-Object Clause, the court cannot conclude the Legislature would have passed PA 281 without the provision allowing free hunting, trapping, and fishing licenses for active members of the military. Thus, this provision cannot be severed from PA 281, and, consequently, the court found PA 281 is unconstitutional. The court noted that its decision rests solely under an analysis of the Michigan Constitution and related cases. However, the court noted that plaintiff's assertion that the initiating petition by defendant put "curb appeal" of free military licenses and invasive species control to "surreptitiously" reenact a provision that would ensure wolves would be on the game species list was an "accurate" assessment. The court even said that PA 281 "conjures up images of a Trojan Horse, within which the ability to hunt wolves was cleverly hidden." The order granting summary judgment for defendants was reversed and the matter was remanded.
Eureka Township v. Petter Not Reported in N.W.2d, 2017 WL 3863144 (Minn.Ct.App. 2017) In this case, the Township brought action against property owners to enjoin the owners from possessing exotic animals on the property, operating an animal exhibition on the property, and operating a business pelting exotic animals on the property. The District Court invalidated the township's exotic animal ordinance as conflicting with state statute, determined that an animal exhibition was not a permissible use under the township's zoning ordinance, and permanently enjoined the owners from operating an animal exhibition and conducting any retail sales, except for horticultural products produced on the property. This court held that the exotic animals ordinance did not conflict with state statute nor was it preempted. Further, this court held that the property owners' grandfathered possession and exhibition of exotic animals was limited to one wolf; animal control officer exception to exotic animal possession was limited to temporary possession of exotic animals in conjunction with owner's work as an animal control officer; township was not estopped from enforcing its exotic animal ordinance; and interpreting zoning ordinance's language to require sale of horticultural products from the land itself was not inherently unreasonable. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded; motion dismissed.
State v. Jensen Not Reported in N.W.2d, 2015 WL 7261420 (Neb. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2015) Defendant was convicted of convicted of two counts of mistreatment of a livestock animal in violation of Neb.Rev.Stat. § 54–903(2) (Reissue 2010) and four counts of neglect of a livestock animal in violation of § 54–903(1). Defendant owned and maintained a herd of over 100 horses in Burt County, Nebraska. After receiving complaints, the local sheriff's office investigated the herd. An expert veterinarian witness at trial testified that approximately 30% of the herd scored very low on the scale measuring a horse's condition and there were several deceased horses found with the herd. On appeal, defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence to support several of his convictions. Specifically, defendant challenged whether the state proved causation and intent under the statute. The court found that the prosecution proved through testimony that defendant caused the death of the horses subject to two of the convictions. With regard to intent, the court found that the evidence showed it would have taken weeks or month for a horse to reach to the low levels on the scale. The court found that defendant was aware of the declining condition of the herd over a significant amount of time, and failed to adequately feed, water, or provide necessary care to his horses. The convictions were affirmed.
People v. Proehl (unpublished) Not Reported in N.W.2d, 2011 WL 2021940 (Mich.App.)

Defendant was convicted of failing to provide adequate care to 16 horses. On appeal, Defendant first argued that, to him, nothing appeared to be wrong with his horses and, consequently, no liability can attach. The court disagreed, explaining: "Defendant's personal belief that his horses were in good health . . . was therefore based on fallacy, and has no effect on his liability under the statute." Defendant also maintained that he is an animal hoarder, which is a "psychological condition" that mitigates his intent. Rejecting this argument, the court noted that Defendant’s "hoarding" contention is based upon a non-adopted bill which, in any event, fails to indicate whether animal hoarding may serve as a proper defense.

People v. Leach Not Reported in N.W.2d, 2006 WL 2683727 (Mich.App.)

Defendant's conviction arises from the killing of a rabbit during the execution of a civil court order at defendant's home on April 15, 2004. Because the court did not find MCL 750.50b unconstitutionally vague and further found sufficient evidence in support of defendant's conviction, defendant's conviction was affirmed. The evidence showed that defendant killed the rabbit in a display of anger arising from the execution of a court; thus, the terms, "[m]alicious", "willful", and "without just cause" are sufficiently specific terms with commonly understood meanings such that enforcement of the statute will not be arbitrary or discriminatory."

Reid v. Kramer Not Reported in N.W. Rptr., 2019 WL 2866091 (Mich. Ct. App. July 2, 2019) In July of 2017, Alpena County Animal Control Officer Michelle Reid, filed a complaint against the respondents alleging that a black and tan German Shepherd named Bruiser had attacked or bit a person. The victim, Joshua Henderson, testified that as he was jogging past the respondents’ house, Bruiser ran toward him and bit his left bicep and left forearm. The Respondents stated that Bruiser had never attacked or bitten anyone before and was raised around children. The prosecutor clarified that euthanization was not being sought at the time, however, the district court found that Bruiser had caused serious injury to Henderson and noted the possibility of Bruiser injuring children in the future and ordered Bruiser to be destroyed. The Respondents appealed to the circuit court, which affirmed the district court’s decision. The Respondents then appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Respondents argued that the circuit court erred in determining that Bruiser was a dangerous animal and that the evidence did not support a finding that Bruiser caused death or serious injury or that he was likely to do so in the future. The Court of Appeals concluded that Bruiser fit the definition of a dangerous animal under the statute, however, the Court agreed with the Respondents that the evidence was insufficient to support a conclusion that Bruiser caused serious injury or was likely to cause death or serious injury in the future. In order for an animal to be destroyed, it must be more than dangerous. Henderson’s injuries consisted of scrapes, puncture wounds, and three stitches. Those injuries did not rise to the level of a “serious injury” as defined under MCL 287.321(e) which defines serious injury as permanent, serious disfigurement, serious impairment of health, or serious impairment of bodily function. The district court did not properly interpret MCL 287.322 and based their decision solely on the fact that Bruiser had bitten someone once and concluded that because of that, the court knew that Bruiser was more likely to do so again. The circuit court erred by affirming the district court’s order because the evidence did not support a finding that Bruiser had caused serious injury or death to a person or that he was likely to do so in the future. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded to the district court.
O'Keefe v. Stevenson Not Reported in N.E.3d, 2017 WL 3776595 (Mass. Land Ct. Aug. 22, 2017) In this case, the plaintiffs appealed a Zoning Board that granted their neighbor a special permit allowing four dogs to be kept at Ms. Sullivan's home. The dogs—pedigreed Eurasiers—are Ms. Sullivan's personal pets and live with Ms. Sullivan inside her house, have someone with them at all times, and spend most of their time indoors. When they are outside, they are confined to a chain-link fenced-in area behind the house. The permit has some conditions that must be met for the dogs to remain on the property, one of which is the dogs not become a nuisance. The court affirmed the grant of the special permit based on the testimony and exhibits admitted at trial after assessing the credibility, weight, and appropriate inferences to be drawn from that evidence. The Board's decision granting the special permit was AFFIRMED.
State v. Anello Not Reported in N.E.2d, 2007 WL 2713802 (Ohio App. 5 Dist.)

In this Ohio case, after police received a complaint about possible neglect of dogs located in a barn, an officer went to investigate and entered the barn through an unlocked door. The Humane Society then assisted the department in seizing forty-two dogs. Defendant-Anello was convicted by jury of two counts of animal cruelty. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress illegally obtained evidence: to wit, the dogs from the barn. The appellate court disagreed, finding that the barn was not included within the curtilage of the residence since it was leased by a different person than the owner of the house (who had moved out of state). Further, the plain view/exigent circumstances exceptions came into play where the officers heard barking, smelled "overwhelming" urine odors, and observed through a window seventeen animals confined in cages that were stacked three high while the temperature outside was eighty degrees with high humidity. 

PetConnect Rescue, Inc. v. Salinas Not Reported in Fed. Supp., 2020 WL 2832468 (S.D. Cal. June 1, 2020) PetConnect Rescue, Inc., Lucky Pup Dog Rescue.com and Sarah Gonzalez (“Plaintiffs”) alleged that the Defendants fraudulently represented dogs that the Defendants sold as rescue animals in order to circumvent California law prohibiting the sale of non-rescue dogs in pet stores. On April 6, 2020, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint against the Defendants alleging trademark infringement and dilution under the Lanham Act, unfair business practices under California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) and violations of California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), fraud, and accounting. Several Defendant filed motions to dismiss and to strike sections of the amended complaint. The United States District Court for the Southern District of California found that Plaintiff PetConnect alleged a cognizable injury in fact in that the Defendants’ use of an infringing mark harmed Plaintiff PetConnect Rescue’s reputation and caused consumer confusion. The Defendants’ Pet Connect Rescue, Inc. brokered the sale of dogs from puppy mills rather than rescue dogs which affected Plaintiff PetConnect’s reputation. The Court also found that Plaintiff PetConnect Rescue raised a claim within the Lanham Act’s zone of interests because the Lanham Act’s protections extended to non-profit organizations’ use of marks, even when those marks do not accompany a sale. The Court refused to dismiss Plaintiffs claims regarding trademark infringement. The Court also refused to dismiss the Plaintiff’s claims under the Lanham Act because the matter of whether Plaintiff’s mark was distinct and had acquired a secondary meaning was a matter more appropriate when the evidentiary record becomes further developed. As for the Unfair Competition claim, the Court found that the Plaintiffs had alleged sufficient facts to state a UCL violation. The Court subsequently rejected the Defendants’ motions to strike thirty-four lines or phrases from the amended complaint because Plaintiff’s use of the terms “puppy mill,” and the allegations that Defendants operate “fake” entities that “induce” purchases, reflected Plaintiff’s allegations of fraud and misrepresentation. The Court found that the Plaintiffs’ references were pertinent to the Plaintiff’s allegations. The Court ultimately denied each of the Defendant’s motions to dismiss and strike.
Peklun v. Tierra Del Mar Condominium Association, Inc. Not Reported in F.Supp.3d, 2015 WL 8029840 (S.D. Fla., 2015) On cross-motions, Defendant Tierra Del Mar Condominium Association, Inc.'s (“TDM") and Plaintiffs, (Personal Representatives of the Estate of Sergey Peklun) seek Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs assert that denial of Sergey Peklun's request for a reasonable accommodation for his dog Julia "resulted in Peklun's increasingly despondent attitude, ultimately culminating in his decision to end his life." As such, plaintiffs’ claim Defendants are liable under theories of intentional infliction of emotional distress and violations of the Florida and Federal Fair Housing Acts. This conflict over Julia first emerged in 2011 and lasted until Peklun's death in 2015. In 2011, Peklun first acquired Julia the dog, who he claimed was being trained as a cardiac service dog. While the training as a service dog was never substantiated, the Board did approve the dog as an emotional support animal for Peklun in 2011. The composition of the Board changed in coming years and the issue arose after another tenant, Frank Speciale, demanded the dog's removal due to stated allergies. TDM warned Peklun if he did not remove Julia within the period provided, it would initiate arbitration against him in accord. Julia was never removed and, on July 16, 2013, TDM commenced arbitration against Peklun with the Florida Division of Condominiums, Timeshares, and Mobile Homes. Speciale also moved for an injunction barring Peklun from keeping Julia on the premises, which was granted on March 11, 2014. During this time, the Palm Beach County Board of County Commissioners Office of Equal Opportunity organized an extensive investigation into TDM's purported discrimination and found "reasonable grounds to believe that [TDM] discriminated against [Peklun] on the basis of his disability.” Following this, on August 11, 2014, TDM approved Peklun's request for a reasonable accommodation as an emotional support animal. Despite this, Speciale continued to seek Julia's eviction, filing a motion in state court, seeking contempt and sanctions. Plaintiffs contended that this behavior reflected "a campaign of harassment." As to TDM instant motion for summary judgment, it claims the decision was reasonable because Peklun failed to provide TDM with the requested information necessary to verify his disability and that Julia was not a trained service animal. Also, TDM asserts Peklun was not a “qualified individual” under the FHA. The District Court found that while Peklun's various cardiac and organ problems did not constitute a "handicap" under the FHA, the submissions of Peklun's treating physicians are sufficient to establish that Peklun's sleep apnea interfered with a major life activity. As a result, there was sufficient evidence that Peklun was handicapped within the meaning of the FHA. Further, the absence of any certification or training did not permit TDM to immediately deny the request for Peklun's assistance animal. In fact, the court observed that Peklun was previously granted an accommodation for Julia on the basis that she was an “emotional support animal” in 2011; that knowledge of the 2011 accommodation was imputed to TDM's current board. The court did note that Section 3604(9) states there is no obligation to honor a request that would constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of other tenants. However, the court noted that determining this threat is a question of fact, not a question of law. The issue of Speciale's allergies "is contentious and the Court declines to grant judgment based on a hotly debated factual dispute." As a result, the cross motions for summary judgment by each party were denied.
Hartlee v. Hardey Not Reported in F.Supp.3d, 2015 WL 5719644 (D. Colo. Sept. 29, 2015)

Plaintiffs filed suit against a veterinarian and a number of police officers who were involved in their prosecution of animal cruelty. Plaintiffs Switf and Hatlee worked together on a Echo Valley Ranch where they provided care and boarding for horses. In February 2012, Officer Smith went to Echo Valley Ranch to conduct a welfare check on the horses. Officer Smith noticed that the horses seemed to be in poor condition, so he requested that a veternarian visis the ranch to inspect the horses. Dr. Olds, a local veterinarian, visited the ranch and wrote a report that suggested that the horses be seized due to their current state. Officer Smith initially served plaintiffs with a warning but after returning to the ranch and noticing that the horses’ condition had worsened, the horses were seized and plaintiffs were charged with animal cruelty. In this case, plaintiffs argued that the veterinarian had wrote the medical report for a “publicity stunt” and that this report influenced Officer’s Smith’s decision to seize the horses and charge plaintiffs with animal cruelty. The court ultimately found that the veterinarian’s report was not made as a “publicity stunt,” especially due to the fact that the report was filed privately and not made available to the public. Also, the court found that there was no evidence to suggest that the veterinarian and the officers were working with one another in a “conspiracy” to seize the horses and charge plaintiffs with animal cruelty.

Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter Not Reported in F.Supp.3d, 2015 WL 4623943 (D. Idaho Aug. 3, 2015) The Animal Legal Defense Fund, and various other organizations and individuals, challenge Idaho Code § 18–7042 as unconstitutional. Section 18-7042 criminalizes undercover investigations of agricultural production facilities. ALDF alleges that § 18–7042 has both the purpose and effect of stifling public debate about modern agriculture and raises two substantive constitutional challenges against the State: (1) violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment; and (2) violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court first found that § 18–7042 is both content and viewpoint based, and thus, must survive the highest level of scrutiny. The Court held that the law does not survive strict scrutiny because it "would contravene strong First Amendment values to say the State has a compelling interest in affording these heavily regulated facilities extra protection from public scrutiny." Even if the interests in property and privacy of these industries is compelling, the law is not narrowly tailored as it restricts more speech than necessary and poses a "particularly serious threat to whistleblowers' free speech rights." Finally, the Court found that the law also violated the Equal Protection clause because the law was spurred by an improper animus toward animal welfare groups, furthers no legitimate or rational purpose, and classifies activities protected by the First Amendment based on content. ALDF's motion for summary judgment was granted.
Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land and Natural Resources Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2013 WL 1442485 (D.Hawai'i)

Fearing potential prosecution under a county ordinance and a state statute for carrying out a Stipulated Order that protects an endangered species (the Palila), defendants, joined substantially by the plaintiffs, sought a motion for declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court granted the defendants’ motion because federal law, the Stipulated Order, preempted both state and county law. The court therefore stated that so long as defendants, or their duly-appointed agents, were acting to enforce the specific terms of the Stipulated Order, they may conduct an aerial sighting over the Palila's critical habitat and shoot any ungulates sighted in that area without fear of violating (1) Hawaii County Code §§ 14–111, –112, & 1–10(a); or (2) HRS § 263–10.

Animal Legal Defense Fund v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2013 WL 1191736 (C.D.Cal.)

The matter before the court concerns Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings with respect to subject-matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs (ALDF and others) petitioned the USDA and FSIS to promulgate regulations condemning force-fed foie gras as an adulterated food product under the Poultry Products Inspection Act (“PPIA”). FSIS refused to do so, concluding that foie gras was not adulterated or diseased; Plaintiffs then filed the instant lawsuit claiming that decision was arbitrary, capricious, and in violation of the APA. The Court determined that the instant action is not about promulgating rules, but about banning force-fed foie gras. Such a decision falls under the USDA's discretion by law.

Mahtani v. Wyeth Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2011 WL 2609857 (D.N.J.)

After some plaintiffs alleged their dogs suffered harmed as a result of using a tick and flea treatment medication, while others alleged the product was ineffective, plaintiffs sought to gain class certification in their lawsuit against a pharmaceutical company. Since the district court found that individual inquiry into questions of fact predominated over inquiry into facts common to class members regarding the plaintiffs’ New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, Unjust Enrichment and Breach of Warranty claims, the plaintiff’s motion for class certification was denied.

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