Anti-Cruelty: Related Cases
|Haefele v. Commonwealth||878 S.E.2d 422 (Va. Ct. App. Oct. 18, 2022)||Defendant Haefele was convicted of two counts of maliciously maiming the livestock of another, in violation of Code § 18.2-144, and two counts of conspiring to maliciously maim the livestock of another. The killing occurred in 2020. Defendant's neighbor possessed two goats on her property in Spotsylvania County and received several complaints. Ultimately, the code enforcement officer instructed the neighbor to remove the goats and even offered assistance in relocating them. However, about a month after this order, Defendant and two other men entered the neighbor's goat pen with the neighbor's permission and killed the goats with “what looked like a two-by-four with spikes wrapped around it." After investigation and review of video footage taken of the attack, Defendant and the two others were charged and convicted by bench trial in 2021. Testimony by an expert in veterinary pathology revealed that the animals suffered before they died. On appeal here, Defendant contends that he could not be convicted under Code § 18.2-144 “because the defendant [Haefele] was acting with the permission of, and in concert with, the owner of the animals in question.” The court disagreed, finding no language in the statute that limits the statute only to acts that were against the will of the owner. Defendant also claims he did not act with requisite malice because the “the owner of the goats had given him permission to act against the goats." Again, the court recounted the brutal and repeated acts against the goats that occurred over a ten-minute span. Thus, the evidence showed that Defendant acted with sufficiently demonstrated malice. While livestock owners can ask others to euthanize or properly slaughter their livestock, the manner in which Defendant caused the goats' deaths clearly demonstrated malicious intent. Thus, the trial court did not err in convicting Defendant under Code § 18.2-144 and the matter was affirmed and remanded.|
|Hammer v. American Kennel Club||304 A.D.2d 74 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept.,2003)||
Plaintiff Jon Hammer is the owner of a pure-bred Brittany Spaniel which has a natural, undocked tail approximately ten (10) inches long. He contends that tail docking is a form of animal cruelty, and that the practical effect of defendant American Kennel Club's tail standards for Brittany Spaniels is to effectively exclude his dog from meaningfully competing shows unless he complies with what he perceives as an unfair and discriminatory practice. Specifically, his amended complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that the complained-of standard (1) unlawfully discriminates against plaintiff by effectively precluding him from entering his dog in breed competitions, (2) is arbitrary and capricious, (3) violates Agriculture and Markets Law § 353, and (4) is null and void as in derogation of law; he further seeks an injunction prohibiting defendants from applying, enforcing or utilizing the standard. The court held that plaintiff lacked standing to obtain any of the civil remedies he sought for the alleged violation of Agriculture and Markets Law Section 353. The Legislature's inclusion of a complete scheme for enforcement of its provisions precludes the possibility that it intended enforcement by private individuals as well. The dissent disagreed with the majority's standing analysis, finding that plaintiff's object is not to privately enforce § 353, insofar as seeking to have the defendants' prosecuted for cruelty. Rather, plaintiff was seeking a declaration that the AKC's standard for judging the Brittany Spaniel deprives him of a benefit of membership on the basis of his unwillingness to violate a state law and, thus, he wanted to enjoin defendants from enforcing that standard against him. The dissent found that whether tail docking for purely cosmetic reasons violates § 353 is solely a question of law and entirely appropriate for a declaratory judgment. Cosmetic docking of tails was wholly unjustifiable under the law in the dissent's eyes. While plaintiff pointed out that docking may serve some purposes for hunting dogs, it is not a justification for docking the tails of non-hunting dogs, such as plaintiff's, for purposes of AKC competitions.
|Hammer v. American Kennel Club||803 N.E.2d 766 (N.Y., 2003)||
Plaintiff sought both declaratory and injunctive relief against the American Kennel Club (AKC) for use of standards in dog show competitions for Brittany Spaniel dogs that require the docking of their tails. The issue in this appeal is whether Agriculture and Markets Law § 353 grants plaintiff, who wishes to enter his dog and compete without penalty in breed contests, a private right of action to preclude defendants from using a standard that encourages him to "dock" his Brittany Spaniel's tail. The Court of Appeals concluded that it would be inconsistent with the applicable legislative scheme to imply a private right of action in plaintiff's favor because the statute does not, either expressly or impliedly, incorporate a method for private citizens to obtain civil relief. In light of the comprehensive statutory enforcement scheme, recognition of a private civil right of action is incompatible with the mechanisms chosen by the Legislature.
|Hartlee v. Hardey||Not Reported in F.Supp.3d, 2015 WL 5719644 (D. Colo. Sept. 29, 2015)||
Plaintiffs filed suit against a veterinarian and a number of police officers who were involved in their prosecution of animal cruelty. Plaintiffs Switf and Hatlee worked together on a Echo Valley Ranch where they provided care and boarding for horses. In February 2012, Officer Smith went to Echo Valley Ranch to conduct a welfare check on the horses. Officer Smith noticed that the horses seemed to be in poor condition, so he requested that a veternarian visis the ranch to inspect the horses. Dr. Olds, a local veterinarian, visited the ranch and wrote a report that suggested that the horses be seized due to their current state. Officer Smith initially served plaintiffs with a warning but after returning to the ranch and noticing that the horses’ condition had worsened, the horses were seized and plaintiffs were charged with animal cruelty. In this case, plaintiffs argued that the veterinarian had wrote the medical report for a “publicity stunt” and that this report influenced Officer’s Smith’s decision to seize the horses and charge plaintiffs with animal cruelty. The court ultimately found that the veterinarian’s report was not made as a “publicity stunt,” especially due to the fact that the report was filed privately and not made available to the public. Also, the court found that there was no evidence to suggest that the veterinarian and the officers were working with one another in a “conspiracy” to seize the horses and charge plaintiffs with animal cruelty.
|Hawaii v. Kaneakua||597 P.2d 590 (Haw. 1979)||
Defendants stipulated that they were involved in cockfights and were prosecuted for numerous violations of § 1109(1)(d), part of Hawaii's cruelty to animals statute. The reviewing court found that the statute was not vague, and was sufficiently definite to satisfy due process with regard to the charge against defendants; nor was the statute overly broad as applied to defendants.
|Hemingway Home and Museum v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture||2006 WL 3747343 (S.D. Fla.)||
The plaintiff lived in Hemmingway's old property, a museum, with 53 polydactyl cats (cats having more than the usual number of toes). The United States Department of Agriculture investigated and said that the plaintiff needed to get an exhibitor's license to show the cats, but that was not possible unless the cats were enclosed. Plaintiff sued the government in order to avoid the $200 per cat per day fines assessed, but the court held that the government has sovereign immunity from being sued.
|Hodge v. State||Hodge v. State, 79 Tenn. 528 (1883).||
The indictment charged that the defendant unlawfully and needlessly mutilated a dog by setting a steel-trap in a bucket of slop and catching the dog by the tongue, and that great pain and torture were unlawfully and needlessly inflicted upon the dog. Defendant argued that a dog had been invading his property and destroying hens' nests for a long time. Witnesses testified that the dog had a bad character for prowling about through the neighborhood at night. The court reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding that defendant had a right to protect his premises against such invasions, and to adopt such means as were necessary for that purpose. There was no evidence that the slop used by defendant was such as was calculated or likely to lure dogs away from the premises where they belonged on to his premises or within his enclosures. If the dog was in the habit of committing the depredations, defendant had a right to set a steel-trap for the purpose of capturing him, and if, while committing the nightly depredations the dog was thus caught and mutilated, it was not needless torture or mutilation within the meaning of the Act, and the jury should have been so instructed. The indictment charged that the defendant unlawfully and needlessly mutilated a dog by setting a steel-trap in a bucket of slop and catching the dog by the tongue, and that great pain and torture were unlawfully and needlessly inflicted upon the dog. Defendant argued that a dog had been invading his property and destroying hens' nests for a long time. Witnesses testified that the dog had a bad character for prowling about through the neighborhood at night. The court reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding that defendant had a right to protect his premises against such invasions, and to adopt such means as were necessary for that purpose. There was no evidence that the slop used by defendant was such as was calculated or likely to lure dogs away from the premises where they belonged on to his premises or within his enclosures. If the dog was in the habit of committing the depredations, defendant had a right to set a steel-trap for the purpose of capturing him, and if, while committing the nightly depredations the dog was thus caught and mutilated, it was not needless torture or mutilation within the meaning of the Act, and the jury should have been so instructed. The court reversed defendant's conviction for cruelty to animals and granted a new trial.
|Hoffmann v. Marion County, Tex.||592 F. App'x 256 (5th Cir. 2014)||Plaintiffs operated a derelict-animal “sanctuary” on their ten-acre property in Marion County, Texas, where they held over one hundred exotic animals, including six tigers, several leopards, and a puma. Plaintiffs were arrested and charged with animal cruelty and forfeited the animals. Afterward, plaintiffs sued many of those involved in the events under a cornucopia of legal theories, all of which the district court eventually rejected. On appeal, plaintiffs argued Marion County and the individual defendants violated their Fourth Amendment rights by illegally searching their property and seizing the animals. The court held, however, that government officials may enter the open fields without a warrant, as the defendants did here, because “an open field is neither a house nor an effect, and, therefore, the government's intrusion upon the open fields is not one of those unreasonable searches proscribed by the text of the Fourth Amendment.” One plaintiff further alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act; however, the court dismissed this claim because the plaintiff failed to allege how he was excluded from a government benefit or effective service as a result of not having an interpreter during the investigation or arrest. The other claims were either dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, not being properly appealed, or not stating a proper cause of action. The district court’s grant of summary judgment was therefore affirmed.|
|Hopson v. DPP|| C.O.D. 229||
The owner of a bird of prey had kept it in a wire aviary for at least six weeks, during which it had injured itself by repeatedly flying into the wire mesh. Having been convicted on these facts of an offence of cruelly ill-treating the bird contrary to the first limb of s 1(1)(a) of the Protection of Animals Act 1911, he appealed, contending that under that limb, unlike the second limb, he should only have been convicted if he was guilty of a positive act of deliberate cruelty. Dismissing the appeal, the Divisional Court held that a person could be guilty of cruel ill-treatment of an animal he was responsible for by allowing it to remain in a situation where it was continuing to injure itself, even if he did not desire to bring about the harm.
|Horton v. State||Horton v. State, 27 So. 468 (Ala. 1900).||
The defendant was charged under the Alabama cruelty to animal statute killing a dog. The trial court found the defendant guilty of cruelly killing the dog. The defendant appealed the descision to the Supreme Court for the determination if the killing of the dog with a rifle was cruel. The Supreme Court found that the killing of a dog without the showing of cruelty to the animal was not a punishable offence under the cruelty to animal statute. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's descision and remanded it.
|Houk v. State||--- So.3d ----, 2021 WL 1685627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2021)||Appellant Crystal Houk challenges her convictions and sentences for animal cruelty and aggravated animal cruelty on several grounds. Appellant contends her dual convictions for those crimes violate double jeopardy because animal cruelty and aggravated animal cruelty are degree variants under section 775.021(4)(b)2. The conviction stems from Houk leaving her dog Gracie May in a car in a Walmart parking lot with the windows closed on a hot, humid day in Florida for over an hour. Apparently, Appellant had pressed a PVC pipe against the accelerator to keep the car accelerating since there was something wrong with the air conditioner. When employees gained entry to her vehicle, they discovered the A/C was actually blowing hot air and the dog was in great distress. Gracie died soon thereafter from heat stroke. A postmortem examination revealed her internal temperature was above 109.9 degrees. Houk was charged with aggravated animal cruelty and animal cruelty, tried by jury, and convicted. She was sentenced to concurrent terms of thirty-six months of probation on Count 1 and twelve months of probation on Count 2, each with a condition that she serve thirty days in jail. On appeal here, this court first found that the offenses of animal cruelty and aggravated animal cruelty satisfy the Blockburger same elements test and do not fall under the identical elements of proof or subsumed-within exceptions. However, as to the degree variant exception, the court agreed with Appellant that the offense of animal cruelty and aggravated animal cruelty are not based on entirely different conduct and a violation of one subsection would also constitute a violation of the other. Additionally, while another statutory section allows the charging of separate offenses for multiple acts or acts against more than one animal, the section does not authorize "the charging of separate offenses or the imposition of multiple punishments when a single act against one animal satisfies both subsections." Accordingly, the court agreed with Appellant and reversed her conviction for animal cruelty (while keeping the higher degree conviction of aggravated cruelty).|
|Hulsizer v. Labor Day Committee, Inc.||734 A.2d 848 (Pa.,1999)||
This Pennsylvania case involves an appeal by allowance from orders of Superior Court which affirmed an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County and imposed counsel fees and costs upon the appellants, Clayton Hulsizer and the Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (PSPCA). Hulsizer, an agent of the PSPCA, filed this action in equity seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against the appellee, Labor Day Committee, Inc., for their role in conducting an annual pigeon shoot. Hulsizer sought to have appellee enjoined from holding the shoot, alleging that it violates the cruelty to animals statute. At issue is whether Hulsizer has standing to bring an enforcement action in Schuylkill County. This court found no inconsistency in reading Section 501 and the HSPOEA (Humane Society Police Officer Enforcement Act) together as statutes that are in pari materia. Since the HSPOEA does not limit the jurisdiction of humane society police officers by requiring them to apply separately to the courts of common pleas in every county in Pennsylvania, the officer had standing to bring an enforcement action. The lower court's orders were reversed.
|Humane Soc. of Rochester and Monroe County for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Inc. v. Lyng||633 F.Supp. 480 (W.D.N.Y.,1986)||
Court decided that the type of branding mandated by Secretary of Agriculture constitutes cruelty to animals because other less painful and equally effective alternatives exist and therefore freed dairy farmers to use other branding methods like freeze branding.
|Humane Soc. of U.S., Inc. v. Brennan||63 A.D.3d 1419, 881 N.Y.S.2d 533 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.,2009)||
In this New York case, the petitioners, various organizations and individuals generally opposed to the production of foie gras (a product derived from the enlarged livers of ducks and geese who were force fed prior to slaughter) submitted a petition to respondent Department of Agriculture and Markets seeking a declaration that foie gras is an adulterated food product within the meaning of Agriculture and Markets Law §§ 200. The respondent Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets refused to issue a statement to the requested declaration. On review to this court, petitioners sought a judicial pronouncement that foie gras is an adulterated food product. This court held that petitioners lacked standing because they did not suffer an injury within the zone of interests protected by State Administrative Procedure Act §§ 204.
|Humane Society of United States v. State Board of Equalization||61 Cal.Rptr.3d 277 (Cal. App. 1 Dist., 2007)||
Humane society and four state taxpayers brought action attacking government waste, requesting injunctive and declaratory relief that would bar implementation of tax exemptions for farm equipment and machinery as they applied to “battery cage” chicken coops that allegedly violated animal cruelty laws. State Board of Equalization demurred. Superior Court sustained without leave to amend the complaint and dismissed the case, which the Court of Appeal affirmed, stating that the plaintiffs did not allege a valid cause of action attacking government waste.
|I.B. Sirmans v. State||534 S.E.2d 862(Ga.App.,2000)||
Defendant was convicted of four counts of animal cruelty and one count of simple assault. The portion of the sentence depriving defendant of animals which the State failed to demonstrate were abused vacated and case remanded; judgment affirmed in all other respects because the motion to suppress was properly denied, and defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to sever the trial.
|In re Clinton Cty.||56 Misc. 3d 1155, 57 N.Y.S.3d 367 (N.Y. Sur. 2017)||Synopsis from the court: County filed notice of claim, directed toward estate of cattle farmer who had passed away after he was charged with animal cruelty, seeking reimbursement for costs incurred in connection with care of seized cattle. The Surrogate's Court, Clinton County, Timothy J. Lawliss, J., held that: (1 ) county failed to establish that it was entitled to any relief based upon a theory of quantum meruit, and (2) even assuming that service providers, and thus county upon payment of service providers' bills, enriched farmer, county was not entitled to recover based upon a theory of unjust enrichment because criminal charges against farmer were dismissed upon his death. Notice of claim denied and dismissed.|
|In re Knippling||183 P.3d 365 (Wash.App. Div. 3,2008)||
The Defendant was convicted in the Superior Court in Spokane County, Washington of second degree assault and first degree animal cruelty. The Defendant requested that he receive credit against his term of community custody for the extra 24 months' confinement time he served before he was re-sentenced. The Court of Appeals held that the Defendant was entitled to 24 months credit against his term of community custody.
|In re Priv. Crim. Complaint Filed by Animal Outlook||2022 WL 588181, 2022 PA Super 37 (Feb. 28, 2022)||Animal Outlook (“AO”) appealed from the order that dismissed its petition for review of the disapproval of the Franklin County District Attorney's Office (“DA”) of multiple private criminal complaints. The requested charges stem from information obtained from an undercover agent who was employed at Martin Farms, where she captured video of cruel mistreatment of animals on the farm that AO contends constituted criminal animal cruelty. These data were complied into a table of 327 incidents, a letter of support from a veterinarian, and a legal memorandum that detailed how these incidents violated Pennsylvania law. AO submitted the gathered information to the pertinent authorities in January 2019 and the Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) initiated an investigation which concluded more than a year later. Ultimately, the PSP issued a press release in March 2020 that indicated that the District Attorney had declined prosecution. After this, AO drafted private criminal complaints that were submitted to the Magisterial District Judge who concluded that the DA correctly determined that there was not enough evidence for prosecution. AO then filed a petition of review of the disapproval of its private complaints pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 506(B)(1) before the trial court, which again dismissed AO petition for review. AO filed this appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. In reviewing the trial court's decision, the Superior Court found that the trial court committed multiple errors of law. First, the trial court did not view the evidence in the light most favorable to moving forward with a prosecution and gave too much credit to the evidence from the Martin Farms veterinarian versus the undercover agent's testimony. The trial court went beyond its role of determining whether the evidence proffered supported each element of the crime charged and instead gave impermissible weight and credibility to Martin Farms evidence. Second, the court made a point of noting that Martin Farms voluntarily changed its practices after the investigation, which had no bearing on the legal sufficiency for criminal charges. The trial court also addressed "only a hand-picked few of the alleged instances of abuse," especially with regard to ignoring the non-anesthetized dehorning of calves. Thus, this court found that AO provided sufficient evidence to show prima facie cases of neglect, cruelty, and aggravated cruelty with respect to the incidents. The court then analyzed whether the record supported a defense of "normal agricultural operations" defense that would counter the charges. This court found that incidents like the dehorning of cattle that already had horns fused to the skull and extreme tail twisting and shocking were sufficient to overcome the affirmative defense. The trial court's dismissal of AO's petition for review was reversed and the trial court was ordered to direct the DA to accept and transmit charges for prosecution.|
|IPPL v. Institute for Behavioral Research, Inc.||799 F.2d 934 (1986)||
Private individuals and organizations brought action seeking to be named guardians of medical research animals seized from organization whose chief was convicted of state animal cruelty statute violations. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland, John R. Hargrove, J., dismissed action, and individuals and organizations appealed. The Court of Appeals, Wilkinson, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) individuals and organizations lacked standing to bring action, and (2) Animal Welfare Act did not confer private cause of action. Case discussed in topic: US Animal Welfare Act.
|Isted v. CPS||(1998) 162 J.P. 513||
The appellant was a keeper of livestock who had shot and injured a neighbor's dog that had strayed into the appellant's pig pen. He had been convicted of doing an act causing unnecessary suffering to the dog contrary to the Protection of Animals Act 1911, s 1(1)(a) (second limb). Dismissing the appeal, the Divisional Court held that the local justices were entitled to find as a matter of fact that it had not been reasonably necessary to shoot the dog.
|Jenkins v. State||262 P.3d 552 (Wyo.,2011)||
Defendant was convicted of misdemeanor animal cruelty. Defendant appealed, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court held that he was not entitled to a reversal, because he failed to demonstrate that his counsel failed to render reasonably competent assistance that prejudiced him to such an extent that he was deprived of a fair trial. The Court held that it was not ineffective assistance to 1) fail to object to testimony regarding defendant's arrest and incarceration, and 2) fail to object to defendant's brother testifying while wearing a striped prison suit.
|Johnson v. Needham|| 1 KB 626||
The Court upheld a decision of local justices to dismiss an information that the defendant "did cruelly ill-treat, abuse, and torture a certain animal" contrary to the Cruelty to Animals Act 1849, s. 2 (1). The Act made it an offence to ill-treat, abuse, or torture an animal, and thereby established three separate offences from which the prosecutor should have elected. Note: Although the 1949 Act has been repealed, similar language appears in the Protection of Animals Act 1911, s 1(1)(a), and presumably the same reasoning applies to that statutory provision.
|Jones v. Beame||380 N.E.2d 277 (N.Y. 1978)||
In this New York case, the plaintiffs, organizations concerned with the treatment of animals in the New York City zoos, sought injunctive and declaratory relief against city officials who were charged with operating the zoos. Due to a citywide fiscal crisis, the City had to make “Draconian” choices with its human and animal charges, according to the court. In granting a motion to dismiss, this court declined to accept the responsibility for matters that it found to be administrative in nature.
|Joyce v Visser|| TASSC 116||
The appellant was convicted of failing to provide food and water to dogs who were chained to a spot. Citing the extreme nature of the neglect and the need for general deterrence, the trial judge sentenced the appellant to three months' imprisonment. On appeal, the appellate judge found the sentence to be manifestly excessive and reduced the sentence.
|Justice by and through Mosiman v. Vercher||--- P.3d ----, 321 Or.App. 439 (2022)||The Oregon Court of Appeals, as a matter of first impression, considers whether a horse has the legal capacity to sue in an Oregon court. The Executive Director of Sound Equine Options (SEO), Kim Mosiman, filed a complaint naming a horse (“Justice”)as plaintiff with the Mosiman acting as his guardian, and claiming negligence against his former owner. In the instant appeal, Mosiman challenges the trial court's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss. In 2017, defendant's neighbor persuaded defendant to seek veterinary care for her horse. The veterinarian found the horse to be about 300 pounds underweight with significant walking difficulties and other maladies. The horse was voluntarily surrendered to Mosiman who eventually nursed the animal back to good health. In 2018, Mosiman filed a complaint on Justice's behalf for a single claim of negligence per se, alleging that defendant violated the Oregon anti-cruelty statute ORS 167.330(1) by failing to provide minimum care. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that a horse lacks the legal capacity to sue and the court granted dismissal. Specifically, the trial court expressed concern over the "profound implications" of allowing a non-human animal to sue and stated that an appellate court could come to a different conclusion by "wad[ing] into the public policy debate involving the evolution of animal rights." Here, the appellate court first found no statutory authority for a court to appoint a guardian for an animal because "a horse inherently lacks self-determination and the ability to express its wishes in a manner the legal system would recognize." The animal has a "distinctive incapacity" that sets it apart from humans with legal disabilities that require appointment of a legal guardian. The court reaffirmed the law's treatment of animals as personal property and found no support in the precedent for permitting an animal to vindicate its own legal rights. While Oregon's animal welfare laws recognize animals as beings capable of feeling pain, this makes them a special type of property and imposes duties on the human owners rather than rights to the animal victims. The court held that only human beings and legislatively-created legal entities are persons with the capacity to sue under Oregon common law. The court emphasized that this holding does not prevent Oregon laws from ever recognizing an animal as a legal person, but the courts are not the appropriate vehicle to do that. Accordingly, this court affirmed the trial court's judgment dismissing the complaint with prejudice.|
|Justice v. State||532 S.W.3d 862 (Tex. App. 2017)||In this Texas appeal, defendant Brent Justice contends that his conviction for a single count of cruelty to a nonlivestock animal was based on insufficient evidence. The incident stemmed from defendant's filming of his co-defendant, Ashley Richards, torturing and killing of a newly-weaned puppy. Justice and Richards ran an escort business named "Bad Gurls Entertainment" that focused on the production and distribution of animal "crush" videos (fetish videos involving the stomping, torturing, and killing of various kinds of animals in a prolonged manner). The evidence that supported the conviction involved the confessions of both perpetrators and the video of the puppy being tortured and ultimately killed. On appeal, defendant argues that he cannot be found guilty since was not the principal involved in the offense. This court was unconvinced, finding that the evidence was sufficient to support a state jail felony since "[t]here is no shortage of evidence that appellant aided Richards in her cruelty," including handing Richards the knife and filming the killing. The one issue in defendant's "hybrid" pro se and represented brief on appeal that the court granted was related to a finding that defendant used a "deadly weapon." After the filing of initial briefs, the Court of Criminal Appeals in Prichard v. State, No. PD-0712-16, --- S.W.3d ---, 2017 WL 2791524 (Tex. Crim. App. June 28, 2017), held that “a deadly weapon finding is disallowed when the recipient or victim is nonhuman.” Thus, in the case at hand, the court deleted the deadly weapon finding since it was directed at the puppy rather than a human. The case was remanded for a new hearing on punishment only since the conviction was affirmed for a state jail felony.|
|Kankey v. State||2013 Ark. App. 68, Not Reported in S.W.3d (Ark.App.,2013)||
A district court found the appellant’s animals had been lawfully seized, and then divested appellant of ownership of the animals and vested custody to the American Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA). The appellant filed an appeal in the civil division of the circuit court, but the circuit court dismissed the appeal as untimely and not properly perfected. Upon another appeal, the Arkansas Court of Appeals found it had no jurisdiction and therefore dismissed the case.
|Kervin v. State||195 So. 3d 1181 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)||Donald Ray Kervin was found guilty of felony animal cruelty stemming from a 2012 incident at his residence. Animal control officers arrived to find defendant's dog "Chubbie" in a small, hot laundry room a the back of his house that emitted a "rotten-flesh odor." Chubbie was visibly wet, lying in his own feces and urine, with several open wounds infested with maggots. After questioning Kervin about the dog's injuries, defendant finally admitted to hitting Chubbie with a shovel for discipline. The dog was ultimately euthanized due to the severity of his condition. In this instant appeal, Kervin contends that the lower court erred in using the 2014 revised jury instruction to instruct the jury on the charged offense rather than the 2012 version of the instruction. Kevin argued that the 2014 version expanded the 2012 version to include the “failure to act” in felony animal cruelty cases. Also, Kervin argued that the 2012 version should have been used because it was in place at the time the offense occurred. Ultimately, the court found that the lower court did not err by using the 2014 jury instruction. The court held that the 2014 jury instructions merely “clarified” the 2012 jury instruction and that the “failure to act” was already present in the 2012 jury instruction. As a result, the court upheld Kervin’s guilty verdict.|
|Knox v. Massachusetts Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals||425 N.E.2d 393 (Mass.App., 1981)||
In this Massachusetts case, the plaintiff, a concessionaire at the Brockton Fair intended to award goldfish as a prize in a game of chance. The defendant, Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (MSPCA), asserted that such conduct would violate G.L. c. 272, s 80F. In the action for declaratory relief, the court considered whether the term "animal" in the statute includes goldfish. The court concluded in the affirmative that, "in interpreting this humane statute designed to protect animals subject to possible neglect by prizewinners," former G.L. c. 272, s 80F applies to goldfish.
|Larobina v R|| NSWDC 79||
The appellant appeal against a conviction for animal cruelty sustained in a lower court. After an examination of the elements of the statutory offense, it was found that the charge upon which the conviction was sustained was unknown to law.
|Lawson v. Pennsylvania SPCA||124 F. Supp. 3d 394 (E.D. Pa. 2015)||Upon an investigation of numerous complaints, the Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Cruelty obtained a warrant and searched plaintiffs’ house. As a result, plaintiffs were charged with over a hundred counts that were later withdrawn. Plaintiffs then filed the present case, asserting violations of their federal constitutional rights, as well as various state-law tort claims. Defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming qualified immunity. The district court granted the motion in part as to: (1) false arrest/false imprisonment, malicious prosecution of one plaintiff and as to 134 of the charges against another plaintiff, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, and invasion of privacy; and (2) to the following claims in Count One: verbal abuse, security of person and property, false arrest/false imprisonment, due process and equal protection, and failure to train or discipline as the result of a policy or custom. The District Court denied the motion with respect to (1) the following claim in Count One: unreasonable search and seizure and the individual defendants' request for qualified immunity in connection with that claim; and (2) with respect to one plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim, but only to the charge relating to the puppy's facial injuries.|
|Lay v. Chamberlain||2000 WL 1819060 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2000) (Not Reported in N.E.2d)||Chamberlain owned a dog breeding kennel with over one hundred fifty dogs. An investigation was conducted when the Sheriff's Office received complaints about the condition of the animals. Observations indicated the kennel was hot, overcrowded, and poorly ventilated. The dogs had severely matted fur, were sick or injured, and lived in cages covered in feces. Dog food was moldy and water bowls were dirty. Many cages were stacked on top of other cages, allowing urine and feces to fall on the dogs below. A court order was granted to remove the dogs. The humane society, rescue groups, and numerous volunteers assisted by providing food, shelter, grooming and necessary veterinary care while Chamberlain's criminal trial was pending. Chamberlain was convicted of animal cruelty. The organizations and volunteers sued Chamberlain for compensation for the care provided to the animals. The trial court granted the award and the appellate court affirmed. Ohio code authorized appellees' standing to sue for the expenses necessary to prevent neglect to the animals. The evidence was sufficient to support an award for damages for the humane society, the rescue groups, and the individual volunteers that protected and provided for the well-being of the dogs during the months of the trial.|
|Leider v. Lewis||243 Cal. App. 4th 1078 (Cal. 2016)||Plaintiffs, taxpayers Aaron Leider and the late Robert Culp, filed suit against the Los Angeles Zoo and Director Lewis to enjoin the continued operation of the elephant exhibit and to prevent construction of a new, expanded exhibit. Plaintiffs contend that the Zoo's conduct violates California animal cruelty laws and constitutes illegal expenditure of public funds and property. The case went to trial and the trial court issued limited injunctions relating to forms of discipline for the elephants, exercise time, and rototilling of the soil in the exhibit. On appeal by both sides, this court first took up whether a taxpayer action could be brought for Penal Code violations or to enforce injunctions. The Court held that the earlier Court of Appeals' decision was the law of the case as to the argument that the plaintiff-taxpayer was precluded from obtaining injunctive relief for conduct that violated the Penal Code. The Court found the issue was previously decided and "is not defeated by raising a new argument that is essentially a twist on an earlier unsuccessful argument." Further, refusing to apply this Civil Code section barring injunctions for Penal Code violations will not create a substantial injustice. The Court also found the order to rototill the soil was proper because it accords with the "spirit and letter" of Penal Code section 597t (a law concerning exercise time for confined animals). As to whether the exhibit constituted animal cruelty under state law, the Court found no abuse of discretion when the trial court declined to make such a finding. Finally, the Court upheld the lower court's ruling that declined further injunctive relief under section 526a (a law that concerns actions against state officers for injuries to public property) because the injury prong could not be satisfied. As stated by the Court, "We agree with the trial court that there is no standard by which to measure this type of harm in order to justify closing a multi-million dollar public exhibit."|
|Let the Animals Live Assiciation;et al. v. Israel Institute of Technology et al. (in Hebrew)||No. 54789-12-11 (Hebrew version)||After pressures from multiple animal rights organizations, an Israeli airline stopped flying monkeys to Israeli research institutions. Multiple Israeli research institutions then filed suit, asking the court to present the airline with a permanent order to fly animals as per their requests, including monkeys, for bio-medical research purposes. In the present case, the question to be decided was whether to allow several animal protection organizations to be added to the claim (whether the airline was bound to fly animals for experiments or not) as defendants or as amicus curiae. The court held that the animal protection organizations should be allowed to join the proceedings as defendants because they could bring before the court a more complete picture of the issue before it was decided; they filed their request at a very early stage; and they spoke and acted for the animals in the face of a verdict that might directly affect the legal rights of the animals.|
|Let the Animals Live v. Hamat Gader||LCA 1684/96||The petitioner, an organization for the protection of animal rights, petitioned the magistrate court to issue an injunction against the respondents, which would prohibit the show they presented, which included a battle between a man and an alligator. The magistrate court held that the battle in question constituted cruelty to animals, which was prohibited under section 2 of the Cruelty to Animals Law (Protection of Animals)-1994. The respondents appealed this order to the district court, which cancelled the injunction. The petitioners requested leave to appeal this decision to this Court. The Court held that the show in question constituted cruelty against animals, as prohibited under section 2 of the Cruelty to Animals Law (Protection of Animals)-1994.|
|Let the Animals Live v. Hamat Gader Recreation Enterprises||LCa 1684?96||
Court held that holding a fighting match between a human and an alligator was a violation of the Israel Anti-Cruelty laws.
|Lindsey v. Texas State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners||Not Reported in S.W. Rptr., 2018 WL 1976577 (Tex. App., 2018)||In 2015, Kristen Lindsey, who is a licensed veterinarian, killed a cat on her property by shooting it through the head with a bow and arrow. Lindsey had seen the cat fighting with her cat and defecating in her horse feeders and believed the cat to be a feral cat. However, there was evidence that the cat actually belonged to the neighbor and was a pet. Lindsey posted a photo of herself holding up the dead cat by the arrow. The photo was shared repeatedly and the story ended up reported on several news outlets. The Board received more than 700 formal complaints and more than 2,700 emails about the incident. In 2016 the Texas State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners (the Board) initiated disciplinary proceedings against Lindsey seeking to revoke her license and alleging violations of the Veterinary Licensing Act and Administrative Rules. While the proceeding was pending, Lindsey filed a petition for declaratory judgment and equitable relief in the trial court. The grand jury declined to indict her for animal cruelty. Due to this, Lindsey asserted that the Board lacked the authority to discipline her because she had not been convicted of animal cruelty and her act did not involve the practice of veterinary medicine. The administrative law judges in the administrative-licensing proceeding issued a proposal for decision and findings of fact and conclusions of law which the Board adopted and issued a final order suspending Lindsey's license for five years (with four years probated). Lindsey then filed a petition for judicial review in trial court after the Board denied her motion for a rehearing. The trial court affirmed the Board's final order. This case involves two appeals that arise from the disciplinary proceeding filed against Lindsey by the Board. Lindsey appeals the first case (03-16-00549-CV) from the trial court denying her motion for summary judgment and granting the Board's motion for summary judgment and dismissing her suit challenging the Board's authority to bring its disciplinary action. In the second case (17-005130-CV), Lindsey appeals from the trial court affirming the Board's final decision in the disciplinary proceeding. Even though Lindsey was not convicted of animal cruelty, the Court of Appeals held that the Board possessed the authority to determine that the offense of animal cruelty was sufficiently connected to the practice of veterinary medicine. Lindsey also did not have effective consent from the neighbor to kill the cat. The Board had sufficient evidence that Lindsey tied her profession to the shooting of the cat through the caption that she put on the photo that was posted on social media. The Court of Appeals ultimately overruled Lindsey's challenges to the Board's authority to seek disciplinary action against her veterinary license in both appeals as well as her challenges regarding the findings of fact and conclusions by the administrative law judges. The Court affirmed the judgment in both causes of action.|
|Long v. The State of Texas||823 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)||
Appellant, who was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death, raised 35 points of error in a direct appeal in which he challenged the trial court's voir dire rulings and its evidentiary rulings. The court held that the admission into evidence of photographs was within the discretion of the lower court, which properly determined that the photographs served a proper purpose in enlightening the jury.
|Lopez v. State||720 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. App. 1986).||
The court convicted the defendant of cruelty to animals where the defendant left his dog in the car on a hot, sunny, dry day with the windows only cracked an inch and a half. Such action was deemed "transporting or confining animal in a cruel manner."
|Mack v. State of Texas (unpublished)||2003 WL 23015101 (Not Reported in S.W.3d)||
The Texas Appeals Court affirmed the trial court's decision that failure to adequately provide for cattle such that they suffered from malnourishment constituted animal cruelty offense under Texas law. The court found that the evidence was legally sufficient to establish that malnourished cow was one of the many domesticated living creatures on defendant's ranch, and was therefore an “animal” under the state law.
|Mackley v. State||--- P.3d ----, 2021 WL 671631 (Wyo. Feb. 22, 2021)||The Wyoming Supreme Court considers whether the jury was properly instructed on the charge of aggravated animal cruelty. The case stems from an incident where a dog escaped his owner and attacked the defendant's dogs at his front door. A local teenager grabbed the offending dog ("Rocky") and dragged him into the street as the dog fight carried on. The defendant responded by grabbing his gun and shooting Rocky as he was held by the teenager. A jury convicted defendant of both aggravated animal cruelty and reckless endangering. At the trial, defendant moved for judgment of acquittal on both charges, arguing that the Wyoming Legislature has established that humanely destroying an animal is not animal cruelty and that the State did not provide evidence that he intentionally pointed a firearm at anyone, which defendant contends is necessary for the reckless endangering charge. On appeal here, the court first observed that defendant's challenge to a confusing or misleading jury instruction was waived because he negotiated with the prosecution to draft it. Further, the Supreme Court did not find an abuse of discretion where the district court refused defendant's additional instructions on the humane destruction of an animal in the jury instructions on the elements for the aggravated cruelty to animals charge. While defendant argued that the instructions should include subsection m from the statute, he only now on appeal contends that the subsection should have been given as a theory of defense. Thus, reviewing this argument for plain error, the Court found that defendant's theory that his killing was "humane" and thus excluded from the crime of aggravated cruelty was not supported by the language of the statute. In fact, such an interpretation not only goes against the plain language, but "then any animal could be killed, under any circumstances, as long as it is killed quickly." Defendant presented no evidence that the dog he shot was suffering or distressed and needed euthanasia. The trial court did not commit error when it declined to instruct the jury on subsection m. As to the reckless endangering conviction, the court also affirmed this charge as defendant showed a conscious disregard for the substantial risk he placed the teenager in regardless of whether he pointed the gun at the victim. Affirmed.|
|Madero v. Luffey||--- F.Supp.3d ----, 2020 WL 733766 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2020)||Ronald Madero allegedly took care of abandoned cats in his neighborhood by giving them food, shelter, and occasional medical care. Madero lived in a duplex in which his son owned both halves of the building. A neighbor contacted Animal Care and Control (ACC) and complained about abandoned kittens in front of her residence. On or about June 15, 2017, Officer Christine Luffey of the Pittsburgh Police Department arrived at Madero’s residence with a non-officer volunteer, Mary Kay Gentert. Officer Luffey requested to inspect the inside of both sides of the duplex. Madero refused and Luffey claimed she had a search warrant. Madero believed that Gentert was present to assist with spay and neuter services for the cats and consented to allow Gentert to inspect the premises while Luffey waited outside. Gentert took photographs inside. Some time afterwards, Luffey executed a search warrant. Madero asserted that the information gathered and photographs taken by Gentert were used to obtain the search warrant. A total of forty-two cats were seized. Madero asserts that after the cats were seized the cats were left for hours on the hot concrete in direct sunlight with no water and that snare catch poles were used to strangle the cats and force them into carriers or traps. Madero further asserted that the cats were not provided with veterinary care for several weeks and were kept in small cages in a windowless room. Some of the cats were ultimately euthanized. On August 7, 2017, Officer Luffey filed a criminal complaint against Madero accusing him of five counts of misdemeanor cruelty to animals and thirty-seven summary counts of cruelty to animals. Madero pled nolo contendere to twenty counts of disorderly conduct and was sentenced to ninety days of probation for each count with all twenty sentences to run consecutively. Madero filed a complaint asserting various causes of action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law alleging illegal search and wrongful seizure of the cats against Officer Luffey, Homeless Cat Management Team (“HCMT”), Provident, and Humane Animal Rescue (“HAR”). The defendants each filed Motions to Dismiss. Madero pled that the cats were abandoned or stray cats, however, he also pled that the cats were his property and evidenced this by pleading that he fed the cats and provided shelter as well as veterinary care. The Court found that Madero pled sufficient facts to support ownership of the cats to afford him the standing to maintain his claims under section 1983 and common law. The Court held that Madero pled a plausible claim against Luffey on all counts of his complaint. Madero alleged that Officer Luffey violated his Fourth Amendment rights by lying about having a search warrant and securing consent by threatening to bust his door down. As for Madero’s state law claims, the court dismissed his negligent misrepresentation claim against Luffey as well as his claims for concerted tortious conduct. Madero failed to plead a threshold color of state law claim against the HAR defendants. There can be no violation of constitutional rights without state action. Madero’s claims for conversion and trespass to chattel against the HAR defendants were also dismissed. All claims against Provident were dismissed, however, Madero’s claim against HCMT for conspiracy was able to proceed. The Court ultimately denied in part and granted in part Officer Luffey’s Motion to Dismiss, Granted HAR’s Motion to Dismiss, and denied in part and granted in part HCMT’s and Provident’s Motion to Dismiss.|
|Mahan v. State||51 P.3d 962, 963 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002)||Mahan had over 130 animals on her property. Alaska Equine Rescue went to check on the condition of the animals at the request of her family members. The animals were in poor health and were removed by Alaska State Troopers and the Rescue. The animals were then placed in foster homes. The defendant's attorney requested a writ of assistance to require law enforcement to assist and force the foster families to answer a questionnaire. The appellate court held that the families were under no legal obligation to answer the questionnaire unless the court were to issue a deposition order and the families were to be properly subpoenaed. The district court's denial of the writ was upheld. Mahan's attorney also asked for a change of venue due to the publicity the case garnered. The court held the defendant was not entitled to a change of venue when 15 jurors had been excused and there was no reason to doubt the impartiality of the jurors who were left after the selection process. There was no indication that the jurors were unable to judge the case fairly. Mahan's attorney also filed a motion to suppress a majority of the evidence, claiming that the Rescue and law enforcement unlawfully entered the property. The judge stated he would rule on the motion if it was appropriate to do so. The judge never ruled on the motion. To preserve an issue for appeal, the appellant must obtain an adverse ruling, thus it constituted a waiver of the claim. Mahan was also prohibited from owning more than one animal. She offered no reason why this condition of probation was an abuse of the judge's discretion, therefore it was a waiver of this claim. Lastly, although the Rescue received donations from the public to help care for the animals, that did not entitle Mahan to an offset. Restitution is meant to make the victims whole again and also to make the defendant pay for the expense caused by their criminal conduct.|
|Maldonado v. Franklin||Not Reported in S.W. Rptr., 2019 WL 4739438 (Tex. App. Sept. 30, 2019)||Trenton and Karina Franklin moved into a subdivision in San Antonio, Texas in September of 2017. Margarita Maldonado lived in the home immediately behind the Franklins’ house and could see into the Franklins’ backyard. Maldonado began complaining about the Franklins’ treatment of their dog. The Franklins left the dog outside 24 hours a day, seven days a week no matter what the weather was like. Maldonado also complained that the dog repeatedly whined and howled which kept her up at night causing her emotional distress. Maldonado went online expressing concern about the health and welfare of her neighbor’s dog, without naming any names. Mr. Franklin at some point saw the post and entered the conversation which lead to Mr. Franklin and Maldonado exchanging direct messages about the dog. Maldonado even placed a dog bed in the backyard for the dog as a gift. In December of 2017, the Franklins filed suit against Maldonado for invasion of privacy by intrusion and seclusion alleging that Maldonado was engaged in a campaign of systemic harassment over the alleged mistreatment of their dog. While the suit was pending, Maldonado contacted Animal Control Services several times to report that the dog was outside with the heat index over 100 degrees. Each time an animal control officer responded to the call they found no actionable neglect or abuse. In June of 2018, Maldonado picketed for five days by walking along the neighborhood sidewalks, including in front of the Franklins’ house, carrying signs such as “Bring the dog in,” and “If you’re hot, they’re hot.” The Franklins then amended their petition adding claims for slander, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and trespass. The trial court granted a temporary injunction against Maldonado, which was ultimately vacated on appeal. Maldonado filed a Anti-SLAPP motion and amended motion to dismiss the Franklins’ claims as targeting her First Amendment rights. The trial court did not rule on the motions within thirty days, so the motions were denied by operation of law. Maldonado appealed. The Court began its analysis by determining whether Maldonado’s motions were timely. Under the Texas Citizen’s Participation Act (TCPA) a motion to dismiss must be filed within sixty days of the legal action. The sixty-day deadline reset each time new factual allegations were alleged. Due to the fact that the Franklins had amended their petition three times and some of the amended petitions did not allege any new factual allegations, the only timely motions that Maldonado filed were for the Franklins’ claims for slander and libel. The Court then concluded that Maldonado’s verbal complaints to the Animal Control Service and online posts on community forums about the Franklins’ alleged mistreatment of their dog were communications made in connection with an issue related to a matter of public concern and were made in the exercise of free speech. Therefore, the TCPA applied to the Franklins’ slander and libel claims. The Court ultimately concluded that although Maldonado established that the TCPA applied to the slander and libel claims, the Franklins met their burden to establish a prima facie case on the slander and libel claims. Therefore, the Court ultimately concluded that Maldonado’s motion to dismiss the slander and libel claims were properly denied. The Court affirmed the trial court’s order and remanded the case to the trial court.|
|Malloy v. Cooper||592 S.E.2d 17 (N.C. 2004)||
Plaintiff owned a Gun Club and sponsored a pigeon shoot. He challenged the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting the intentional wounding or killing of animals. Held: unconstitutionally vague.
|Maloney v. State||1975 OK CR 22 (Ok. App. 1975)||
The State charged defendant with maliciously placing a dog in a pit with another dog and encouraging the dogs to fight, injure, maim, or kill one another. The trial court convicted defendant of cruelty to animals pursuant to Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1685 (1971) and fined defendant. Defendant appealed. On appeal, the court held that Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1682 (1971) was constitutional as applied to the case but reversed and remanded the case because the court determined that the defendant had been improperly convicted under the anti-cruelty statute rather than the dogfighting statute.
|Mansbridge v Nichols|| VSC 530||
The appellant was convicted of seven offences under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1986 (Vic) related to the appellant's treatment of merino sheep in her care. The appellant was successful in overturning three of the charges on the basis that they were latently duplicitous or ambiguous. The appellant was unsuccessful in arguing that the trial judge failed to give adequate reasons.
|Martinez v. State||48 S.W.3d 273 (Tex. App. 2001).||
A jury may infer a culpable mental state ("intentionally and knowingly") from the circumstances surrounding the offense of cruelty to animals.
|Matter of Ricco v Corbisiero||565 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1991)||
Petitioner harness race-horse driver was suspended by the New York State Racing and Wagering Board, Harness Racing Division for 15 days for failing to drive his horse to the finish. The driver argued that whipping the horse had not improved his performance. Considering that the horse had equaled his best time, and had lost by only two feet, and that it would have been a violation of the New York anti-cruelty law (Agriculture and Markets Law ( § 353) to overdrive the horse, the court overturned the suspension.