*523 **1 Max and Olinda Kraushaar are getting divorced. They have a dog, Dario. They’re fighting over Dario. Dario is Max’s certified emotional support animal. Both parties agree that in Florida, pets are personal property subject to equitable distribution under section 61.075(1), Florida Statutes. Against this backdrop, Max petitions for certiorari review of the trial court’s order denying a motion for protective order pertaining to discovery surrounding Dario’s designation as an emotional support animal.
A trial court’s discovery order, even where erroneous, rarely warrants certiorari relief. This is because the petitioner is required to establish: “(1) a departure from the essential requirements of the law, (2) resulting in material injury for the remainder of the case (3) that cannot be corrected on postjudgment appeal.” Williams v. Oken, 62 So. 3d 1129, 1132 (Fla. 2011) (quoting Reeves v. Fleetwood Homes of Fla., Inc., 889 So. 2d 812, 822 (Fla. 2004)). An overbroad, irrelevant, or burdensome discovery obligation does not, without more, constitute material injury. See, e.g., Coral Gables Chiropractic PLLC v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 199 So. 3d 292, 295 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016). But here, Olinda is seeking extensive medical records and depositions from two of Max’s doctors. Because of the confidential and protected nature of medical records, an order that improperly compels production *524 or examination of the same satisfies the jurisdictional element of irreparable harm. See Paylan v. Fitzgerald, 223 So. 3d 431, 434 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (“Orders that require disclosure of confidential medical information meet the irreparable harm requirement for certiorari review because once such information is improperly disclosed, the harm caused by that disclosure cannot be undone.” (citing USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v. Callery, 66 So. 3d 315, 316 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011))).
Having established irreparable harm if the records are improperly disclosed, we must examine whether such an order departs from the essential requirements of the law. Olinda argues that the medical records are relevant to whether Max fraudulently obtained an emotional support certification for Dario. Max counters that it wouldn’t matter anyway, because the emotional support designation doesn’t change a pet’s status as property for purposes of equitable distribution. And Dario’s status as Max’s emotional support animal alone does not justify intrusive discovery into Max’s medical history. At least, not without more. This is because “Florida courts must consider the factors enumerated in section 61.075(1), as is, along with any special needs or special circumstances to distribute pets.” Harby v. Harby, 331 So. 3d 814, 822 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021). That a pet owner has sentimental interest in a family pet is not an earthshattering proposition. As our sister court explained, “the trial court may consider a party’s sentimental interest in property, such as the ordinary attachment to pets, alongside the other [statutory] factors.” Id. at 823.
**2 So if Max seeks to show sentimental interest through Dario’s status as an emotional support animal, that could be given its appropriate weight by the court along with all other factors in line with the statutory scheme. And no medical records would be necessary. But here, Max sought to show that Dario’s status as an emotional support animal constituted a “special need[ ] or special circumstance[ ]” because Max “had a disability” for which Dario “provided emotional support to alleviate an effect thereof.” Id. at 822. Max’s emergency motion for return of Dario explains that “[t]he Dog ... provid[ed] therapeutic comfort for a long-standing anxiety condition.” The motion attaches and incorporates by reference diagnoses and letters from “doctors stating why and the need of Dario as a companion dog.” Because Max seeks to rely on his disability, and Dario’s alleviation thereof, as a special need or circumstance, the medical records, or at least some of them, would be discoverable with proper safeguards.
But the trial court would need to review any records produced in camera to assure that the records relate to the issues raised. See Tanner v. Hart, 313 So. 3d 805, 808 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) (explaining that “disclosure of ‘any and all’ records from 2011 through the present casts too wide a net” and collecting cases explaining the need of the trial court to conduct an in camera review of any medical record before compelling production to ensure relevance to the litigation).
To the extent Max sought to utilize Dario’s status as an emotional support animal to prove a special need or circumstance tipping equitable distribution in his favor, such discovery of Max’s medical records would be discoverable, but such discovery would nonetheless need to be carefully tailored with appropriate safeguards. At a minimum, the records would need to be subject to in camera review. We therefore grant the petition and quash the order under review.
Petition granted; order quashed.
All Citations
424 So.3d 522, 2025 WL 3019323
Full Case Name: Max H. KRAUSHAAR, Petitioner, v. Olinda KRAUSHAAR, Respondent.
Summary:
In this marital dissolution proceeding, the central dispute involved the classification of a dog as an emotional support animal and its impact on the equitable distribution of property. The court affirmed that, under Florida law, pets are considered personal property pursuant to section 61.075(1). The petitioner challenged the trial court's order compelling discovery into his medical records, which was sought to investigate the legitimacy of the emotional support animal certification. The appellate court held that while a party's general sentimental attachment to a pet is a factor for consideration, it does not automatically justify intrusive discovery into protected medical information. However, by affirmatively asserting his disability and the dog's role in alleviating it as a "special circumstance" warranting a disproportionate share, the petitioner placed his medical condition at issue, rendering some records discoverable. Nevertheless, the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law by ordering production without conducting an in camera review to tailor the requests and implement safeguards against the disclosure of irrelevant information. The court therefore granted the petition for certiorari and quashed the discovery order.