Results

Displaying 91 - 100 of 1097
Title Authorsort descending Citation Summary
Detailed Discussion of Minnesota Great Ape Laws Amy Breyer Animal Legal & Historical Center The following article discusses Great Apes law in Minnesota. While there is no direct law governing who may own a great ape in Minnesota, there are, however, laws in various parts of the Minnesota code that have some limited application to great apes. On the upside, the state's anti-cruelty law applies to all animals, and there is a law specifically protecting companion animals which applies to apes kept for that purpose. On the other hand, the structure of the state's endangered species law - that it neither references apes nor the federal endangered list - makes it a particularly lacklustre protection. Moreover, the state's affirmative decision to address the ownership and possession of Great Apes as a "regulated" animal, along with a number of exceptions and exemptions to the general ban against possessing such animals, is a window into how the state views these animals.
Detailed Discussion of Mississippi Great Ape Laws Amy Breyer Animal Legal & Historical Center The following article discusses Great Apes law in Mississippi. Mississippi law directly regulates Great Apes by a law that bans the importation and possession of certain wild animals deemed "inherently dangerous." In addition, the state also addresses Great Apes in its general anti-cruelty law as well as its endangered species provisions.
Detailed Discussion of Nebraska Great Ape Laws Amy Breyer Animal Legal & Historical Center Nebraska, like many other states, addresses the question of who may possess a Great Ape by reference to federal law. Nebraska's Nongame Endangered Species Conservation Act states that it is "unlawful for any person to take, possess, transport, export, process, sell or offer for sale, or ship nongame wildlife in need of conservation...." As with other states, Nebraska also has exceptions to the ban against possessing endangered species under its provisions concerning possession of captive wildlife. Great Apes do fall under the definition of "animal" in Section 28-1008, and are thus covered by the general ban against cruelty. The statute, however, carves out an exception for research facilities that meet federal standards.
ASSET FORFEITURE AND ANIMAL CRUELTY: MAKING ONE OF THE MOST POWERFUL TOOLS IN THE LAW WORK FOR THE MOST POWERLESS Amy Breyer 6 Animal L. 203 (2000) Animals have historically been one of the most vulnerable segments of society to crime due both to their status as property and their inability to advocate for themselves. While this has long worked to their disadvantage, developments in an area of jurisprudence where criminal and property law merge now offer an unprecedented possibility. Forfeiture laws have become one of the most powerful and effective tools in the war against crime. The principles and precedents that have emerged from asset forfeiture are aptly suited to application in the animal cruelty context as well. This article discusses asset forfeiture and animal cruelty, offering suggestions on how to combine these two areas of law in an effort to better protect animals from abuse.
Detailed Discussion of New Jersey Great Ape Laws Amy Breyer and Rebecca Wisch Animal Legal & Historical Center The following article discusses Great Ape law in New Jersey. While New Jersey does not expressly forbid possession of great apes, personal possession is effectively banned by state regulations dealing with endangered and “potentially dangerous” species. Further, the state Nongame and Endangered Species Conservation Act bars the taking, possession, transportation and sale of endangered species. Great Apes are not specifically named, but rather are included by reference to the federal endangered species list. The ban on possession of endangered apes is buttressed by a companion regulation that states “no permit shall be issued for the possession of any species designated as endangered by the U.S. Department of the Interior. . .” Great apes are also covered under the state’s anti-cruelty laws. Unlike many other states, there are no general exemptions for research or other activities.
Justice for Dusty: Implementing Mandatory Minimum Sentences for Animal Abusers Kirsten E. Brimer 113 Penn St. L. Rev. 649 (Fall 2008)

This Comment discusses the problem with the current punishments for animal abuse violations and analyzes why states should adopt statutes that require mandatory minimums in animal brutality convictions. Part II focuses on the psychological problems associated with animal cruelty, including the relationship between animal cruelty and violence toward humans. Part III examines the structure of current animal abuse legislation. Part IV concentrates on the advantages of applying mandatory minimum sentences to the anticruelty provisions of animal abuse statutes.

2014 Federal Legislative Review Jessica Brockway 21 Animal L. 365 (2015) This article provides a review of significant animal-related federal legislation from 2014.
NEW ZEALAND’S ANIMAL WELFARE ACT: WHAT IS ITS VALUE REGARDING NON-HUMAN HOMINIDS? Paula Brosnahan 6 Animal L. 185 (2000) New Zealand's Animal Welfare Act has been touted as a world first in great ape protection, and that may be true. However, it has also been depicted as an act conferring basic legal rights on great apes, and that is an exaggeration. Challenging the legal status of great apes in any jurisdiction requires sound, factual propositions. Therefore, the background and breadth of New Zealand's protections must be understood before proponents of change employ them as precedent. This essay offers a brief history of the non-human hominid provisions of New Zealand's Animal Welfare Act.
Cropping and Docking: A Discussion of the Controversy and the Role of Law in Preventing Unnecessary Cosmetic Surgery on Dogs Amy L. Broughton Animal Legal & Historical Center

This article describes the procedures of tail docking and ear cropping, the history of the procedures, their place in modern veterinary care, and discuss the positions of advocates both for, and against these procedures. Additionally, this article explains the ways in which the law is being used internationally in preventing these unnecessary procedures, and the ways that current and future American anti-cruelty laws can be used to put a stop to this epidemic.
STEVENS, R.A.V., AND ANIMAL CRUELTY SPEECH: WHY CONGRESS'S NEW STATUTE REMAINS CONSTITUTIONALLY PROBLEMATIC J. Alexandra Bruce 51 Gonz. L. Rev. 481 (2015-2016) Abstract: The constitutionality of restrictions on speech depicting actual cruelty to animals is a question that continues to divide courts and commentators. In U.S. v. Stevens, the Supreme Court struck down a 1999 ban on depictions of animal cruelty. The Court invalidated the ban on its face because, as written, the statute extended beyond acts of actual animal cruelty to other forms of unlawful animal harm, such as hunting out of season. Thus, the Court did not resolve the core question presented.

Congress responded by drafting a new statute, one narrowed to “crush” videos--obscene depictions of animal cruelty--in an effort to avoid constitutional problems. This new statute, however, continues to raise constitutional and public policy concerns--despite its recent upholding in the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Richards.

This article is the first to analyze the constitutional and public policy issues presented by Congress's new animal cruelty speech regulation. This article contends that the modified statute is poor public policy and remains constitutionally problematic. First, as a policy matter, the statute is ineffective because it fails to criminalize the most widespread and troubling form of animal cruelty speech: animal fighting videos. Second, the statute's overly narrow reach--limited to obscene depictions of animal cruelty--in fact increases its constitutional problems by triggering the “virulence” doctrine first articulated in R.A.V. Since courts are unlikely to view obscene depictions of animal cruelty as virulently “prurient” obscenity, as opposed to the kind of “morbidly” violent speech entitled to the protections of strict scrutiny as established in Brown, the statute will likely be invalidated.

The article concludes with an exploration of possible new legislation, which could effectively prevent animal cruelty, while also preserving free speech rights.

Pages