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Displaying 81 - 90 of 165
Title Authorsort descending Citation Summary
Origins of Animal Law: Three Perspectives Richard J. Katz: National Advisor, Michael C. Blumm: Faculty Advisor, and Holly Anne Gibbons: Law Student Editor 10 Animal L. 1 (2004)

This article provides three different perspectives on the origins of the Animal Law Review based at Lewis & Clark School of Law.

A SHORT HISTORY OF (MOSTLY) WESTERN ANIMAL LAW: PART I Thomas G. Kelch 19 Animal L. 23 (2012) This Article, presented in two parts, travels through animal law from ancient Babylonia to the present, analyzing examples of laws from the ancient, medieval, Renaissance and Enlightenment, recent modern, and modern historical periods. In performing this analysis, particular attention is focused on the primary motives and purposes behind these laws. What is discovered is that there has been a historical progression in the primary motives underlying animal laws in these different periods. While economic and religious motives dominate the ancient and medieval periods, in the Renaissance and Enlightenment we see social engineering—efforts to change human behavior—come to the fore. In the recent modern period, we finally see protecting animals for their own sakes, animal protection, motivating animal law. In our present historical period there is a movement towards what is defined as “scientific animal welfare”—the use of modern animal welfare science as the inspiration for animal laws and regulations. Does this historical trend toward use of modern science in making animal law portend a change that may transform our relationship with animals? Modern science tells us that many animals have substantial cognitive abilities and rich emotional lives, and this science would seem to lead us to question the use of animals in agriculture, experimentation, and entertainment altogether. It is ultimately concluded in this Article, however, that so far only a very narrow science of animal welfare is actually being applied in modern animal protection laws and regulations, one that proceeds from a premise that present uses of animals are legally, ethically, and morally appropriate. It is only in the future that the true implications of modern science may ever be translated into legal reality.
A SHORT HISTORY OF (MOSTLY) WESTERN ANIMAL LAW: PART II Thomas G. Kelch 19 Animal L. 347 (2013) This Article, presented in two parts, travels through animal law from ancient Babylonia to the present, analyzing examples of laws from the ancient, medieval, Renaissance and Enlightenment, recent modern, and modern historical periods. In performing this analysis, particular attention is focused on the primary motives and purposes behind these laws. What is discovered is that there has been a historical progression in the primary motives underlying animal laws in these different periods. In Part I of this Article, it was discovered that while economic and religious motives dominate the ancient and medieval periods, in the Renaissance and Enlightenment, we see social engineering—efforts to change human behavior—come to the fore. In this Part II of the Article, it is found that in the recent modern historical period we finally see protecting animals for their own sakes—animal protection—motivating animal law. In our present historical period, this Part II of the Article uncovers a movement towards what is defined as “scientific animal welfare”—the use of modern animal-welfare science as the inspiration for animal laws and regulations. Does this historical trend toward the use of modern science in making animal law portend a change that may transform our relationship with animals? Modern science tells us that many animals have substantial cognitive abilities and rich emotional lives, and this science would seem to lead us to question the use of animals in agriculture, experimentation, and entertainment altogether. It is ultimately concluded in this Part II of the Article, however, that only a very narrow science of animal welfare is actually being applied in modern animal-protection laws and regulations, one that proceeds from the premise that present uses of animals are legally, ethically, and morally appropriate. It is only in the future that the true implications of modern science may ever be translated into legal reality.
CULTURAL SOLIPSISM, CULTURAL LENSES, UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES, AND ANIMAL ADVOCACY Thomas G. Kelch 31 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 403 This article explores the cultural similarities and differences relating to the relationship between humans and animals in a globalized world. The article acknowledges that cultural differences in a globalized world can have a profound impact on the efficacy of advocacy for the benefit of animals. Attempts in one nation to provide protection for animals can have unintended consequences in our globalized world. The problem that then presents itself is, given the potpourri of human cultures and the need to take a global view of animal rights advocacy, how can animal rights advocates most efficiently and successfully advocate for animals? This article addresses that issue.
A SLAVE BY ANY OTHER NAME IS STILL A SLAVE: THE TILIKUM CASE AND APPLICATION OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT TO NONHUMAN ANIMALS Jeffrey S. Kerr, Martina Bernstein, Amanda Schwoerke, Matthew D. Strugar, Jared S. Goodman 19 Animal L. 221 (2013) On its face, the Thirteenth Amendment outlaws the conditions and practices of slavery and involuntary servitude wherever they may exist in this country—irrespective of the victim’s race, creed, sex, or species. In 2011, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, on behalf of five wild-captured orcas, sued SeaWorld for enslaving the orcas in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. The case presented, for the first time, the question of whether the Thirteenth Amendment’s protections can extend to nonhuman animals. This Article examines the lawsuit’s factual, theoretical, and strategic underpinnings, and argues that the district court’s opinion ultimately dismissing the suit failed to address the critical issues that animated this case of first impression: Who “counts” as a legal person for the purposes of law? Is it time to recognize nonhuman animals as legal persons, based on progressing scientific and normative views? What principles underlie the Thirteenth Amendment? When and how does the application of the Constitution expand? Can the meaning of the Constitution evolve to encompass the interests of nonhuman animals? Drawing on the United States Supreme Court’s long history of evolving constitutional interpretation, this Article presents four theories of constitutional change, under which the meanings of “slavery” and “involuntary servitude” are expansive enough to include nonhuman animals. Despite the district court’s decision, the case can be properly viewed as the first step toward the legal recognition that the Thirteenth Amendment protects the rights of nonhuman animals to be free from bondage.
Animal mourning. Précis of How animals grieve (King 2013) Barbara J. King Animal Sentience 2016.004 Abstract When an animal dies, that individual’s mate, relatives, or friends may express grief. Changes in the survivor’s patterns of social behavior, eating, sleeping, and/or of expression of affect are the key criteria for defining grief. Based on this understanding of grief, it is not only big-brained mammals like elephants, apes, and cetaceans who can be said to mourn, but also a wide variety of other animals, including domestic companions like cats, dogs, and rabbits; horses and farm animals; and some birds. With keen attention placed on seeking where grief is found to occur and where it is absent in wild and captive animal populations, scientists and others interested in animal emotion and animal minds can build up a database that answers questions about patterns of grief in the animal kingdom. The expression of grief is expected to be highly variable in individuals within populations, based on an animal’s ontogeny, personality, and relationship to the deceased. Human grief may be unique in our species’ ability to anticipate death and to consider its meaning across time and space, and yet such hypothesized species-specific features do not imply a more profound emotional experience in humans compared to other animals. This new knowledge of the depth of animals’ capacity for grief invites novel exploration of animal-welfare issues including the use of animals in factory farming, entertainment, and biomedicine.
WHO THE JUDGE ATE FOR BREAKFAST: ON THE LIMITS OF CREATIVITY IN ANIMAL LAW AND THE REDEEMING POWER OF POWERLESSNESS Matthew Liebman 18 Animal L. 133 (2011)

Drawing upon various schools of legal thought, this Essay explores how ideological and non-legal factors influence the adjudication process in animal law cases. The Legal Realist and Critical Legal Studies movements highlighted the indeterminacy present in legal doctrine and undermined trust in judges’ ability to arrive at “correct” answers to legal questions. In the midst of such indeterminacy, where legal texts do not predetermine legal outcomes, judges tend to render decisions that are consistent with pervasive societal norms and existing distributions of political power. Starting from these premises, the Author questions whether innovative and creative impact litigation by the animal law movement can succeed in fundamentally challenging speciesism through a legal system that is pervasively hostile to the interests of animals. Although incremental and meaningful gains are possible through litigation, we must recognize the limits of legal reform in the short-term. Although such limitations are typically seen as cause for despair, the Author argues that recognizing our powerlessness can be a source of compassion and an opportunity to experience our shared existential vulnerability with animals.
I Fought the Law: A Review of Terrorists or Freedom Fighters?: Reflections on the Liberation of Animals, Edited By Steven Best & Anthony J. Nocella II Matthew Liebman 1 Journal of Animal Law 151 (2005)

This book review seeks to introduce the major issues raised by the authors of the essays in "Terrorists or Freedom Fighters?" and to commend Best and Nocella for their valuable contribution to the body of animal rights theory and practice.

Animal Law in Action: The Law, Public Perception, and the Limits of Animal Rights Theory as a Basis for Legal Reform Jonathan R. Lovvorn 12 Animal L. 133 (2005)

This article discusses animal law as a model for legal reform.

Derechos de los animales en Colombia: una lectura crítica en perspectiva ambiental Carlos Lozano Lozano, C. 2022. Animal rights in Colombia: a critical reading in environmental perspective. State Law Magazine. 54 (Nov. 2022), 345–380. Animal rights are commonly understood as an expression of the rights of nature. However, both are in open contradiction, due to the complex interactions of ecosystems and the place of fauna in them, poorly understood by the generators of animal law rules, because in those animal suffering is inherent. The rights of animals in Colombia are not an expression of the rights of nature, on the contrary, they undermine them, and hinder the consolidation of an environmental right aligned with social justice and that puts the survival of ecosystems at the center. The above, because animal law outlaws critical ecological processes, gentrifies environmental law, promotes an artificial binary between fauna and flora, contradicts certain forms of climate action, hinders conservation, stigmatizes cultural diversity, agency class discrimination, prevents the control of invasive species, generates a protection deficit for other kingdoms of life, like the vegetable and the fungi, and promotes a transition from anthropocentrism to a kind of zoocentrism (article in Spanish).

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