Results
| Title |
Author |
Citation | Summary |
|---|---|---|---|
| ANIMAL OPPRESSION AND THE PRAGMATIST | Lesli Bisgould | 3 Animal L. 39 (1997) | A pragmatist can be thought of as someone concerned about the practical consequences of her actions or beliefs. It is likely that all animal rights activists, whose common goal might be framed as the eradication of animal oppression, consider themselves pragmatists. Theirs is a lofty goal. Oppression which has been thousands of years in the making could reasonably be anticipated to be a long time in the unmaking. In the intervening years, different ideas have emerged about the practical consequences of different actions or beliefs. These differences (sometimes categorized under the broad headings of'rights" or 'welfare'" have transformed, or been transformed, into a pernicious conflict between advocates. It is essential, if meaningful change is to be achieved, that this conflict be resolved and not casually remanded to the realm where all opinions are seen to be equally valid, and to each her own. Gary Francione, lawyer, professor and author, has recently attempted an analysis of this discord in his book Rain Without Thunder: The Ideology of the Animal Rights Movement. The following commentary briefly considers some of the observations and conclusions Francione makes and some of the backlash his thoughts have engendered. |
| Brief Summary of Animals and Philosophy | Alissa Branham | Animal Legal & Historical Center |
This brief summary examines the historical philosophical figures who contributed to the modern animal rights movement. |
| Overview of Philosophy and Animals | Alissa Branham | Animal Legal & Historical Center |
This overview examines the historical philosophical figures who have contributed to the modern animal rights and welfare movement. |
| Detailed Discussion of Philosophy and Animals | Alissa Branham | Animal Legal & Historical Center |
This discussion examines the historical philosophical figures who contributed to the animal rights and welfare movement. Included are the philosophies of Rene Descartes, Immanuel Kant, and John Stuart Mill. |
| Proposed Fundraising Bills in Oklahoma and Missouri Would Unconstitutionally Target Animal Rights Charities | Daina Bray, Samantha Hasey & Candace Hensley | 67 Syracuse L. Rev. 217 (2017) | Two proposed state bills out of Oklahoma and Missouri would prohibit an “animal rights charitable organization” from soliciting contributions in-state intended for either out-of-state use or “political purposes.” It is worthwhile to examine the bills and the factual context out of which they arose because of the important constitutional rights that they implicate and the potential chilling effect of this sort of legislation on the ability of nonprofits to advocate for their causes. While today it is “animal rights” groups under attack—by way of the bills discussed herein and other legislation such as so-called “ag-gag” bills, which suffer from some of the same constitutional deficiencies—it is not difficult to imagine scenarios in which other nonprofit groups with a viewpoint unwelcome to a legislature, or to powerful private interests, could be similarly targeted. |
| NEW ZEALAND’S ANIMAL WELFARE ACT: WHAT IS ITS VALUE REGARDING NON-HUMAN HOMINIDS? | Paula Brosnahan | 6 Animal L. 185 (2000) | New Zealand's Animal Welfare Act has been touted as a world first in great ape protection, and that may be true. However, it has also been depicted as an act conferring basic legal rights on great apes, and that is an exaggeration. Challenging the legal status of great apes in any jurisdiction requires sound, factual propositions. Therefore, the background and breadth of New Zealand's protections must be understood before proponents of change employ them as precedent. This essay offers a brief history of the non-human hominid provisions of New Zealand's Animal Welfare Act. |
| Mythic Non-Violence | Tamie L. Bryant | 2 Journal of Animal Law 1 (2006) |
In this essay the author claims that mythic rejection of violence harms animals and their advocates in the following ways: (1) it lays the foundation for the claims of institutional (ab)users of animals that they do not and would not treat animals cruelly or violently because they are participants in the mainstream values of the society; (2) it results in traumatic silencing of advocates because of public disbelief that so much violence against animals could be occurring in a society that abhors violence; (3) it creates broad-brush oppositional categories such that animals’ advocates can be painted as violent actors in a society that rejects violence; and (4) it hinders full consideration among advocates as to what advocates themselves consider “violent” means of protecting animals for fear that such discussion might allow for any amount of violence and, thereby, discredit animals’ advocates and their cause. |
| Sacrificing the Sacrifice of Animals: Legal Personhood for Animals, The Status of Animals as Property, and the Presumed Primacy of Humans | Taimie L. Bryant | 39 Rutgers L.J. 247 (2008) |
Part I of this article begins with consideration of two different definitions of legal personhood. In Part II, the author makes use of philosopher Jacques Derrida's suggestion that humans maintain their hegemony and conceptual separation from animals by failing to include animals in the proscription “Thou shalt not kill.” Ultimately, the author concludes that these two examples indicate that pursuit of direct legal standing for animals themselves is not always necessary to secure positive substantive changes in the law. |
| Symposium: Confronting Barriers To The Courtroom For Animal Advocates - Linking Cultural And Legal Transitions | Taimie Bryant, Una Chaudhuri, and Dale Jamieson | 13 Animal Law 29 (2006) |
In this discussion, panelists explore the many viewpoints society holds with respect to nonhuman animals. The discussion broadly covers ethics and what constitutes ethical behavior in this regard. The question dealt with is, largely, what is the appropriate ethical model to use when arguing that animals deserve better treatment and expanded rights? Unlike parallel movements for human civil rights or women’s equality, the animal rights movement has much greater hurdles to overcome when it comes to arguing that animals deserve equal treatment under the law. In an attempt to address this question, the dialogue touches upon many areas of human thought. The panelists take on diverse fields such as philosophy, science, anthropology, environmentalism, and feminism and use them to understand the past and present state of animal law. The analytical tools of these several disciplines are also applied to animal law in an attempt to develop a better model for the future. |
| Fifteen Volumes of Animal Law | Laura Cadiz | 15 Animal L. 1 (2008) |
This article celebrates the fifteenth volume of the Animal Law Review based at Lewis & Clark Law School by discussing the journal's history and development. |