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Title Authorsort ascending Citation Summary
". . . und die tiere" Constitutional Protection for Germany's Animals Kate M. Nattrass 10 Animal L. 283 (2004) In the summer of 2002, Germany welcomed animals into the folds of constitutional protection. With the addition of the words “and the animals,” Germany became the first country in the European Union (“E.U.”), and the second on the European continent, to guarantee the highest level of federal legal protection to its nonhuman animals. Though a welcomed development in the eyes of most Germans, this groundbreaking event received very little attention on the world stage. Common misconceptions about the ramifications of the constitutional amendment resulted in limited to no accurate representation in worldwide media. Likewise, international policymakers and animal protectionists have shown little awareness of this development and its potential implications. In addition to possible legal effects, the social implications of such an occurrence in a major western country are vast. International leaders will certainly take note as the effects of this change begin to take place in Germany’s laws and, increasingly, in its international policies. More importantly, the global animal protection community should take note of what is possible, and what can be learned from the achievements of Germany’s animal protection community. This study traces the legal and social developments leading to Germany’s constitutional amendment which provides protection to animals, showing how this legal highpoint was achieved. Multiple sources are used, including congressional, judicial, and party doc uments, press releases, international media reports, personal communication with leaders in four major German animal protection organizations, interviews with a key Ministry official, and published materials. This study will also critically assess the claims of the animal protection and opposition communities in order to predict where German animal law is going and what effects this change will have on the treatment of animals both within Germany and internationally. Concluding thoughts will address how the international animal protection community can understand this legal victory in a constructive context.
Our Dumb Animals Vol 20 No.3 MSPCA Vol 20, No 3

This is a magazine published by the Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. It is a mixture of articles, humor, poems and information, not unlike the Reader's Digest format of today. It is reflective of a softer, gentler era.

Two Competing Models of Activism, One Goal: A Case Study of Anti-Whaling Campaigns in the Southern Ocean Anthony L.I. Moffa 37 Yale J. Int'l L. 201 (2012)

This Comment is divided into four parts. Part I will describe the problem presented by international whaling and provide a historical context of the industry, its relatively recent regulation, and specific actions concerning Japanese whaling in the Southern Ocean. Parts II and III will draw on this case study to illustrate the competing models of activism--protest and interventionist--and highlight the demonstrated advantages of and drawbacks to each. Part IV will lend insight into the implications of permitting each model.

Exporting Morality with Trade Restrictions: The Wrong Path to Animal Rights Gary Miller 34 Brook. J. Int'l L. 999 (2009)

Part I of this Note will critique normative moral theory with respect to its fundamental role in animal welfare proselytizing, its applicability to legal theory, and its usefulness as a basis for legal decision making. Part II will discuss international trade disputes arising over morality-based domestic import restrictions in order to examine why the GATT has consistently been interpreted to err on the side of free trade and consumer choice. Finally, Part III will argue that the DCPA is not only an ineffective and unenforceable law but also potentially counterproductive to the goals of the Western animal welfare movement and overly costly to global trade infrastructure in light of more effective alternatives.

Legal Protection Only For Those Who Are Most Like "Us"? Camden J. McDaris 2 Journal of Animal Law 159 (2006)

This note analyzes the challenges that the animal rights movement faces in reforming society’s relationship to animals--particularly in regard to farmed animals--by tracking a similar evolution of the concepts of “dominion” and “civilization” within the early feminist movement. Specific focus is on nineteenth-century white middle-class women, who viewed themselves as models of civilized, liberated womanhood, while asserting maternalistic dominion over their “primitive” and underprivileged sisters. Acknowledging the way in which nineteenth-century America--which, for socio-political and legal purposes, was composed almost exclusively of Protestant white men--was willing to gradually “grant” one class of women a voice in society, based on well-established perceptions of “true womanhood,” is important in considering the way in which modern society seems poised to acknowledge some degree of rights for companion animals, while ignoring the legally-sanctioned misery to which billions of farmed animals are subjected annually.

CAN NONHUMAN ANIMALS FIND TORT PROTECTION IN A HUMAN-CENTERED COMMON LAW? Enger McCartney-Smith 4 Animal L. 173 (1998) The question of 'Rights allocation" typically hinges on society's distinction between legal and moral entitlement. Although many rights find support in both categories, not all rights grounded in societal morality are likewise accorded legal status. The animal rights movement, particularly in the last three decades, has advanced the recognition of nonhuman animals' moral entitlements, but corresponding legal rights have been slow to follow. This Comment explores this gap in nonhuman animals' rights allocation with an eye toward establishing a basis for a private right of intentional tort action. Through appeal to predominant tort jurisprudential theories, in conjunction with an examination of our scientifically and experientially grounded understanding of nonhuman animals, the Comment concludes that there is room in our current legal system for direct recognition of, and compensation for, intentional injurious behavior aimed at nonhuman animals
Natural Behavior Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson 16 Animal L. 1 (2009)

This introduction to Volume 16 is provided by Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, author of such book as When Elephants Weep, and The Pig Who Sang. to the Moon.

The Animal Question: The Key to Coming to Terms with Nature Jim Mason 13 Animal Law 197 (2007)

In this Introduction to Volume 13, Part 2 of Animal Law, the author considers the "Animal Question" - the shorthand term "for all of those difficult questions about our views of, and relations with,nonhuman animals."

LIVE FREE OR DIE: ON THEIR OWN TERMS: BRINGING ANIMAL-RIGHTS PHILOSOPHY DOWN TO EARTH BY LEE HALL Joel Marks 17 Animal L. 243 (2010)

This book review examines Lee Hall’s new book, which presents an innovative animal rights theory: wild animals, due to their autonomous nature, are endowed with rights, but domesticated animals lack rights because they are not autonomous. With that theory in mind, Hall outlines ideas about how humans are obligated to treat both wild and domestic animals. Hall first argues that the rights of wild animals require that humans let them alone. Yet, despite the fact that domestic animals lack rights under Hall’s theory, Hall argues that humans are required to care for them because it is humans who brought them into existence. While the reviewer believes that Hall’s theory is indeed innovative and appealing, he ultimately concludes that it cannot explain why domestic animals completely lack rights and that the implications of the theory for how they are to be treated are unsatisfactory.

Pawing Open the Courthouse Door: Why Animals' Interests Should Matter Lauren Magnotti 80 St. John's L. Rev. 455 (Winter 2006)

It is widely accepted that animals are viewed as property under the law. It is equally apparent, however, that animals are much more than the average inanimate piece of personal property. The law of standing should reflect that animals are creatures with interests worthy of legal protection in their own right. Thus, while the courts may inevitably continue to recognize animals as property, animals are qualitatively different and the courts can and must take this into consideration when deciding the issue of standing.

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