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Scharer v. San Luis Rey Equine Hosp., Inc. |
Horse owner sued veterinarians and equine hospital for professional malpractice after horse was euthanized less than two months after surgery to remove horse’s ovaries. The Superior Court granted summary judgment for defendants based on the one-year statute of limitations. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that equitable tolling did not apply because plaintiff was not prevented from pursuing her claim in a timely manner by the defendants or the court. A provision in the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act extending the statute of limitations by 90 days did not apply absent a claim for personal injury or wrongful death to a person.
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Scheele v. Dustin |
A dog that wandered onto defendant’s property was shot and killed by defendant. The dog’s owners sued under an intentional tort theory and a claim for loss of companionship. The Supreme Court upheld the award of economic damages for the intentional destruction of property. It also held that the owners could not recover noneconomic damages for emotional distress under Vermont common law.
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Schriver v. Raptosh |
This Idaho case addresses the recoverable damages for a pet owner following the death of a pet due to alleged veterinary malpractice and an unauthorized necropsy. The Schrivers sought non-economic damages, including emotional distress and loss of companionship, after their cat, Gypsy, died during a veterinary procedure and was subjected to a necropsy without their consent. The district court denied emotional distress damages under their trespass to chattels/conversion claim and granted summary judgment in favor of the veterinarian on claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and lack of informed consent. The court, however, applied the “value to owner” measure for economic damages, which the veterinarian cross-appealed. The court affirmed that pets are considered personal property under Idaho law, and damages for their loss are limited to economic value, excluding sentimental value or loss of companionship. Emotional distress damages are not recoverable under trespass to chattels or conversion claims but may be pursued under independent torts like intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court upheld the denial of negligent infliction of emotional distress, finding no duty of care owed by veterinarians to prevent emotional harm to pet owners. However, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim regarding the unauthorized necropsy, remanding it for jury determination as to whether the conduct was “extreme and outrageous.” The court also affirmed that lack of informed consent is not a standalone cause of action in veterinary malpractice cases, though it may inform claims of professional negligence. Finally, the court upheld the “value to owner” measure for economic damages, clarifying that it includes the pet’s unique characteristics but excludes sentimental value. The court denied the veterinarian’s request for attorney fees, as the primary issues of the litigation remain unresolved. |
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SEIDNER v. DILL |
Charles Dill, appellee, brought this action in the Municipal Court of Marion County, Indiana, therein alleging that the defendant-appellant, Harold Seidner, maliciously and intentionally shot and killed plaintiff's dog. The case essentially involved a companion animal that was shot and killed by the defendant neighbor who alleged that the dog was after his livestock. A statute in Indiana provided that a person was authorized to kill a dog “known” for “roaming” that harmed or threatened to harm the livestock. A verdict of six hundred dollars for the wrongful killing of the dog was affirmed. This case, however, was subsequently overruled by
Puckett v. Miller
, 178 Ind. App. 174 (Ind. App. Ct. 1978).
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SENTELL v. NEW ORLEANS & C. R. CO. |
This was an action originally instituted by Sentell in the civil district court for the parish of Orleans, to recover the value of a Newffoundland bitch, known as 'Countess Lona,' alleged to have been negligently killed by the railroad company.
The company answered, denying the allegation of negligence, and set up as a separate defense that plaintiff had not complied either with the requirements of the state law, or of the city ordinances, with respect to the keeping of dogs, and was therefore not entitled to recover. Recognizing that an owner has only a conditional interest in a dog as a form of property, the Supreme Court held that the Louisiana law was within its police power, and the judgment of the court of appeals against plaintiff was therefore affirmed.
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Sentencia C-467/16 |
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Sentencia T-034/13 |
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Sexton v. Brown |
In this Washington case, Valeri Sexton and Corey Recla sued Kenny Brown, DVM, for damages arising from the death of their dog. Plaintiffs alleged a number of causes of action including negligence, breach of bailment, conversion, and trespass to chattels. The incident occurred after plaintiff's dog ran away while plaintiff was camping Marblemount area. Another party found the Yorkshire terrier and took it to defendant-veterinarian's office, the Pet Emergency Center (PEC). After being examined first by a one veterinarian, defendant-veterinarian Brown took over care and determined that the dog suffered from a life threatening condition; he then told the finders that if they did not want to pay for further care, they could have the dog euthanized. This court affirmed the trial court's decision that the medical malpractice act does not apply to veterinarians. It also affirmed the dismissal of Sexton's breach of bailment claim, finding that Brown was not a finder under relevant Washington law. The court did find that there were material issues of fact about the measure of damages, and reversed the decision to limit damages to the fair market or replacement value of the dog. Further, the court found genuine issues of material fact about whether Brown's actions were justified when viewed under the requirements of Washington's veterinary practice laws.
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Sharon Shumate v. Cecile Mouraux, an individual; Jean-Pierre Mouraux, an individual; both doing business as Happy Pets Inn, and |
In this California case, the plaintiff sought damages after her companion, a nine-year-old purebred cocker spaniel, suffered terminal injuries after staying at a “dog spa.” The defendants marketed their pet boarding facility in the brochures given to plaintiff as one that would provide “personal care in a secure atmosphere.” After plaintiff’s dog spent a visit at defendants’ facility, she noticed that Daisy was behaving abnormally, crouching low to the ground and apparently cowering. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff then observed the dog whimpering in pain with bloody stools and a slow, lethargic demeanor. Upon bringing the dog in for a veterinary examination, the veterinarian determined that the dog had suffered multiple broken ribs. The dog later died and a necropsy revealed the dog had twelve broken ribs, a torn liver, and brain swelling caused by severe trauma. In a phone call to defendants, the defendants denied any wrongdoing saying that nothing could have happened to Daisy while at the Happy Pets Inn. Plaintiff’s causes of action focused on negligence claims, arguing that Daisy’s injuries could not have occurred without negligence by someone and that she was in the exclusive control of defendants when they occurred. (Plaintiff also raised a violation of business practices claim under California code.) What is significant about this complaint is that it raises a modified res ipsa loquitur argument in a bailment action. It also contends that an exculpatory waiver in such a business relationship was unlawful. |
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Shera v. N.C. State University Veterinary Teaching Hosp. |
After an animal hospital caused the death of a dog due to an improperly placed feeding tube, the dog owners sued for veterinary malpractice under the Tort Claims Act. The Court of Appeals held that the replacement value of the dog was the appropriate measure of damages, and not the intrinsic value. Owners’ emotional bond with the dog was not compensable under North Carolina law.
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