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City of Boston v. Erickson |
This very short case concerns the disposition of defendant Heidi Erickson's six animals (four living and two dead) that were seized in connection with an animal cruelty case against her. After Erickson was convicted, the city withdrew its challenge to the return of the living animals and proceeded only as to the deceased ones. A single justice denied the city's petition for relief, on the condition that Erickson demonstrate “that she has made arrangements for [t]he prompt and proper disposal [of the deceased animals], which disposal also is in compliance with health codes.” Erickson challenged this order, arguing that it interfered with her property rights by requiring her to discard or destroy the deceased animals. However, this court found no abuse of discretion, where it interpreted the justice's order to mean that she must comply with all applicable health codes rather than forfeit her deceased animals.
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Com. v. Erickson |
In this Massachusetts case, the defendant was found guilty of six counts of animal cruelty involving one dog and five cats after a bench trial. On appeal, defendant challenged the warrantless entry into her apartment and argued that the judge erred when he failed to grant her motion to suppress the evidence gathered in the search. The Court of Appeals found no error where the search was justified under the "emergency exception" to the warrant requirement. The court found that the officer was justified to enter where the smell emanating from the apartment led him to believe that someone might be dead inside. The court was not persuaded by defendant's argument that, once the officer saw the dog feces covering the apartment that was the source of the smell, it was then objectively unreasonable for him to conclude the smell was caused by a dead body. "The argument ignores the reality that there were in fact dead bodies in the apartment, not merely dog feces, to say nothing of the additional odor caused by the blood, cat urine, and cat feces that were also found."
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Dart v Singer |
The applicants pleaded guilty to a number of charges under the Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld) following the seizure of 113 live dogs, one cat, 488 rats, 73 mice, 12 guinea pigs and 11 birds from their premises due to unsanitary and inappropriate living conditions. The applicants claimed that RSPCA officers were acting ultra vires and that a stay preventing the RSCPA from parting with the animals should be effected. The applicants' argument failed.
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Detailed Discussion of Animal Hoarding |
This article provides a basic overview of animal hoarding, its psychological underpinnings, and existing laws that are used to combat animal hoarding. The article suggests that current laws do not adequately prevent animal hoarding or protect animals, and that hoarding-specific legislation should be enacted. Hoarding-specific legislation should create a separate offense of animal hoarding, require psychological evaluation of animal hoarders, and prohibit future ownership of animals for convicted hoarders.
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GA - Alto - Hoarding - Article 1: Animal Control ( §§ 6-2, 6-16, 6-40, 6-41) |
This Alto, Georgia hoarding ordinance makes it a crime to collect animals while failing to provide them with humane/adequate care; to collect dead animals that are not properly disposed of; and to collect, house, or harbor animals in filthy, unsanitary conditions that constitute a health hazard to the animals being kept, and/or to the animals or residents of adjacent property. A person found guilty of hoarding animals may not own, possess, or have on his or her premises in Alto any animal for one year from the date of conviction. Additionally, a person may also face fines not to exceed $1,000 or may also face imprisonment not to exceed 6 months or both.
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Hemingway Home and Museum v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture |
The plaintiff lived in Hemmingway's old property, a museum, with 53 polydactyl cats (cats having more than the usual number of toes). The United States Department of Agriculture investigated and said that the plaintiff needed to get an exhibitor's license to show the cats, but that was not possible unless the cats were enclosed. Plaintiff sued the government in order to avoid the $200 per cat per day fines assessed, but the court held that the government has sovereign immunity from being sued.
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HI - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Laws (Chapter 711) |
Under this set of Hawaii laws, a person commits the misdemeanor offense of cruelty to animals if the person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly overdrives, overloads, tortures, torments, cruelly beats or starves any animal, deprives a pet animal of necessary sustenance, mutilates, poisons, or kills without need any animal other than insects, vermin, or other pests, or engages in animal fighting enterprises. Dog fighting constitutes a felony where the person owns or trains the dog to fight. The section has enhanced penalties for cruelty to guide or service animals or interference with their duties. |
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Hoarding |
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IL - Cruelty Generally - Consolidated Cruelty Statutes (Humane Care for Animals Act) |
This comprehensive Humane Care of Animals Act from Illinois gives the requisite anti-cruelty provisions. "Animal" means every living creature, domestic or wild, but does not include man. Notably, the Act includes a provisions for psychological counseling for a person convicted of violating this section. An individual is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor for the first offense and a second or subsequent violation is a Class 4 felony with every day that a violation continues constituting a separate offense. The Act includes special provisions for juveniles and "companion animal hoarders" (510 ILCS 70/2.10). The cruelty provisions are listed at 510 ILCS 70/3.01, 3.02, and 3.03. The statute also prohibits the marketing and distribution of depictions of animal torture or cruelty for entertainment purposes (510 ILCS 70/3.03-1). |
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In the Matter of a Protective Order for Jean Marie Primrose - Cat Champion Corporation, Appellant v. Jean Marie Primrose, Respon |
This series of actions stemmed from the seizure of 11 cats from Jean Marie Primrose from her Linn County, Oregon home. The cats were neglected, thin, and missing patches of hair when they were removed from Ms. Primrose's home and placed in the custody of Cat Champion, a non-profit rescue organization. Ms. Primrose was charged with criminal animal neglect in the second degree, but the trial court dismissed those charges because she was found incompetent due to a cognitive impairment. Because the case was dismissed, the cats were not forfeited by law and Primrose remained the rightful owner. Further, Cat Champion had incurred a $32,510 debt in caring for the animals. In lieu of returning the cats to Ms. Primrose, who Cat Champions felt was incapable of adequately caring for them, Cat Champions filed a petition for a limited protective order as a fiduciary for the care and placement of the cats. The probate court ruled against Cat Champions, finding that nothing in the relevant chapter allowed the court to permanently divest Ms. Primrose of her personal property (the cats). On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals overturned the lower court's order and held that the probate court did indeed have authority to enter a limited protective order under ORS 125.650 as a "fiduciary necessary to implement a protective order." |
