Farming or Food Production
Displaying 31 - 40 of 502
Title |
Summary |
|---|---|
| Argentina - Farm animals - Ley 27233, 2015 | |
| Argentina - Farm animals - Ley 3.959, 1900 | This is the law of the Police for Animal Health. The purpose of this law is to set the parameters to ensure the protection of livestock against contagious exotic diseases. This law regulates topics such as importation and exportation of livestock, prohibiting the importation or exportation of animals infected with contagious diseases or suspected of being infected. |
| Argentina - Health - Ley Nº 23.899, 1990 | |
| Argentina - Slaughter - Ley 18.819, 1970 | |
| Argentina - Transportation - Decreto 1248, 1975 | This Decreto contains the regulations for the safe treatment of live animals during loading, unloading and transportation of livestock. It aims for the humane treatment of animals during transportation and other related options. |
| Ass'n des Éleveurs de Canards et d'Oies du Quebec v. Bonta | California prohibits the in-state sale of products that are “the result of force feeding a bird for the purpose of enlarging the bird's liver beyond normal size.” Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25982. The law had a 7.5-year grace period before it went into effect. The law has two components: first, it bans the practice of force-feeding ducks and geese to produce foie gras; and second, the law banned the in-state sale of products that are "the result" of that practice. After nine years of litigation and in their third set of appeals before this Court, the parties ask the court here to decide whether California's sales ban is preempted by the Poultry Products Inspection Act (“PPIA”) or violates the dormant Commerce Clause. As to the first issue of preemption, the plaintiff sellers contend that at least one USDA Policy Book defines foie gras as liver from poultry that has been "specially fed and fattened" and other USDA documents suggest this is done via forced-feeding. Thus, contend the sellers, it is impossible to produce and properly label foie gras, as is required by the PPIA, and then also comply with the California law. The court disagreed with the assertion, finding that the sellers can still force feed birds to make their products, but not sell those in California. Said the court, "The sales ban is neither a command to market non-force-fed products as foie gras nor to call force-fed products something different." Further, the sellers raise a new suggestion that the ban constitutes express preemption because force feeding operates as an "ingredient requirement." Essentially, they contend you cannot have foie gras without force-feeding birds. This was also rejected, as the court found nothing new that would reverse the precedent established in the prior decision by the court. Finally, the sellers appeal dismissal of their dormant Commerce Clause claim, arguing that the sales ban is impermissibly extraterritorial because force-feeding is only banned in California and therefore, only regulates out-of-state conduct. The court dismissed this, noting states are free to regulate commerce within their boundaries provided such regulation does not affect transactions from out of that state. Moreover, the sellers' argument that the ban is "unduly burdensome" for this reason also failed since there is not requirement that a state impose the "least burdensome" method for in-state commerce. The court held that the sales ban is neither preempted nor unconstitutional and that the specified transactions are out-of-state sales permitted by California law. |
| Association des Eleveurs de Canards et d'Oies du Quebec v. Harris |
Prior to California's Force Fed Birds law—which bans the sale of products that are the result of force feeding birds to enlarge their livers beyond normal size—coming into effect, two non-California entities produced foie gras that was sold at a California restaurant. When the law came into effect, all three entities sought to enjoin the state of California from enforcing the law; they argued the law was unconstitutionally vague and violated the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The district court, however, denied their motion for preliminary injunction. On appeal, the 9th Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision to deny the preliminary injunction. |
| AU - Cruelty - Queensland Animal Care and Protection Regulation 2002 | |
| AU - Livestock - Australian Meat and Live-stock Industry Act 1997 |
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| Austin v. Bundrick |
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