GA - Horse Meat - Article 4. Advertisement and Sale of Meat Generally. |
As stated in the legislative intent, the General Assembly declares that purchasers and consumers have a right to expect and demand honesty and fair practices in the sale of meat for human consumption. It is the purpose of this Code to ensure that honest, fair, and ethical practices are followed in the advertising and sale of meat for human consumption. With regard to horsemeat, the Code prohibits the slaughter a horse in this state for the purpose of selling or offering for sale for human consumption or for other than human consumption the horse meat derived from such slaughtered animal unless certain conditions are met. Further, no horse meat shall be sold or offered for sale in this state for human consumption unless at the place of sale there shall be posted in a conspicuous location a sign bearing the words "HORSE MEAT FOR SALE." |
Gill v. Prehistoric Ponds, Inc. |
In this Georgia case, the Court of Appeals held that, on issue of first impression, an alligator farm was not a "farm" within meaning of the state statute that exempted "farm laborers" or their employers from coverage under the Workers' Compensation Act (Gill was bitten while cleaning out a pen and subsequently developed both a bone infection and salmonella). In construing the relevant statutes, the court found that in the chapter on Employment Security Law (ESL), the legislature meant that individuals who raise or tend wildlife perform "agricultural labor," but only when they do so on a "farm," which is "used for production of stock, dairy products, poultry, fruit, and fur-bearing animals." Accordingly, the court concluded that when Gill cleaned out the alligator pens, he was caring for wildlife and thus performing "agricultural labor." However, his employer, an alligator farm, was not a "farm" because alligators are "wildlife," not "[live]stock ... [or] fur-bearing animals."
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GIVING SLAUGHTERHOUSES GLASS WALLS: A NEW DIRECTION IN FOOD LABELING AND ANIMAL WELFARE |
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Goodell v. Humboldt County |
The issue of county versus local control over livestock regulations came to a head when the Iowa Supreme Court invalidated a series of ordinances that had been enacted by the Humboldt County Board of Supervisors to add additional regulations to the livestock industry and to address problems created by confined animal feeding operations in the county. The court ruled that the ordinances were inconsistent with state law and invalid under the doctrine of implied preemption.
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Got Organic Milk? "Pasture"-Ize it!: An Analysis of the UDSA's Pasture Regulations for Organic Dairy Animals |
This article discusses the “access to pasture” issue and analyzes the ambiguity that has lead to widely varied farming practices and finished products. The vague language undermines the goals of the National Organic Program and threatens the integrity of the organic seal. This article suggests ways to clarify the standards and offers alternative solutions to the problems facing consumers, organic food advocates, and farmers because of the vague regulations |
Gromer v. Matchett |
In this Missouri case, the defendant-farmer appeals an award of $12,250 to plaintiff-motorist, whose vehicle was struck by another vehicle after a horse coming from defendant's farm collided with the first vehicle. Defendant asserts that the Stock Law (Section 270.010) was inappropriately applied to him where he did not own the livestock (the horse) in question. Since plaintiff relied on the language of the Stock Law, which unambiguously refers only to "owners," in submitting her verdict directing instruction that allowed her to recover damages without proof of Defendant's negligence, the case must be reversed and remanded.
This cause was Ordered Transferred to Mo.S.Ct. November 16, 2010.
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Hairston v. Burger King Corp. |
Louisiana appeals court affirmed trial court's finding that plaintiff failed to adequately link her stomach ailment with a burger purchased from Burger King and thus could not sustain an action that sought recovery of alleged damages suffering due to food poisoning.
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Harvey v. Southern Pac. Co. |
This is a case involving a train hitting a cow. This case involves a judgment for defendant based upon plaintiff's common-law negligence complaint in that defendant ran its train upon and killed the plaintiff's cow. The appellate court upheld defendant's motion for a directed verdict where plaintiff alleged negligence on the part of defendant for failing to fence in its track.
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Hastings v. Sauve |
Plaintiff motorist was injured after hitting a cow that had wandered onto the highway, and sued owner for negligently failing to confine cow. The Supreme Court held that injury claims could only proceed under strict liability theory based on owner's knowledge of animal's vicious propensities. There was no evidence that cow had a vicious propensity, or that owner knew of propensity, thus, owner was not liable.
This order was Reversed by
Hastings v. Sauve
, 2013 WL 1829834 (N.Y., 2013).
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Hastings v. Sauve |
After plaintiff motorist was injured after hitting a cow that had wandered onto the highway, she sued farm owner, operator of cattle-shipping business, and operator's assistant, alleging that defendants were negligent in not properly confining cow to its pasture. There was no evidence that cow had a vicious or abnormal propensity, or that cow's owner knew of propensity, as required to support a strict liability claim. However, on appeal to the Court of Appeals, the court held that a landowner or the owner of an animal may be liable under ordinary tort-law principles when a farm animal is negligently allowed to stray from the property on which the animal is kept.
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