|
American Horse Protection Asso. v. Frizzell |
The court upheld the Secretary’s decision to remove 400 horses from certain public lands in Nevada because of the risks of overgrazing, but also asserted that the Secretary’s discretion was not so complete as to deny judicial review of his actions.
|
|
American Horse Protection Assoc. v. Andrus |
The court stated that the Secretary’s decision to remove 3,500 to 7,000 wild horses in order to maintain the horse population at a permanent level might qualify as “major” federal action and thus require an EIS before removal could occur.
While the secretary has wide discretion under the WFRHBA, he has no discretion regarding compliance with NEPA. The court also held that the exercise of jurisdiction by two courts over public lands created no threat of conflicting decisions on range utilization, because the courts only determined whether the land use decision was an informed one.
|
|
American Wild Horse Preservation Campaign v. Perdue |
This case involves a challenge by plaintiff-wild horse preservationists under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) to a proposed management plan issued for wild horse territory (WHT) by the Forest Service (FS). Plaintiffs argue that the revision, which changed the borders by removing a middle section so that it was not a contiguous territory, was arbitrary and capricious. After the United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment for the Forest Service, plaintiffs appealed. On appeal, FS contends that the unified territory was based on a cartographic error in the 1980s; in essence, FS argues that the 2013 change merely corrects an "administrative error" and returns management to the correct WHT boundary from 1975. However, this Court held that FS' decision to eliminate the middle section of the WHT was arbitrary and capricious because the plan failed to explain the change in policy. Further, FS did not adequately consider whether an Environmental Impact Statement was required under NEPA regarding this change. The Court was unconvinced by the FS's attempts to "shrug off" the inclusion of the Middle Section as an "administrative error" and stated that there is no "oops" exception for federal agencies. There were decades of data that relied on the "error" along with formal published plans that supported management activities and population studies. The court was unwilling to allow the FS to correct a past error by committing a new legal error: "[I]n administrative law, as elsewhere, two wrongs do not make a right." The court noted that FS may change its policies in the future, provided it reasonably supports those changes. Additionally, the Court found the FS' "Finding of No Significant Impact" in the environmental analysis was a "head-in-the-sand" approach that ignored real consequences of the boundary changes. Accordingly, this Court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in part and directed the district court to remand to the Service for further consideration.
|
|
American Wild Horse Preservation Campaign v. Vilsack |
The American Wild Horse Preservation Campaign (Plaintiffs) brought this action against the United States Forest Service (Forest Service) to prevent the implementation of the new Devil’s Garden Wild Horse Territory Plan (WHT) that Modoc County helped develop. Plaintiffs brought six claims against defendants, all under the Administrative Procedures Act. In Counts I, II, and III, plaintiffs alleged that the boundary clarification was arbitrary and capricious because it violated the Wild Horses Act, the National Forest Management Act (NFMA), and National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and in Counts IV, V, and VI, they claimed that the adjustment to the "appropriate management level" (AML) range was arbitrary and capricious because it was contrary to the same three statutes. Because the Forest Service reasonably concluded that the disputed territory was never formally incorporated into the Devil's Garden WHT, and that any references to one contiguous territory were the result of administrative error, the Court found that it was not arbitrary and capricious or in violation of the law for the Forest Service to act to correct the boundary in the 2013 Environmental Assessment and the 2013 Management Plan. Thus, defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Counts I, II, and III. And because the Forest Service articulated a rational basis for its decision to adjust the AML range for the Devil's Garden WHT that was not counter to record evidence or otherwise contrary to the law, the Court found that defendants were also entitled to summary judgment on Counts IV, V, and VI. Thus, plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was denied, defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment was granted, and because they sought the same relief as defendants, the intervenor-defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment was denied as moot. |
|
An Analysis of Factors Responsible for the Decline of the U.S. Horse Industry: Why Horse Slaughter is not the Solution |
|
|
Animal Protection Institute of America v. Hodel |
The Ninth Circuit held that the Secretary could not transfer title to a private individual whom the secretary knows will commercially exploit the adopted horse. The Secretary argued that the WFRHBA placed only one requirement on the transfer of title: the private individual must humanely care for and maintain the horse for one year prior to title transfer. The court, however, concluded that the statute commands the secretary to not only determine that the animal has been well cared for, but also that the adopter remains a qualified individual. Given the statute’s prohibition of commercial exploitation of wild horses as well as its concern with their humane treatment, the court concluded that a private individual cannot remain a “qualified individual” if he or she intends to commercially exploit the horse after they obtain title.
|
|
Animal Protection Institute of America, Inc. v. Hodel |
In this case, animal protection groups sued the Secretary of the Interior to enjoin or restrain him from allowing the adoptions of wild horses and burros under circumstances where the defendants know the horses are being adopted for commercial slaughter or exploitation. Defendants opposed the motion and and argued that the Secretary has duly promulgated regulations permitting adoptions of such animals and provided that the animals are humanely cared for during the one year period provided for in 16 U.S.C. § 1333(c). This Court granted plaintiffs' motion, enjoining the Secretary from transferring the titles of wild free-roaming horses and burros to individuals who have, prior to the expiration of the one year “probationary period” expressed to the Secretary an intent to use said animals for commercial purposes.
|
|
Anti-Horse Slaughter Legislation: Bad for Horses, Bad for Society |
Part I of this Note will discuss the domestic horse slaughter industry. It will examine what types of horses are sent to slaughterhouses and by whom, as well as how slaughterhouses operate. Part II will discuss the current state of horse slaughter legislation and the legislative histories that led to the current situation. Part III will discuss the forecast for equine welfare and will explain why the closure of the U.S. equine slaughter industry is detrimental to equine welfare, and Part IV will discuss the negative economic effects that will be felt by the abolition of the domestic slaughter industry. This Note concludes by calling for the repeal of state laws criminalizing the slaughter of horses for human consumption, the reopening of equine slaughterhouses in the United States, and the rejection of the proposed Prevention of Equine Cruelty Act of 2008.
|
|
AR - Equine - Equine Activity Liability |
This Arkansas statute provides that an equine activity sponsor, an employee of an equine activity sponsor, a livestock sponsor, an employee of a livestock sponsor, a livestock owner, a livestock facility, or a livestock auction market are not liable for an injury to or the death of a participant resulting from the inherent risks of an equine activities activity or a livestock activity. Liability is not limited when the equine activity sponsor or an employee of an equine activity sponsor, a livestock sponsor, an employee of a livestock sponsor, a livestock owner, a livestock facility, or a livestock auction market knows or should know the equipment or tack is faulty, fails to make reasonable and prudent efforts to determine the ability of the participant, was aware of dangerous latent condition on the land, commits an act or omission that constitutes willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the participant, or when the participant is intentionally injured. Warning signs alerting participants to the assumption of risk in equine activities are also required by law. |
|
Avoiding a Triple Frown: The Need for a National Horse Racing Commission |
This paper highlights the problems of the horse racing industry in an effort to advocate why a national horse racing commission is needed. As currently positioned, the industry has failed to address these problems causing not only a decline in the sport, but also contributing to the many horse breakdowns on the track. With each state having its own racing commission to regulate the sport in that state, the industry as a whole has remained fragmented. Through its commerce powers, Congress could and should mandate a national horse racing commission with a standardized set of mandatory rules for the entire sport.
|
