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SC - Impound - § 47-3-750. Seizure and impoundment of dangerous animal. |
This South Carolina statute provides that if an animal control officer has probable cause to believe that a dangerous animal is being harbored or cared for in violation of Section 47-3-720 or 47-3-740 or 47-3-760(E), or Section 47-3-730, the agent or officer may petition the appropriate court to order the seizure and impoundment of the dangerous animal while the trial is pending. |
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Scott v. Donkel |
In this Alabama case, there was an injury to a non-tenant child by a dog bite, and the defendant was a landlord. The attack occurred off the rented premises in the public street.
The action was based upon negligence, that is, a failure to protect against a dangerous condition.
The key to such a claim is the knowledge of the landlord. Plaintiff presented no evidence of the landlord being aware of the dog let alone that he knew of its vicious propensity.
The court did not find a duty to inspect the premises and discover this information. The court did not reach the point that the attack occurred off the premises. The granting of the motion for summary judgment for the landlord was upheld.
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SD - Bite - Chapter 40-34. Dog Licenses and Regulation (Vicious Dog Provisions) |
This South Dakota statute provides that a vicious dog, defined as any dog which, when unprovoked, in a vicious manner approaches in apparent attitude of attack, or bites, or otherwise attacks a human being including a mailman, meter reader, serviceman, etc. who is on private property by reason of permission of the owner, is a public nuisance. However, no dog may be declared vicious if an injury or damage is sustained to any person who was committing a willful trespass or other tort upon premises occupied by the owner or keeper of the dog, or who was teasing, tormenting, abusing or assaulting the dog or was committing or attempting to commit a crime. |
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SD - Dogs - Consolidated Dog Laws |
These South Dakota statutes comprise the state's dog laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, vicious dog laws, and rabies vaccination provisions. |
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SD - Marion - Breed - 9.0312 Vicious or Diseased Animals. |
In Marion, South Dakota, it is unlawful to keep, maintain or have in their possession or under their control any vicious animal, which includes Pit Bulls, Doberman Pincers, and Rottweilers. Police are authorized to impound any vicious dog or kill it without impounding it. A violation is a misdemeanor.
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SEIDNER v. DILL |
Charles Dill, appellee, brought this action in the Municipal Court of Marion County, Indiana, therein alleging that the defendant-appellant, Harold Seidner, maliciously and intentionally shot and killed plaintiff's dog. The case essentially involved a companion animal that was shot and killed by the defendant neighbor who alleged that the dog was after his livestock. A statute in Indiana provided that a person was authorized to kill a dog “known” for “roaming” that harmed or threatened to harm the livestock. A verdict of six hundred dollars for the wrongful killing of the dog was affirmed. This case, however, was subsequently overruled by
Puckett v. Miller
, 178 Ind. App. 174 (Ind. App. Ct. 1978).
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Sentencia Caso Humberto José Saldaña Taboada contra la Municipalidad Provincial de Trujillo - Peru |
In this case, the plaintiff sued the mayor of Trujillo, Peru, to enforce an ordinance requiring the city to provide shelter for stray dogs. Trujillo lacked a municipal dog shelter and used the Anti-Rabies Center, which did not meet the legal requirements. The city argued that the ordinance aimed to manage potentially dangerous dogs, not to protect abandoned ones, and housed dogs at the Anti-Rabies Center due to their aggressive behavior. The lower courts ruled against the plaintiff, interpreting the ordinance as applying only to potentially dangerous dogs. However, the Constitutional Tribunal found conflicting laws regarding the city's responsibilities and reversed the decision, ordering Trujillo to provide appropriate shelter or collaborate with nonprofits for housing the stray dogs. |
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Shelvey v. Bicknell |
Both plaintiff (appellant) Shelvey and the defendant (respondent) dog owners were guests of an unnamed third party at that party's beach cabin, where the defendants left their Rottweiler unrestrained on the cabin's deck overnight. The friendly dog jumped over the deck railing to follow the plaintiff to the beach where she was walking; the large, energetic dog bumped her legs while playfully chasing a seagull, knocking her down and leaving her unconscious. The dog had previously knocked its owner and a child down at one time due to its large size and weight. A trial judge earlier found that the defendant owners were not liable to the plaintiff in negligence as the freak accident was not reasonably foreseeable; the Court of Appeal concurred, finding no negligence. Scienter was not argued or discussed at either level.
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Sinclair v. Okata |
Defendants are able to present a genuine question of fact regarding whether they were on notice of their dog's vicious propensity given their characterization of the four prior biting incidents as "behavioral responses common to all dogs." Defendants' expert concluded that each time, Anchor's responses were "natural" or instinctive. Plaintiffs offer no evidence, through expert testimony or otherwise, to refute the opinion of defendants' expert.
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Sligar v. Odell |
In this Washington case, plaintiff Sligar was bitten on the finger by the Odells' dog after Sligar's finger protruded through a hole in the six-foot high chain link fence that separated their two properties. The court found the dispositive question was whether, pursuant to RCW 16.08.040 and .050 (a law that defines when entry onto the property of the dog owner is for a lawful purpose) Sligar's finger was “lawfully in or on ... the property of the” Odells at the time of the dog bite. The court found that the statute provides that consent may not be presumed where the property is fenced. Concerning the common law negligence claim, Sligar contends that the Odells were negligent in failing to protect her from harm because they failed to erect a solid fence on the property boundary until after the bite occurred. However, the court had previously found that it is not unreasonable to keep a dog in a fenced backyard where the dog has not shown any dangerous propensities.
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