Breeding or Puppy Mills

Displaying 51 - 60 of 164
Titlesort descending Summary
IL - Swap Meets - 50/24.1. Swap meets This law requires that swap meet organizers provide the State with certain records about the presence and sale of animals.
IN - Breeder - Article 21. Commercial Dog Breeder Regulation The laws set forth requirements for commercial breeders in Indiana. “Commercial dog breeder” means a person who (1) maintains more than nineteen (19) unaltered female dogs that are at least twelve (12) months of age; and (2) engages in the sale of dogs, resulting from the breeding of dogs, to a dog broker; a pet store; or the general public. Registration is required. Exemptions exist under the chapter.
IN - Breeders - Rule 1. Commercial Dog Breeder and Broker Registration This set of Indiana rules provides the rules for licensing and registration of commercial dog brokers and breeders.
IN - Health - Article 17. Animal Health and Animal Products. Chapter 18. Crimes and Infractions This set of Indiana laws covers diseased livestock and the sale of domestic animals. It also provides that a person responsible for livestock or poultry who knowingly or intentionally permits the livestock or poultry to run at large commits a Class B misdemeanor. Another provision states that a person may not import to or export from Indiana for the purpose of sale any dog under the age of eight (8) weeks unless the dog is transported with its dam.
IN RE: JAMES AND JULIA STUEKERJUERGEN, D/B/A CORNER VIEW KENNELS.
Dog broker shipping dogs under 8 weeks old was assessed civil penalty of $7,000 and license as dealer under Animal Welfare Act was suspended for 35 days, since broker was one of largest dog brokers in state, 8-week minimum age requirement was based on finding that ability of dogs to function in adult environment was adversely affected if shipped under that age, violations were serious and flagrant in view of large number of puppies shipped on 10 different occasions during 2-month period, and broker had violated Act and standards on prior occasion resulting in 12 day license suspension.
In re: MARJORIE WALKER, d/b/a LINN CREEK KENNEL


Judicial Officer affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's decision that Marjorie Walker, d/b/a Linn Creek Kennel, violated the regulations of the Animal Welfare Act. The Judicial Officer stated that the Animal Welfare Act provides factors that must be considered when deciding the amount of civil penalty, and that the ability to pay the penalty is not a factor. Respondent was ordered to cease and desist from violating the regulations and standards, pay a $14,300 civil penalty, and the license was revoked .
IN RE: ROSIA LEE ENNES
Civil penalty of $1,000 against unlicensed dealer was appropriate under 7 USCS § 2149(b), and greater penalty could have been requested where although moderate size of kennel suggested modest penalty, selling hundreds of dogs without license over 40-month period was grave violation of Animal Welfare Act, violations were not committed in good faith since dogs were knowingly and intentionally sold without license after receiving 4 warnings, and even though dealer thought mistakenly that Department would not prosecute her for such violations and there was no history of previous violations, the hundreds of violations proven were sufficient to warrant severe sanction.
Johnson v. Smith Scott Johnson and Harlene Hoyt, the plaintiffs, challenge the constitutionality of the Kansas Pet Animal Act (the Act), which authorizes warrantless inspections of their homestead, where Mr. Johnson operates a business housing and training bird dogs. They argue that the Act violates the Fourth Amendment by permitting warrantless inspections and infringes on their constitutional right to travel by requiring premises to be made available for inspection within 30 minutes of an inspector’s arrival. The United States District Court for the District of Kansas granted the state’s motion to dismiss, prompting the plaintiffs to appeal. The court analyzed the Act, noting that it imposes varying inspection requirements and housing standards on different licensees, with all licensees subject to initial and routine inspections “at reasonable times.” Refusal to permit inspections constitutes grounds for license suspension or revocation. The court then examined whether the Act violates the Fourth Amendment, applying precedent from Burger and subsequent cases. It identified relevant factors for determining whether an industry is closely regulated, including the history of warrantless inspections, the extensiveness of the regulatory scheme, whether similar schemes exist in other jurisdictions, and the potential threat to public welfare if left unregulated. The parties disputed whether Mr. Johnson’s business qualifies as part of a closely regulated industry. The court credited the plaintiffs’ allegation that training kennels are distinct from other animal-related operations, noting that Kansas treats them as a separate category requiring specific licenses. The court concluded that the boarding or training-kennel industry does not qualify as closely regulated under the Fourth Amendment’s narrow exception for warrantless inspections. It emphasized the industry’s lack of a long tradition of regulation and found that the regulatory scheme does not clearly inform industry participants of unannounced warrantless inspections. Applying Patel, the court held that the regulatory scheme must satisfy three criteria for warrantless searches to be reasonable: a substantial government interest, necessity of warrantless inspections to further the regulatory scheme, and a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant. The court found that dismissal of the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim was improper, as the complaint did not establish that the closely regulated industry exception applies or that the Burger factors were satisfied. It also reversed the dismissal of the claim that the Act unconstitutionally conditions licensure on waiving Fourth Amendment rights. However, the court affirmed that the 30-minute inspection availability requirement does not violate the constitutional right to travel. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Julie Marie Grizzel v. James William Hickey d/b/a S & S Farms; Ron Lee Omara and S & S Farms, Inc. aka S.S. Farms Linn County, I


The plaintiff in this Oregon case brought an action alleging negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress against the defendant, who was a licensed animal dealer. Plaintiff owned “My Girl,” a purebred cocker spaniel, whom plaintiff cared for and enclosed in a secure, fenced backyard. While My Girl was secure in her backyard, two other individuals seized her and transported her to defendant Hickey (who was known to be engaged in the business of selling animals to research laboratories).
Just Puppies, Inc. v. Brown The plaintiffs, including retail pet stores and a USDA-licensed breeder, challenged Maryland's 2021 Pet Store Statute, which prohibits retail pet stores from selling or transferring dogs and cats, alleging it conflicts with the federal Animal Welfare Act (AWA) and violates the Commerce Clause. The Pet Store Statute aims to curb the sale of dogs from "puppy mills" by banning retail pet stores and brokers from selling dogs, while exempting breeders who sell animals born at their establishments. Plaintiffs argued that the statute effectively shifts dog sales from regulated retail pet stores sourcing from out-of-state breeders to unregulated internet sales and local breeders, undermining the AWA's regulatory framework. The AWA establishes federal standards for the humane treatment of animals, including licensing requirements for breeders and brokers, but explicitly allows states to enact additional animal welfare regulations. The court rejected plaintiffs' claim that the AWA preempts the Pet Store Statute, finding no conflict because the AWA does not occupy the field of animal welfare regulation and permits concurrent state laws. Plaintiffs also argued that the statute obstructs the AWA's objectives by eliminating USDA-licensed brokers from the Maryland market, but the court found no evidence that the statute impedes federal licensing or inspection processes. The court dismissed plaintiffs' Commerce Clause claims, finding no discriminatory purpose or effect against out-of-state breeders, as the statute applies equally to in-state and out-of-state entities and does not prohibit interstate sales. The statute allows out-of-state breeders to sell directly to Maryland consumers, either in person or online, and does not regulate sales occurring wholly outside Maryland. The court upheld the statute's legitimacy, recognizing Maryland's interest in addressing puppy mills, protecting consumers from unhealthy animals, and reducing shelter populations, which are valid state police powers. The court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, concluding that the Pet Store Statute is not preempted by the AWA and does not violate the Commerce Clause, as it regulates animal welfare within Maryland's traditional authority. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.

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