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State v. Siliski |
In this Tennessee case, the defendant, Jennifer Siliski, was convicted of nine counts of misdemeanor animal cruelty. Williamson County Animal Control took custody of over two hundred animals forfeited by the defendant as a result of her criminal charges and convictions. Third parties claiming ownership of some of the animals appeared before the trial court and asked for the return of their animals. This appeal arises from third parties claiming that they were denied due process by the manner in which the trial court conducted the hearing regarding ownership of the animals and that the trial court erred in denying their property claims. The appellate court concluded that the trial court did not have jurisdiction in the criminal case to dispose of the claims, and reversed the judgment.
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State v. Silver |
In this case, the defendant was found guilty on multiple counts of animal abuse after failing to provide minimally adequate care for his herd of alpacas. The defendant was charged with a felony count (Count 1) and a misdemeanor count (Count 6) of first-degree animal abuse. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by not merging the multiple guilty verdicts into a single conviction. The state agreed that the trial court did err in its decision not to merge the verdicts; however, the state argued that the mistake should not require resentencing. The defendant argued that the court should follow its previous decisions and order a remand for resentencing. Ultimately, the court remanded the case for resentencing under ORS 138.222(5)(b). The state argued that language of ORS 138.222(5)(b) should be interpreted not to include merger errors. The court disagreed with this argument and relied on its decision in previous cases that interpreted the language of the statute more broadly. Additionally, the court held that if the state’s disapproval of the ORS 138.222(5)(b) is something that should be dealt with by the legislature and not the court. |
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State v. Smith |
In this Washington case, defendant Smith appealed his conviction for first degree animal cruelty following the death of his llama. Smith claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to (1) discover information before trial that may have explained the llama's death and (2) seek a lesser included instruction on second degree animal cruelty. This court agreed. It found that defense counsel's "all or nothing strategy" was not a legitimate trial tactic and constituted deficient performance where counsel presented evidence to call into question the State's theory on starvation, but not evidence related to the entire crime. The court found that the jury was "left in an arduous position: to either convict Smith of first degree animal cruelty or to let him go free despite evidence of some culpable behavior." The case was reversed and remanded.
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State v. Spade |
In 2006, appellant was charged with one count of animal cruelty after 149 dogs were seized from her rescue shelter. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that, since the appellant (1) entered into a valid plea agreement which "specifically and unequivocally reserved a restitution hearing" and (2) "attempted on numerous occasions to challenge the amounts she was required by the magistrate court to post in separate bonds," that the final order of the Circuit Court of Berkeley County should be reversed. Accordingly, the court found that the plaintiff was entitled to a restitution hearing to determine the actual reasonable costs incurred in providing care, medical treatment, and provisions to the animals seized.
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State v. Walker |
A dog owner was placed on probation which limited him from having any animals on his property for five years. While on probation, bears on the owner's property were confiscated after getting loose. The trial court ordered the dog owner to pay restitution for the upkeep of the confiscated bears, but the Court of Appeals reversed holding the trial court did not the authority to require the dog owner to pay restitution for the upkeep of the bears because the forfeiture of animals penalty did not apply to conviction for failure to confine or restrain a dog.
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State v. Washburn |
In this Vermont case, the defendant appealed a criminal division order granting the State's motion for civil forfeiture of his dog "Chad" based on a finding that he subjected the dog to cruelty. The first incident occurred in April 2022, where the defendant left Chad, a Siberian husky, locked in his vehicle on an "unseasonably warm" day where temperatures were in the high nineties. Two subsequent incidents occurred in the following months, culminating in defendant's arrest and a requirement that defendant surrender his dog. On appeal, defendant argues that the criminal division lacked jurisdiction over the forfeiture proceeding since Chad was not seized under 13 V.S.A. § 354, that the State failed to prove animal cruelty by clear and convincing evidence under 13 V.S.A. § 352. Defendant also argued that the criminal division erred in admitting lay witness testimony (the police officer) regarding the internal temperature of defendant's car under Vermont Rule of Evidence 701. The Supreme Court found that the dog owner's challenge to the dog's seizure was not an issue of subject-matter jurisdiction. Since defendant conceded it was not raised below, the court held that it could not be raised for the first time on appeal. As to defendant's next argument that there was insufficient evidence, this court found clear and convincing evidence that established animal cruelty to warrant forfeiture, including the fact Chad had no access to water, the outside temperature was high, and the officer observed early stages of heat exhaustion in the dog. Finally, even if admitting the lay testimony of the officer as to internal car temperature was error, it "falls within the purview of harmless error" since the record provided an unchallenged temperature reading for that day and the officer observed closed windows and distress from the dog. The case was affirmed. |
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State v. Wilson |
In this Florida case, the state appeals a county court order that granted appellee's motion to dismiss two counts of an information and which also declared a state statute to be unconstitutional. Defendant-appellee was arrested for having approximately seventy-seven poodles in cages in the back of a van without food, water and sufficient air. In her motion to dismiss, defendant-appellee alleged that the phrases “sufficient quantity of good and wholesome food and water” and “[k]eeps any animals in any enclosure without wholesome exercise and change of air” as contained in sections 828.13(2)(a) and (b) were void for vagueness. In reversing the lower court, this court held that the prohibitions against depriving an animal of sufficient food, water, air and exercise, when measured by common understanding and practice, are not unconstitutionally vague.
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State v. Witham |
A man ran over his girlfriend's cat after having a fight with his girlfriend. The trial court found the man guilty of aggravated cruelty to animals. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the trial court, holding the aggravated cruelty to animals statute was not unconstitutionally vague.
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State v. Wood |
Plaintiff entered an oral agreement for defendant to board and train her horse, Talladega. The horse died within two months from starvation, and the Harnett County Animal Control found three other horses under defendant's care that were underfed, and seized them. The jury trial resulted in a conviction of two counts of misdemeanor animal cruelty from which the defendant appeals. However, this court affirms the jury's conviction, stating that the assignment of error is without merit and would not have affected the jury's conviction.
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State v. Ziemann |
The petitioner-defendant challenged her criminal conviction for cruelly neglecting several horses she owned by asserting that her Fourth Amendment rights were violated. However, the court of appeals side stepped the petitioners claim that she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in a farmstead, that she did not own or reside on, because she leased the grass on the farmstead for a dollar by invoking the “open fields” doctrine.
The court held that even if such a lease might implicate the petitioners Fourth Amendment rights in some circumstances, the petitioner here was only leasing a open field, which she cannot have a legitimate expectation of privacy in.
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