Anti-Cruelty

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Titlesort descending Summary
Justice by and through Mosiman v. Vercher The Oregon Court of Appeals, as a matter of first impression, considers whether a horse has the legal capacity to sue in an Oregon court. The Executive Director of Sound Equine Options (SEO), Kim Mosiman, filed a complaint naming a horse (“Justice”)as plaintiff with the Mosiman acting as his guardian, and claiming negligence against his former owner. In the instant appeal, Mosiman challenges the trial court's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss. In 2017, defendant's neighbor persuaded defendant to seek veterinary care for her horse. The veterinarian found the horse to be about 300 pounds underweight with significant walking difficulties and other maladies. The horse was voluntarily surrendered to Mosiman who eventually nursed the animal back to good health. In 2018, Mosiman filed a complaint on Justice's behalf for a single claim of negligence per se, alleging that defendant violated the Oregon anti-cruelty statute ORS 167.330(1) by failing to provide minimum care. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that a horse lacks the legal capacity to sue and the court granted dismissal. Specifically, the trial court expressed concern over the "profound implications" of allowing a non-human animal to sue and stated that an appellate court could come to a different conclusion by "wad[ing] into the public policy debate involving the evolution of animal rights." Here, the appellate court first found no statutory authority for a court to appoint a guardian for an animal because "a horse inherently lacks self-determination and the ability to express its wishes in a manner the legal system would recognize." The animal has a "distinctive incapacity" that sets it apart from humans with legal disabilities that require appointment of a legal guardian. The court reaffirmed the law's treatment of animals as personal property and found no support in the precedent for permitting an animal to vindicate its own legal rights. While Oregon's animal welfare laws recognize animals as beings capable of feeling pain, this makes them a special type of property and imposes duties on the human owners rather than rights to the animal victims. The court held that only human beings and legislatively-created legal entities are persons with the capacity to sue under Oregon common law. The court emphasized that this holding does not prevent Oregon laws from ever recognizing an animal as a legal person, but the courts are not the appropriate vehicle to do that. Accordingly, this court affirmed the trial court's judgment dismissing the complaint with prejudice.
Justice for Dusty: Implementing Mandatory Minimum Sentences for Animal Abusers


This Comment discusses the problem with the current punishments for animal abuse violations and analyzes why states should adopt statutes that require mandatory minimums in animal brutality convictions. Part II focuses on the psychological problems associated with animal cruelty, including the relationship between animal cruelty and violence toward humans. Part III examines the structure of current animal abuse legislation. Part IV concentrates on the advantages of applying mandatory minimum sentences to the anticruelty provisions of animal abuse statutes.

Justice v. State In this Texas appeal, defendant Brent Justice contends that his conviction for a single count of cruelty to a nonlivestock animal was based on insufficient evidence. The incident stemmed from defendant's filming of his co-defendant, Ashley Richards, torturing and killing of a newly-weaned puppy. Justice and Richards ran an escort business named "Bad Gurls Entertainment" that focused on the production and distribution of animal "crush" videos (fetish videos involving the stomping, torturing, and killing of various kinds of animals in a prolonged manner). The evidence that supported the conviction involved the confessions of both perpetrators and the video of the puppy being tortured and ultimately killed. On appeal, defendant argues that he cannot be found guilty since was not the principal involved in the offense. This court was unconvinced, finding that the evidence was sufficient to support a state jail felony since "[t]here is no shortage of evidence that appellant aided Richards in her cruelty," including handing Richards the knife and filming the killing. The one issue in defendant's "hybrid" pro se and represented brief on appeal that the court granted was related to a finding that defendant used a "deadly weapon." After the filing of initial briefs, the Court of Criminal Appeals in Prichard v. State, No. PD-0712-16, --- S.W.3d ---, 2017 WL 2791524 (Tex. Crim. App. June 28, 2017), held that “a deadly weapon finding is disallowed when the recipient or victim is nonhuman.” Thus, in the case at hand, the court deleted the deadly weapon finding since it was directed at the puppy rather than a human. The case was remanded for a new hearing on punishment only since the conviction was affirmed for a state jail felony.
Justice, an American Quarter Horse, by and through his Guardian, Kim MOSIMAN, Plaintiff, v. Gwendolyn VERCHER, Defendant. This Oregon complaint seeks economic and non-economic damages for Justice, an American Quarter Horse from Oregon, by and through his guardian. Justice suffered extreme pain, distress, and permanent injury due to the criminal neglect of Defendant Gwendolyn Vercher. According to the facts issued in the complaint, Defendant denied Justice adequate food and shelter for months, abandoning him to starve and freeze. As a result of this neglect, Justice was left debilitated and emaciated. Plaintiffs' attorneys plead negligence per se based on violation of Oregon's anti-cruelty statute. The attached opinion letter from Washington County Circuit Court grants defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of capacity to sue. In an issue of first impression, the court ruled that finding that a horse, or any nonhuman animal, has the capacity to sue would have "profound implications." In addition, the court found that a non-human animal lacks the capacity to "accept[] legal responsibilities." The court left it to the Oregon Legislature or the appellate court to wade into a policy debate on animal rights.
Kankey v. State


A district court found the appellant’s animals had been lawfully seized, and then divested appellant of ownership of the animals and vested custody to the American Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA). The appellant filed an appeal in the civil division of the circuit court, but the circuit court dismissed the appeal as untimely and not properly perfected. Upon another appeal, the Arkansas Court of Appeals found it had no jurisdiction and therefore dismissed the case.

Kervin v. State Donald Ray Kervin was found guilty of felony animal cruelty stemming from a 2012 incident at his residence. Animal control officers arrived to find defendant's dog "Chubbie" in a small, hot laundry room a the back of his house that emitted a "rotten-flesh odor." Chubbie was visibly wet, lying in his own feces and urine, with several open wounds infested with maggots. After questioning Kervin about the dog's injuries, defendant finally admitted to hitting Chubbie with a shovel for discipline. The dog was ultimately euthanized due to the severity of his condition. In this instant appeal, Kervin contends that the lower court erred in using the 2014 revised jury instruction to instruct the jury on the charged offense rather than the 2012 version of the instruction. Kevin argued that the 2014 version expanded the 2012 version to include the “failure to act” in felony animal cruelty cases. Also, Kervin argued that the 2012 version should have been used because it was in place at the time the offense occurred. Ultimately, the court found that the lower court did not err by using the 2014 jury instruction. The court held that the 2014 jury instructions merely “clarified” the 2012 jury instruction and that the “failure to act” was already present in the 2012 jury instruction. As a result, the court upheld Kervin’s guilty verdict.
Knox v. Massachusetts Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals


In this Massachusetts case, the plaintiff, a concessionaire at the Brockton Fair intended to award goldfish as a prize in a game of chance. The defendant, Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (MSPCA), asserted that such conduct would violate G.L. c. 272, s 80F. In the action for declaratory relief, the court considered whether the term "animal" in the statute includes goldfish. The court concluded in the affirmative that, "in interpreting this humane statute designed to protect animals subject to possible neglect by prizewinners," former G.L. c. 272, s 80F applies to goldfish.

KS - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty and Animal Fighting Laws The Kansas anti-cruelty statutes define cruelty to animals as knowingly killing, injuring, maiming, torturing, burning or mutilating any animal. Also included as cruelty are abandoning any animal, failing to provide food, horse-tripping, and poisoning any domestic animal, unlawful disposition of animals, dog and cock-fighting. Cruelty to animals may be a misdemeanor or a felony. Exceptions are made for such things as veterinary practices, research experiments, rodeo and farming practices, euthanasia, and pest control. It is also illegal to allow a dangerous animal to run at large or to engage in sodomy with an animal.
KS - Vehicle, animal - 60-5401. Immunity for damage to motor vehicle This Kansas law, effective in 2018, provides immunity for civil liability for damage to the motor vehicle if a person enters a motor vehicle to remove a vulnerable person or domestic animal. “Domestic animal” means a dog, cat or other animal that is domesticated and may be kept as a household pet, but does not include livestock. Several conditions must be met before a person is granted immunity under the law.
KY - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Statutes These Kentucky statutes represent the state's anti-cruelty and animal fighting provisions. Under the law, animal cruelty in the first-degree (a class D felony) occurs when a person causes four-legged animals to fight for pleasure or profit. Exclusions under this section include, among others, the killing of animals when hunting, fishing, or trapping; as incident to the processing as food or for other commercial purposes; or for veterinary, agricultural, spaying or neutering, or cosmetic purposes.

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