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Robinson v. Pezzat |
While executing a search warrant at the plaintiff’s home, a police officer shot and killed the plaintiff’s thirteen-year-old dog. Accounts differed as to whether the dog bit the officer before shooting or whether the bite was a result of the shooting. The plaintiff filed suit against the police officer and municipality and alleged, inter alia, violations of her constitutional rights, several common law torts, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court was not swayed by the plaintiff’s “uncorroborated version of events” and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the plaintiff had not met her burden to defeat either the individual police officer’s or the municipality’s immunity. This case is under appeal as of September 15, 2015. |
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Robinson v. U.S. |
Richard "Dick" Robinson was charged by the Department of Agriculture with violating the Animal Welfare Act for transporting a wolf from Utah to California for exhibition on television without a license. Robinson exhibited the wolf on several television programs to promote his most recent book about his exploits as an animal trainer and producer of animal films. Respondent once held a valid exhibitor's license under the AWA, but the license was revoked in 1979 when Robinson failed to comply with the terms of a consent decision requiring him to install more adequate plywood cover for his bear cages. After a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) for the Department of Agriculture issued a cease and desist order to prevent Robinson from further illegally transporting and exhibiting his animals and assessed a $500 civil penalty against him. The Judicial Officer of the Department of Agriculture affirmed the order of the ALJ on appeal. The 10th Circuit affirmed the ALJ's conclusion that a cease and desist order by itself was insufficient and that a $500 penalty was necessary to impress Robinson with the need to comply with the Act's requirements in the future.
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Romero v. Bexar County |
Several reports to the police were made that a man had threatened several individuals with a firearm. In responding to the calls, the police identified the plaintiff pet owner as the allegedly armed man. Officers then proceeded to the plaintiff’s home and acknowledged that they saw a “Beware of Dogs” sign, but still entered the fenced-in premises. Upon entering the yard, four dogs approached and one of the officers shot and killed one of the dogs. The plaintiff brought suit against the officer and municipality and alleged violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In evaluating the officer’s claim of qualified immunity, the court held that the officer’s actions were objectively reasonable, considering he had reason to believe the plaintiff may be armed and dangerous and claimed “several large dogs ran out aggressively charging, barking and growling.” The officer’s relation of events was backed up by his fellow officer on the scene. |
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Rossi v. Mohawk and Hudson River Humane Soc. |
Petitioner-Debtor challenged the Bankruptcy Court’s denial of Petitioner’s application for a Temporary Restraining Order and for a stay pending appeal after the Mohawk and Hudson River Humane Society seized 23 cats from Petitioner’s prior home for failure to provide proper sustenance/cruelty to animals and subsequently obtained a bond against Petitioner for the cost of providing animal care.
The United States District Court, N.D. New York denied Petitioner’s motion for leave to appeal requesting relief identical to that which was denied by the Bankruptcy Court, finding that the exhibits submitted show that Petitioner was currently charged with four misdemeanors, and that the commencement of the criminal charges against Petitioner and the posting of security pending the disposition of such criminal charges fall within the exception to the automatic stay under federal law.
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Rowley v. City of New Bedford |
This opinion concerns the City of New Bedford, Massachusetts' motion to dismiss plaintiff Rowley's (formerly plaintiff "Friends of Ruth & Emily, Inc.") citizen suit for injunction under the federal Endangered Species Act. Plaintiffs allege that two Asian Elephants, Ruth and Emily, were mistreated by the Buttonwood Park Zoo in New Bedford by chaining their legs, housing them in inadequate facilities, failing to provide proper socialization, and failing to provide adequate veterinary care, which gives rise to a "taking" under Section 9 of the ESA. Rowley claims that she is a member of the zoological society there and visits the elephants on a "near daily basis," resulting in “an aesthetic, emotional, and spiritual relationship with Ruth and Emily over the years.” The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts asked both parties to brief on the issue of standing for the instant action. The court first noted that the ESA expressly authorizes citizen suits for injunctive relief. To survive a motion to dismiss, Rowley must, through facts, clearly demonstrate standing, and then the court must analyze those facts under a multi-pronged approach. To begin, the court distinguished cases that established the proper "animal nexus" for injury in fact with those that did not meet that finding. Here, Rowley's complaint established injury in fact because she lives in New Bedford, is a member of the Zoo's Zoological Society, and observes the elephants on a near daily basis. Rowley alleges that the maltreatment of Ruth and Emily injures this ability because she observes their ongoing suffering while in substandard captivity. The court was not persuaded by New Bedford's claim that Rowley has not established injury in fact because she has no specialized training in wildlife or animal welfare. In fact, this claim ignored precedent from this very circuit that "aesthetic injury" can be established by viewing animals in inhumane conditions. In addition, the court rejected New Bedford's "nonexistent requirement into the injury in fact analysis" that Rowley must have observed or will observe Asian elephants in their native habitats. As a result, the court found Rowley properly established injury in fact. As to the next requirement of causation, the court found that Rowley sufficiently alleged that the Zoo's actions caused the harm complained of for purposes of surviving a motion to dismiss. Finally, as to redressability, the court found that Rowley's request for a declaratory judgment as to the Zoo's treatment of Ruth and Emily, and an injunction prohibiting the Zoo from euthanizing the elephants met this prong. New Bedford's contention that Rowley's further suggestion of moving the elephants to a sanctuary in Tennessee impaired her redressability argument because Rowley did not propose how the cost of relocation would be funded was also rejected. At this stage, the court does not need to determine whether this solution is necessary or feasible. The District Court ultimately held that Rowley demonstrated sufficient standing to pursue her claims. Hence, New Bedford's motion to dismiss was denied. |
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Rule v. Fort Dodge Animal Health, Inc. |
The plaintiff brought this action against Defendants Fort Dodge Animal Health, Inc. and Wyeth Corporation, seeking economic damages suffered from the purchase and injection of her dog with ProHeart® 6 to prevent heartworm. The complaint alleged products liability/failure to warn, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and violation of state deceptive business practices, among others. In 2004, defendants recalled ProHeart® 6 in response to a request by FDA due to reported adverse reactions. This Court found that Massachusetts law follows the traditional “economic loss rule,” where such losses are not recoverable in in tort and strict liability actions where there has been no personal injury or property damage. Here, the plaintiff was barred from recovering because she has not alleged any personal injury or property damage under her products liability claim. Further, plaintiff failed to show that defendants' deceptive act caused some injury and compsensable loss. Defendants' motion to dismiss was granted.
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Rupert v. Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service |
Appellant was the pastor of an all-race Native American church that required the use of eagle feathers during certain worship who challenged the BGEPA after being denied a permit to obtain eagle feathers because he was not a member of a recognized Indian tribe. Under an equal protection analysis, the court found the limitation on the use of eagle parts to Native Americans is rationally related to the government's interest in preserving the eagle population as well as the special religious and cultural interests of Native Americans. For further discussion on religious challenges to the BGEPA by non-Native Americans, see
Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act.
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Rupert v. U.S. |
Paris N. Rupert, unlawfully, willfully and feloniously deliver to the Frisco Railroad Company, a common carrier, for transportation out of said territory and to the city of Chicago in the state of Illinois, the dead bodies of quail, which said quail had theretofore been killed in the Territory of Oklahoma in violation of the laws of said territory and with the intent and purpose of being shipped and transported out of said territory in violation of the laws of said territory. The court held that the territory of Oklahoma had the authority to provide by legislation, as it did, that wild game, such as quail, should not be shipped out of the state, even though the game was killed during the open season. Further, the act of Congress (the Lacey Act) is valid wherein it is declared that the shipment out of the territory in violation of the territorial law constitutes a crime under the national law.
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Saenz v. DOI (vacated by U.S. v. Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001)) |
(This case was vacated by United States v. Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199(10th Cir. 2001). Appellant was descended from the Chiricahua tribe of Apache Indians, and, although originally recognized as a tribe, it is not presently recognized. The court affirmed the vacating of defendant's conviction for possessing eagle parts, holding that the present test under RFRA with regard to whether a tribe has been formally recognized bears no relationship whatsoever to whether one sincerely practices Indian religions and is substantially burdened when prohibited from possessing eagle parts. For discussion of Eagle Act, see
Detailed Discussion
.
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Safari Club International v. Jewell |
Safari Club International and the National Rifle Association filed suit challenging the federal government’s suspension of imports of trophies from elephants sport-hunted in Zimbabwe. In April of 2014, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“the Service”) suspended imports of trophies from elephants on the basis that the Service could no longer make the finding required under its regulations “that the killing of the animal whose trophy is intended for import would enhance survival of the species.” Safari Club asserted four main arguments against the Service’s suspension of imports: (1) the agency violated APA rulemaking requirements by not providing for notice and comment; (2) the agency applied prohibited guidelines and the wrong standard in making its findings; (3) the agency failed to overcome a statutory presumption in Section 9(c)(a) of the Endangered Species Act; and (4) the agency violated the APA by failing to explain why it maintained the enhancement finding requirement in the Special Rule after the requirement was eliminated from the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). The court reviewed Safari International’s arguments and granted summary judgment only with respect to the argument that the Service had failed to publish notice of the changed Zimbabwe enhancement finding in the Federal Register until May 12, 2014. The court dismissed the remaining arguments put forth by Safari International and granted summary judgment in favor of the Service. The court found that the Service had violated its commitment to publish any notice of a change in the Federal Register before the change can take effect. The Service violated this commitment by publishing notice of the suspension of imports of trophies in the Federal Register on May 12, 2014 but making the effective date of the suspension April 4, 2014. For this reason, the court found that the effective date of the suspension must be changed to May 12, 2014. With respect to Safari International’s other arguments, the court found that Safari International was unable to meet its burden and held in favor of the Service. |
