Washington

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Rabon v. City of Seattle (II)


This Washington case constitutes plaintiff's second appeal in extended litigation aimed at preventing the City of Seattle from destroying his dogs after a jury convicted him of the criminal charge of owning vicious dogs. The case began when Rabon filed a civil suit seeking an injunction against having his dogs destroyed.  This present appeal is from an order dismissing his constitutional claims against the City on summary judgment.  In affirming the order of summary judgment, this court held that a person's interest in keeping a vicious dog as a pet is not so great as to require a more careful procedure than is provided by Seattle's administrative and hearing process. The fact that plaintiff did not have a right to an immediate pre-deprivation hearing before the dogs were seized and impounded is justified by the strong public interest in prompt action to prevent more attacks. 

Rabon v. City of Seattle


Petitioner dog owner sought an injunction against a Seattle ordinance that allowed the city to destroy a vicious dog once the owner has been found guilty of owning a vicious dog (two

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.  The majority held that the state statute regulating dogs did not preempt field of regulating dangerous dogs and the city ordinance did not irreconcilably conflict with state statute.  Notably, Justice Sanders filed a strong dissent, pointing out that these dogs are the primary companions for the elderly petitioner.  While the state law regulating dangerous dogs allows cities to regulate "potentially dangerous dogs," the Seattle ordinance in question fails to make a distinction between the two types of dogs.  Justice Sanders wrote: "As Mr. Rabon notes, if the City were correct, dog owners and defense attorneys would find themselves arguing the bite was so vicious that the dog qualifies as "dangerous" in order to spare the dog's life."  Thus, the ordinance "eviscerates" the dual definition and violates the overriding state law on dangerous dogs.

Pickford v. Masion


Plaintiffs' dog was mauled by Defendants' dogs and sustained permanent injuries.  The trial court granted summary judgment against Plaintiffs' claims of negligent and malicious infliction of emotional distress.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of partial summary judgment and further held the destruction of the companionship relationship could not be extended to dogs.

Pete Mansour v. King County, a municipal corporation; King County Animal Control; King County Licensing and Regulatory Services In this Washington case, Division One of the Washington Court of Appeals reversed a King County Animal Control decision declaring a dog vicious and ordering her removed from the county. This decision overrides the practice of a dog being presumed guilty until proven innocent in that county. The court found that for Mansour or any other pet owner to prove effectively present his or her case and rebut the evidence against him or her, due process requires that he or she be able to subpoena witnesses and present records. Mr. Mansour was prejudiced in his case because he was not allowed to do so and was not given sufficient notice for the hearing.
Overview of Washington Great Ape Laws This is a brief overview of Washington Great Ape law.
Morawek v. City of Bonney Lake A woman filed a complaint with the Bonney Lake animal control authority after her neighbor’s dog killed her cat. The animal control officer served plaintiff with paperwork stating that his dog satisfied the definition of a dangerous dog under the Bonney Lake Municipal Code because the dog had killed a domestic animal without provocation while off his owner's property. Plaintiff appealed the designation to the police chief, the city hearing examiner, and the superior court; all of which affirmed the designation. The Washington Court of Appeals, however, held that the hearing examiner's finding that the owner's dog killed the neighbor's cat without provocation was not supported by substantial evidence, as required to uphold a dangerous dog designation, even though the “location” element of the dangerous dog designation was satisfied. The dangerous dog designation was therefore reversed.
Matter of Ware After the Lewis County Prosecuting Attorney's Office's decided not to issue charges in an animal abuse case, two private citizens sought to independently initiate criminal charges. One person filed a petition for a citizen's complaint in district court and, after that was denied, another person filed a petition to summon a grand jury. On appeal, those appellants argue that the lower court erred in not granting their petitions. The animal cruelty claim stems from an incident in 2016, where a woman filed a report with police stating that a neighbor had killed her mother's cat by throwing a rock at the cat and stabbing it with a knife. Witnesses gave similar account of the abuse of the cat by the neighbor. The responding police officer then determined that there was probable cause to arrest the suspect for first degree animal cruelty. The officer found the cat's body and photographed the injuries, although the officer could not determine whether the cat had been stabbed. Subsequently, the prosecuting attorney's office declined to file charges because the actions related to the animal's death were unclear. Additionally, the cat's body was not collected at the scene to sustain a charge.
Matter of Marriage of Niemi Douglas Niemi appealed the trial court's order granting Mariah Niemi visits with their two dogs, which were awarded to Douglas as his separate property in a dissolution proceeding. Douglas and Mariah were married for 27 years and had two large dogs who were each about two years old. During the petition for legal separation, Mariah asked for 10 hours a week of visitation with the dogs because they were "family members." Following the trial, Mariah continued to emphasize her desire to have access to the dogs and the court ultimately awarded the dogs to Douglas as separate property, but allowed Mariah visits with the dogs three times a week. Douglas appealed that award, contending that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding visitation of his separate property. Mariah countered with the fact a court has discretion to grant her access to this "special classification" of property. Here, the Court of Appeals agreed with Douglas, finding that the lower court had no authority under Washington law to compel a party to produce separate property after a marital dissolution. The court also held that is not the province of the court to recognize a special category of personal property when the statute has not done so. Finally, the court observed that such agreements about visitation with animals would lead to continuing supervision and enforcement problems in the court system. Because the trial court exceeded its authority in awarding visitation rights, this court reversed and remanded the issue for the trial court to strike the provision related to visitation and maintenance costs for the dogs.
Mary Grace Long, plaintiff v. Miles R. Lewis and Darnell Webb, defendants


This King County, Washington case concerns the appropriate measure of damages for the loss of plaintiff's cat. The court granted plaintiff's motion, finding that damages can include intrinsic value and loss of use. While "loss of companionship" may be the subject of testimony and argument, the court stated that it may not be a "line item" measure of damages.

MARILYN DANTON v. ST. FRANCIS 24 HOUR ANIMAL HOSPITAL, P.C. a Washington professional services corporation (UBI 602-029-072); an This Washington case involves plaintiff's suit against defendant animal hospital for the escape of her cat while the cat was being boarded at the hospital. Plaintiff sued for simple negligence with a presumption of res ipsa loquitur and breach of bailment contract. With regard to damages, plaintiff pleads intrinsic value of "Moochie," which includes as component the emotional distress suffered by plaintiff. Following a six-person jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff on her negligence and breach of contract claims in a total amount of $2,500.00

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