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Leith v. Frost |
In this Illinois case, plaintiffs, Mark and Mindy Leith, sued defendant, Andrew E. Frost, for tortious damage to their personal property, a dachshund named Molly. The trial court found in plaintiffs' favor with an award of $200, Molly's fair market value, rather than the $4,784 in veterinary expenses. While the court recognized fair market value is the traditional ceiling for damage to personal property, Illinois courts have held that certain items of personal property (heirlooms, photographs, pets, etc.) have no market value. Thus, the basis for assessing compensatory damages in such a case is to determine the actual value to the plaintiff beyond nominal damages. Adopting the rationale of the Kansas Court of Appeals in
Burgess v. Shampooch Pet Industries, Inc., t
his Court found that Mollly's worth to plaintiffs was established by the $4,784 plaintiffs paid for the dog's veterinary care.
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Lessman v. Rhodes |
Plaintiff, a participant in a horse show, was injured when a stallion bucked and kicked him; he sued the show’s sponsor, and the stallion’s rider and owner alleging negligent and willful and wanton misconduct, by failing to conduct background checks into the horses and by failing to separate the stallions participating in the show,
inter alia
.
The Equine Activity Liability Act, which was established to shield those persons who participate in equine activities from liability, provides an exception to the general rule by permitting liability for equine activity sponsors that commit “an act or omission that constitutes willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the participant, and that act or omission caused the injury.”
In this case, the plaintiff failed to provide evidence that showed that the defendants behaved in a reckless or intentional manner, therefore the summary judgment in favor of the defendant entered by the trial court was founded to be proper.
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Massa v. Department of Registration and Education |
Dr. Massa sought judicial review of the gross malpractice finding and resulting license revocation in the circuit court after the circuit court reversed the Department's finding of gross malpractice as a conclusion against the manifest weight of the evidence. This finding arises from the death of plaintiff’s German Shepard, after Dr. Massa removed the dog’s healthy uterus and ovaries, while failing to treat the dog’s soon-to-be fatal thoracic condition. The Department's findings in this case could only be disturbed only upon Dr. Massa's showing that they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. The Court held that the record in this case was plainly sufficient to support the Department's determination of gross malpractice in that Dr. Massa ignored the serious nature of Charlie's lung condition and proceeded to remove reproductive organs which, at least at the time of surgery, he knew or should have known to have been healthy.
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Mississippi Bluff Motel Inc. v. Rock Island County |
The State of Illinois seeks to intervene as a protector of wildlife in a zoning action where the property at issue was adjacent to a bald eagle refuge. The court denied the state's request, finding that it did not have a stake in the litigation as it held no property interest nor was it representing a special class of people. Instead, the court found the state's interest speculative and the immediacy of harm was nonexistent, as it would create "bad law" to allow the State to intervene whenever there was a potential ecological or environmental consequence in a civil lawsuit. For further discussion on the federal Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, see
Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act
.
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Moore v. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. |
Plaintiffs, Ami Moore and Doggie Do Right-911, Inc., aver that defendants PETA, Diane Opresnik, John Keene, and Mary DePaolo defamed them and placed them in a false light by stating that the plaintiff dog trainer placed a shock device on a dog's genitals and allegedly shocked it. Prior to this action, the claim against PETA was settled and dismissed. The defamation claims against Opresnik, Keene, and DePaolo, persisted. In dismissing the remaining claims, the court found that there was no positive factual statement of criminal animal cruelty to support a defamation
per se
claim. Further, another claim fell outside the statute of limitations period and was also inadequately supported by specific allegations.
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Nelson v. Lewis |
Toddler accidentally stepped on the tail of the owner's dog, and the dog responded by scratching her eye, causing permanent damage to the tear duct. The toddler sought damages under Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 8, para. 366 (1973), arguing that her unintentional act did not constitute provocation. The court held that provocation under the statute referred to both intentional or unintentional acts. Because the dog was provoked by the unintentional act, he did not react viciously.
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Nikolic v. Seidenberg |
When the pet owner adopted a dog, she signed a contract agreeing to have her dog spayed at the vet's facility and to return the dog to the vet if it was sick. For days after the surgery the dog was ill so the other vet performed exploratory surgery and repaired a cut in the dog's intestine. The pet owner filed an action to recover the medical expenses and the lower court granted the vet's motion to dismiss. The reviewing court held that the language in the contract was not sufficiently clear and explicit to exculpate the vet from negligence because the vet was not a party to the contract and thus not a direct beneficiary of the contract.
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Overview of Illinois Great Ape Laws |
This is a short overview of Illinois Great Ape law. |
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Pagel v. Yates |
Horse owner sued breeder for negligence and conversion after breeder returned the wrong mare. On issue of damages, Appellate Court held that evidence was insufficient to support the jury award because 1) evidence of value of mare’s offspring four years after conversion was irrelevant and prejudicial; 2) trial court's instruction to jury allowed recovery for the horse's unborn offspring as well as fair market value of horse in foal, which permitted a double recovery; and 3) owner could not recover his expenses after he learned of switch and made no effort to resolve the problem because he had duty to avoid further loss.
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People v. Collier |
Chicago police officers, while investigating reports of animal abuse, visited Samuel Collier’s place of residence and observed a dog chained up outside in 15-degree weather. On a second visit, the same dog was observed chained up outside in the cold. The dog happened to match the description of a dog that had been reported stolen in the neighborhood. Office Chausse executed a search warrant on Collier’s property and was welcomed by the smell of urine and feces. The house had feces everywhere. The house was also extremely cold with no running water. A total of four dogs were found that were kept in rooms without food or water. One of the dogs found was a bulldog that had been stolen from someone’s backyard. Collier was subsequently arrested. Collier was found guilty of one count of theft and four counts of cruel treatment of animals and was sentenced to two years in prison. Collier subsequently appealed. Collier argued that there was insufficient evidence to prove his guilt at trial because despite the photographs of his house the dogs were found to be in good health. The Court held that the poor conditions in which the dogs were kept along with the condition of the dogs and the premises was sufficient to prove that the dogs were abused or treated cruelly under Illinois law. Collier also attempted to argue that the charging instrument failed to adequately notify him of the offense he was charged with. The Court found no merit in this argument. Lastly, Collier argued that the animal cruelty statute violated due process because it was unconstitutionally vague and potentially criminalized innocent conduct. The Court, however, stated that the statute did not capture innocent conduct, instead, it captured conduct that can be defined as cruel or abusive. Cruel and abusive conduct is clearly not innocent conduct. The statute sufficiently informed reasonable persons of the conduct that was prohibited. The Court ultimately affirmed the judgment of the trial court. |
