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Kush v. Wentworth |
Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant for violation of the Animal Control Act and alleged negligence due to the broken leg that the Plaintiff suffered after she was kicked by Defendant’s horse while trying to pass the horse on a group ride.
At the time of the accident, the defendant was neither an “equine activity sponsor” nor an “equine professional” according to the Act.
The issue was whether the Act applied only to those two groups of people, and the court held that the Act
does not
preclude negligence liability for persons other than equine activity sponsors and equine professionals.
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Leith v. Frost |
In this Illinois case, plaintiffs, Mark and Mindy Leith, sued defendant, Andrew E. Frost, for tortious damage to their personal property, a dachshund named Molly. The trial court found in plaintiffs' favor with an award of $200, Molly's fair market value, rather than the $4,784 in veterinary expenses. While the court recognized fair market value is the traditional ceiling for damage to personal property, Illinois courts have held that certain items of personal property (heirlooms, photographs, pets, etc.) have no market value. Thus, the basis for assessing compensatory damages in such a case is to determine the actual value to the plaintiff beyond nominal damages. Adopting the rationale of the Kansas Court of Appeals in
Burgess v. Shampooch Pet Industries, Inc., t
his Court found that Mollly's worth to plaintiffs was established by the $4,784 plaintiffs paid for the dog's veterinary care.
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Lessman v. Rhodes |
Plaintiff, a participant in a horse show, was injured when a stallion bucked and kicked him; he sued the show’s sponsor, and the stallion’s rider and owner alleging negligent and willful and wanton misconduct, by failing to conduct background checks into the horses and by failing to separate the stallions participating in the show,
inter alia
.
The Equine Activity Liability Act, which was established to shield those persons who participate in equine activities from liability, provides an exception to the general rule by permitting liability for equine activity sponsors that commit “an act or omission that constitutes willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the participant, and that act or omission caused the injury.”
In this case, the plaintiff failed to provide evidence that showed that the defendants behaved in a reckless or intentional manner, therefore the summary judgment in favor of the defendant entered by the trial court was founded to be proper.
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Loman v. Freeman |
This case concerns surgical procedures performed on a racehorse that rendered the horse unfit for future racing. The horse's owners brought this action against the veterinarians who performed the surgical procedure, alleging negligence and conversion. The circuit court dismissed and the court of appeals reversed the decision of the lower court. At the state supreme court, the court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court. The court found that defendant was permanently deprived of the use of the horse due to its lameness from the surgery, which sustained the claim of conversion. |
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Massa v. Department of Registration and Education |
Dr. Massa sought judicial review of the gross malpractice finding and resulting license revocation in the circuit court after the circuit court reversed the Department's finding of gross malpractice as a conclusion against the manifest weight of the evidence. This finding arises from the death of plaintiff’s German Shepard, after Dr. Massa removed the dog’s healthy uterus and ovaries, while failing to treat the dog’s soon-to-be fatal thoracic condition. The Department's findings in this case could only be disturbed only upon Dr. Massa's showing that they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. The Court held that the record in this case was plainly sufficient to support the Department's determination of gross malpractice in that Dr. Massa ignored the serious nature of Charlie's lung condition and proceeded to remove reproductive organs which, at least at the time of surgery, he knew or should have known to have been healthy.
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Mathis v. Crawford |
Plaintiff filed this suit in small claims court seeking damages for the destruction of his three dogs, that were mauled to death by dogs owned by defendant over a period of 15 years. The trial court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff and awarded him $5,000. Defendant appealed to request that the court of appeals amend the trial court's award of damages to a lesser amount of $500. The court found that, although plaintiff was able to show that he suffered damages at the result of defendant's dogs killing his dogs, the value of the dogs was still unclear. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial solely to discern the issue of the value of the dogs. |
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Milke v. Ratcliff Animal Hospital, Inc. |
This is an action for veterinary malpractice brought against a veterinarian and veterinary clinic, as well as an action for improper delay and bad faith dealing against the insurer of the veterinary clinic. Plaintiff brought this case after their 6-month old puppy died in the post-operative period following neutering surgery. Defendant veterinarian and clinic could not provide an exact cause of death, and the malpractice insurer that plaintiff was referred to denied plaintiff's malpractice claim. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, and plaintiff appealed. On appeal, the court found that the veterinarian and clinic did not commit malpractice and the insurer did not act in bad faith, and affirmed the judgment of the lower court. |
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Mississippi Bluff Motel Inc. v. Rock Island County |
The State of Illinois seeks to intervene as a protector of wildlife in a zoning action where the property at issue was adjacent to a bald eagle refuge. The court denied the state's request, finding that it did not have a stake in the litigation as it held no property interest nor was it representing a special class of people. Instead, the court found the state's interest speculative and the immediacy of harm was nonexistent, as it would create "bad law" to allow the State to intervene whenever there was a potential ecological or environmental consequence in a civil lawsuit. For further discussion on the federal Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, see
Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act
.
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Moore v. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. |
Plaintiffs, Ami Moore and Doggie Do Right-911, Inc., aver that defendants PETA, Diane Opresnik, John Keene, and Mary DePaolo defamed them and placed them in a false light by stating that the plaintiff dog trainer placed a shock device on a dog's genitals and allegedly shocked it. Prior to this action, the claim against PETA was settled and dismissed. The defamation claims against Opresnik, Keene, and DePaolo, persisted. In dismissing the remaining claims, the court found that there was no positive factual statement of criminal animal cruelty to support a defamation
per se
claim. Further, another claim fell outside the statute of limitations period and was also inadequately supported by specific allegations.
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Nelson v. Lewis |
Toddler accidentally stepped on the tail of the owner's dog, and the dog responded by scratching her eye, causing permanent damage to the tear duct. The toddler sought damages under Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 8, para. 366 (1973), arguing that her unintentional act did not constitute provocation. The court held that provocation under the statute referred to both intentional or unintentional acts. Because the dog was provoked by the unintentional act, he did not react viciously.
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