|Eriksson v. Nunnink||In this case a deceased horse rider's parents (Erikssons) have brought wrongful death and negligent infliction of emotional distress actions against the rider's coach after she fell from her horse in competition and died. Due to a release form signed by the parents, the coach (Nunnink) could only be held liable if he was found grossly negligent. The parents attempted to show that the coach was grossly negligent in allowing the rider to compete after injuries sustained by the horse. This court concluded that the Erikssons failed to establish that Nunnink was grossly negligent. The court affirmed the judgment.|
|ERIC SANDLE, plaintiff v. JEFRI DAVIS, and DOES 1-20 inclusive, defendant||This complaint arose from the intentional shooting of plaintiff's dog by defendant. Plaintiff was on his property pruning a tree when defendant shot plaintiff's dog, who was in the street at the time approximately three feet away from defendant. As a result of the shooting, plaintiff's dog is paralyzed in the back half of his body and suffers from bladder and bowel difficulties. Three causes of action were raised in the complaint: (1) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (2) conversion; and (3) violation of California Civil Code of Procedure Section 3340 (relating to damage to animals).|
|Drinkhouse v. Van Ness||
|Dreyer v. Cyriacks||
Plaintiffs brought action against Defendant for damages after Defendant shot and killed Plaintiffs’ dog.
The Trial Court set aside a jury verdict granting Plaintiffs $100,000 in actual and $25,000 in punitive damages, on the ground that the verdict was excessive.
On appeal, the District Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California, affirmed the Trial Court decision, finding that the Trial Court was justified in holding that both the actual and punitive damages awards were grossly excessive, given the circumstances under which the incident occurred.
In making its decision, the Court of Appeal pointed out that, although this particular dog had been in the motion picture industry, dogs are nonetheless considered property, and as such, are to be ascertained in the same manner as other property, and not in the same manner as human life.
|Drake v. Dean||
|Dixon v. City of Woodland|
|Detailed Discussion of California Great Ape Laws||In California, all gorillas, chimpanzees, orangutans, bonobos, and gibbons are classified as “wildlife” that must be restricted by the state for their own health and welfare. According to the legislature, it is necessary to regulate the import, possession, use, and treatment of Great Apes because “many animals die in captivity or transit…some keepers of wild animals lack sufficient knowledge or facilities for the proper care of wild animals … [and] some wild animals are a threat to public health and safety.”The following discussion begins with a general overview of the various state statutes and regulations affecting Great Apes. It then analyzes the applicability of those laws to the possession and use of apes for specific purposes, including their possession as pets, for scientific research, for commercial purposes, and in sanctuaries. The discussion concludes with a compilation of local ordinances which govern the possession and use of apes within geographic subdivisions of the state.|
|Deanna Wilson, the guardian of her beloved Avain companions v. PETCO Animal Supplies, INC. and DOES 1-10|
|Davis v. Gaschler||
|Davert v. Larson||