Results
Title |
Author | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WILDEARTH GUARDIANS vs. NATIONAL PARK SERVICE | 703 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. Ct. App.,2013) | 2013 WL 93169 (10th Cir. Ct. App.,2013) |
In this case, the WildEarth Guardians brought a suit against the National Park Service for violating the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Rocky Mountain National Park Enabling Act (RMNP)'s ban on hunting. The district court and the appeals court, however, held that the NPS did not violate NEPA because the agency articulated reasons for excluding the natural wolf alternative from its Environmental Impact Statement. Additionally, since the National Park Service Organic Act (NPSOA)'s detrimental animal exception and the RMNP's dangerous animal exception apply to the prohibition on killing, capturing, or wounding—not the prohibition on hunting, the use of volunteers to cull the park’s elk population did not violate the RMNP or the NPSOA. |
Case | |
| Wilderness Society v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service | 316 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2003) | 3 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 309, 2003 Daily Journal D.A.R. 385 |
Plaintiffs, The Wilderness Society and the Alaska Center for the Environment, challenge a decision by Defendant United States Fish and Wildlife Service (the Service) to permit a sockeye salmon enhancement project (the Project) at Tustumena Lake (within a designated wilderness area in the Kenai National Wildlife Refuge in Alaska). Plaintiffs argue that the Project violates the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131- 1136, because it contravenes that Act's requirement to preserve the "natural condition" and "wilderness character" of the area, and because it constitutes an impermissible "commercial enterprise" within a wilderness area. With regard to the "wilderness character" question, the court held that the Service permissibly interpreted the Act, and that the activities in question did not contravene the wilderness character of the Refuge, as the Service's decision that the Project is "compatible" with the purposes of the Refuge is entitled to deference. With regard to the prohibition against "commercial activities," the Court held that the Service reasonably determined that non-wilderness commercial activities providing funding for a nonprofit organization conducting a project did not render project "commercial enterprise" barred by statute. |
Case | |
| Wildlife Issues | Policy | ||||
| Wildlife Jurisprudence | David Favre | 25 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 459 | This article begins by briefly exploring the extent to which wildlife, historically and presently, have a place within our society, culture and legal system. Then, building upon the reality that wildlife, like humans, have personal interests in living their individual lives, suggests five principles for developing laws and programs to better accommodate wildlife interests in the legal system. Individuals, species and geographic groups are presented as focus points for thinking about wildlife interests. Additionally, the three possibilities of who should be the plaintiff for asserting wildlife rights are described: government, private parties, and the wildlife themselves. Finally, the article proposes new paths forward for our system’s wildlife with the goal that their interests in life and habitat can be more forthrightly balanced against competing human interests. | Article | |
| Wildlife Protection Association of Australia Inc and Minister for Environment and Heritage and Australian Wildlife Protection Council Inc and Animals Australia and Flinders Council | [2006] AATA 953 |
The respondent Minister made declarations under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) that particular plans relating to Bennett's wallabies and Tasmanian pademelons were approved wildlife trade management plans. The applicant questioned whether the plans permitted the inhumane hunting of wallabies and treatment of joeys as well as the basis upon which the quotas were derived. The tribunal found both matters satisfactorily addressed though further monitoring measures were deemed to be prudent. |
Case | ||
| Wildlife Rehabilitation | Angela Nicole Johnson |
Brief Summary of Wildlife Rehabilitation Laws
|
Topical Introduction | ||
| Wildlife Services | Rachel Pemberton |
Brief Summary of Wildlife Services |
Topical Introduction | ||
| Wilhelm v. Flores | 95 S.W.3d 96 (Tex. 2006) | 2006 WL 1566461 (Tex.), 49 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 709 |
In this Texas case, a deceased worker's estate and his four adult children brought a negligence action against the beekeeper and others, after the worker died from anaphylactic shock caused by bee stings. On petition for review, the Supreme Court held that beekeeper did not owe worker, a commercial buyer's employee, any duty to warn him of dangers associated with bee stings or to protect worker from being stung. |
Case | |
| Wilkerson v. State | 401 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 1981) |
Appellant was charged with violating Florida's Cruelty to Animals statute, Fla. Stat. ch. 828.12 (1979). He pleaded nolo contendere, reserving his right to appeal the trial court's order, which denied his motion to dismiss and upheld the constitutionality of the statute. The supreme court affirmed. Appellant argued that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because the statute failed to provide guidance as to what animals were included and what acts were unnecessary. The supreme court concluded that people of common intelligence would have been able to discern what were and were not animals under the statute and that the legislature clearly intended that a raccoon be included. Additionally, just because the statute did not enumerate every instance in which conduct against an animal was unnecessary or excessive did not render the statute void for vagueness. The conduct prohibited was described in general language. Finally, because appellant's conduct was clearly proscribed by the statute, he did not have standing to make an overbreadth attack. |
Case | ||
| Wilkins v. Daniels | Slip Copy, 2012 WL 6644465 (S.D.Ohio, 2012) |
Various owners of exotic and wild animals filed a lawsuit in order to obtain a temporary restraining order and a permanent/preliminary injunction against the Ohio Department of Agriculture and its Director, David Daniels. The owners of the exotic and wild animals argued the Ohio Dangerous Wild Animals and Restricted Snakes Act, which the Ohio Department of Agriculture and its Director were trying to enforce, was unconstitutional. The district court denied the owners’ motion for obtain a temporary restraining order and a permanent/preliminary injunction reasoning that the exceptions to the Act’s ban on owning wild and exotic animals does not violate the owners’ freedom of association rights, that the legislature had a legitimate purpose so as to not violate procedural due process with regards to micro-chipping wild and exotic animals, and that the Act did not constitute an unconstitutional takings. Significantly, the court recognized that owners of wild and exotic animals have a limited or qualified property interest in said animals. |
Case |
